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TO
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Chief,
Professional Development
Training

FROM
DE

Trainer

SECURITY - CLASSIFICATION - DE SÉCURITÉ

CONFIDENTIAL

OUR FILE — N / RÉFÉRENCE

YOUR FILE — V / RÉFÉRENCE

DATE

January 27, 1993

SUBJECT
OBJET

**SECURITY SCREENING INVESTIGATORS COURSE # 1
JANUARY 4 TO JANUARY 15, 1993
CSIS TRAINING CENTRE, OTTAWA**

1. The course met with the objectives and expectations of participants, trainers and Security Screening Branch personnel.

COURSE PARTICIPANTS

2. Thirteen (13) class participants can be classified in the following categories:

REGION eight (8) from Ottawa
 four (4) from Quebec
 one (1) from Toronto

EMPLOYMENT

indeterminate: nine (9)
contract : four (4)

GENDER

men: eight (8)
women: five (5)

3. Illness limited the participation of three employees. [redacted] missed the second week; [redacted] the last two days; [redacted] the last afternoon.

CSIS — SCRS	
RECORDS / DOSSIERS	
1994-07-20	
REVISED	<i>OC 449</i>
REVIEWED	

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TRAINING TEAM

4. The course was prepared and delivered in coordination with [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] of HQ OSS. [REDACTED] volunteered support in advice and planning role play scenarios. [REDACTED] did most of the support work-much of it urgent.

RESISTANCE

5. Quebec Region originally refused to send experienced investigators to the course. They perceived the training as teaching new employees how to conduct a security investigation. Discussions were held with [REDACTED] to the effect that the D.G. of OSS initiated the training as an update of policies and procedures and a sharing of skills and that the course was sponsored by the D.D.O. [REDACTED] obtained a commitment from [REDACTED] to send four employees at the OSS Conference in Cornwall in December, 1992.
6. At the first session employees were reassured that the course was an update and sharing of skills, not to teach them how to do an investigation. The participants responded positively to this reassurance and suggested that the training be called a WORKSHOP, instead of a COURSE in order to avoid embarrassment to employees with as much as thirty years experience as an investigator.

CHANGES IN CONTENT

7. Further^{to} the recommendations of the coordinator of the pilot course the following changes were implemented in SSIC No. 1:
 - R.C.M.P and D.N.D threat assessment and security screening sessions were eliminated.
 - Statement Analysis and impromptu interviews were removed.
 - Immigration Screening sessions totalled five hours. Parts of this presentation were done by investigators of the R.C.M.P. and Immigration, as well as [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]
 - The D.S.O session was expanded from one and a half hours to half a day. Four resources presented different aspects of the D.S.S. security effort protecting material and computer information.

8. A session was scheduled with [REDACTED] to explain aspects of [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
9. [REDACTED] gave a session on the dangers inherent in CSIS applicant investigations by referring to real penetration attempts by hostile intelligence services.
10. The RAP presentation was reduced by one hour and an hour presentation by the [REDACTED] Unit was scheduled.

PROBLEMS

11. Syndicate rooms were not always available when required. It should be noted that since our last course three of the five syndicate rooms have been converted into offices.
12. Participants frequently complained of "stale" air, overheating of the classroom and dust in the air. Three participants missed varying periods of time due to illness.
13. Obtaining the services of [REDACTED] was difficult. In spite of detailed messages, a letter from our D.G. and at least fifteen phone messages to her, [REDACTED] did not return phone calls nor acknowledge the messages. The day before her scheduled presentation (January 4th) I located her in Montreal where she professed to having no knowledge of the course. She informed us that we should request a date from her secretary for the following week.
14. Her secretary fixed a date and time with me. Another letter signed by the D.G. HTD was faxed to her and then hand delivered the next day. All attempts to discuss the session content, delivery and context directly with [REDACTED] at her business telephone, resulted in returned phone calls from her secretary.
15. [REDACTED] did give an excellent session on January 15th. She was advised that there would be another course in April, 1993. She expressed her eagerness to participate in the next workshop and suggested that we meet in person to discuss an expanded version of her presentation.
16. The participation of [REDACTED] resources on the ethnic panel after the Christmas holidays was limited. On January 4th, I reminded [REDACTED] of his commitment to provide three resources from his section for the next morning. The target groups were [REDACTED] [REDACTED] was responsible for coordinating their participation. She could promise us only one resource, [REDACTED] due to a serious backlog of work created by the absences of his employees during the Christmas season.

17. [REDACTED] of Quebec Region [REDACTED] identified a willing, able and competent resource in his section, but could not release her for a day because of a similar backlog problem.
18. Fortunately [REDACTED] of Toronto Region, could free [REDACTED] on very short notice.
19. The final composition of the panel -on Friday, instead of Tuesday -was:
[REDACTED]
20. There was some resistance to participating in the role play exercises. Some participants complained that the exercises lacked realism; with little time to prepare, ^{observers present} ~~people watching~~, sterile environment, etc. They were eventually convinced that there was no viable alternative vehicle to allow participants to integrate the skills and knowledge acquired during the previous week.
21. [REDACTED] was not available to give the "Access to Information and Privacy Act (ATIP)" presentation. [REDACTED] gave it in his place.
22. One HTD coordinator is clearly insufficient to deal simultaneously with all the problem solving, resource coaching, course monitoring, preparing role players and schedules, etc. If [REDACTED] was not available to support the activities at critical moments the quality of the course would have suffered.
23. Furthermore, I am the only PDT Trainer familiar with this course. If I am transferred or leave between courses there will be no continuity in our capability to deliver

COURSE CONTENT

GLOBAL EVALUATION

24. Participants agreed that they had all learned considerably during the course. They commented that the greatest benefit from their perspective was sharing information, approaches and ideas with Security Screening investigators from other regions. This is particularly important because they each work in isolation.
- ✕ The role playing exercises also fulfilled this "networking" need.

WELCOMING ADDRESS

25. [REDACTED] address was well received. The Exchange created a forum to identify operational difficulties and ambiguities.

GOVERNMENT SECURITY POLICY

26. [REDACTED] of Treasury Board security policy group presented the context of our security screening effort well. The policy itself was considered "dry", but participants became more involved in the question and answer segment.

CSIS APPLICANTS

27. The presentations of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were well appreciated; whereas the session on internal security was inadequate for their needs.

[REDACTED] reinforced the bottom line reality of CSIS applicant investigations: cases of attempted penetration of the Service by hostile intelligence services. It was suggested that he be given more time to discuss the substance of the screening aspect of these operations.

Information provided by [REDACTED] was highly valued, but his presentation style could be improved. Suggestions for better overheads, slower delivery, explaining the stages of the hiring process were offered.

[REDACTED] of Internal Security presented information which missed the mark. Participants would have preferred to hear about more pertinent questions, such as relations between OSS and SIS and what decisions and action are taken after reports of investigations indicated serious problems.

MULTICULTURALISM

28. [REDACTED] gave a 20 minute presentation on multiculturalism unfortunately, it was not enough time to give a ~~coherent~~ or satisfying session.

INTERVIEWING TECHNIQUES

29. Two half day sessions in interviewing techniques were given by the writer. The techniques were considered valuable and workable. Participants felt they needed more time to learn and integrate the skills. Suggestions for this presentation include: including interviewing techniques in the evaluation of their role plays and having actors to assist in the role play scenarios. (It would also

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be beneficial to have a model or a film of a difficult interview to demonstrate techniques.) The training was considered practical and relevant. Participants appreciated the flexible approach which constantly adjusted to their needs. Additional time could be spent on topics such as [REDACTED]

30. Participants appreciated [REDACTED] presentation. His case studies were particularly effective. The next day he sent additional information on Legal Service's recommendations [REDACTED]

Some participants suggested that he have more time. We spent 2 hours with him in spite of the 1½ hours allotted. Ten to fifteen minutes for questions, more time on the concept of "reasonable doubt", discussion of an immigration case, were suggested formats for expanding his presentation.

31. [REDACTED] explained the challenging idiosyncrosies of the system. This session was not originally scheduled on the course. It was added when we realized from the session with the D.G. OSS that it was one of the major concerns of the participants. It was deemed very useful to explain problems and solutions, and to diminish frustration.

IMMIGRATION SCREENING

32. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] took a different approach to their session for this course. Two R.C.M.P. immigration enforcement officers and three C.E.I.C. representatives co-presented with them. This format was very well received.

Our investigators often conduct immigration screening interviews in which the subject lies. The investigator naturally concludes that the lack of honesty derives from security concerns. In many cases, however, the subject displays deceptive behaviour because of involvement in smuggling, illegal immigration, drug importing or other criminal activity. When properly sensitized to the clues of other activities it is easier to stay on track and correctly "read" the subject.

R.C.M.P. officers showed the class several styles of false passports. Immigration officials described the thrust of their investigations and where our investigators can assist each other.

Participants appreciated the message of HQ Unit Heads. Several suggestions for the next course include:

fewer overhead projectuals, eliminate the organizational chart and statistics in order to focus more on the nature of the problems perceived by HQ. Some felt a half day would be sufficient for their presentation.

Immigration officer Ab Lelievre [REDACTED] Even though his content was considered very interesting his style [REDACTED]

SUBSTANCE ABUSE/STRESS

33. Participants enjoyed [REDACTED] presentation, but questioned its relevance. They had hoped to gain a better understanding of substance abuse, how to recognize and deal with abusers. They were also expecting some information about stress.

The positive message they did receive was that management should "talk to them as people". Unfortunately, they were no better informed about substance abuse or stress. [REDACTED] was variously described as "a good entertainer... too opinionated ... negative person."

Comment: Because I was solving logistical problems created by resources' last minute unavailability, I could not attend this presentation.

ATIP

34. The session on the Access to Information and Privacy Act was given by [REDACTED] The information was considered important, but [REDACTED] lacked structure and sometimes, relevance. [REDACTED] who monitored the class from the back of the room, impressed the participants more when she helped [REDACTED] with some answers.

In this session a controversy arose over how personal notes were to be stored and for how long they should be kept. There was a considerable discrepancy on the understanding and application of this policy between regions. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] agreed that HQ OSS would resolve the problem.

ETHNIC PANEL

35. Participants unanimously praised the high quality of this session and the presenters. [REDACTED] of Toronto Region [REDACTED] was once again singled out as an excellent speaker.

SEXUAL ORIENTATION

36. **Pink Triangle Services of Ottawa designated four representatives to give the investigators a session on the context of the security concerns of sexual orientation. Three of the four panellists were federal government employees with security clearances.**

Participants agreed that the presentation made a positive impact in dealing with prejudice and helped change some points of view. Comments by participants include:

- **as representatives of a lobby group, their neutrality is questionable.**
- **there was attempt to convince us that if they admit their homosexuality to the Service, then the problem is solved; however, there is still a problem if they remain in the closet for everyone else.**
- **they tried to reverse the problem to the investigators; that is, that the investigators have a problem dealing with gays; whereas it is the gays that have a problem "coming out".**
- **the historical background was not necessary.**
- **observers at the back of the class made comments informed the presenters about CSIS screening policy concerning gays. (The Pink Triangle is already well aware of our policy.) Some participants felt that observers should not have the right to participate in the discussions.**
- **there were too many people in the room. (Several analysts from HQ OSS attended the session).**
- **they manipulated statistics, ie. 10% of the population is gay, when even their own information indicates 1%.**
- **they were quite open.**
- **it was beneficial to learn the words which make them comfortable and how to approach them.**
- **they had their own evaluation forms and appeared to evangelize.**

IMMIGRATION ACT

37. Changes in the Immigration Act and their impact on screening investigations were discussed by [REDACTED]. The session was well received and timely.

HQ GUIDELINES

38. [REDACTED] delivered a session on Policies, Procedures and Guidelines from the HQ OSS perspective. The presentation was appreciated. Some participants comments were:

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- that it is very relevant information which Unit Heads should all have ^{from} Day One.
 - that he could use more time for his content, by should break up the presentation with exercises.
 - that using shared experiences as references points for communicating his information would be more effective.
 - that the nature of the session is more valuable to new security screening investigators than the more experienced ones.

DEPARTMENTAL SECURITY OFFICER (D.S.O.)

39. [REDACTED] the Director of security at D.S.S., gave a presentation from the perspective of our biggest screening client. Three of his Unit Heads lectured on their respective responsibilities. Participants rated the speakers as excellent and the material very interesting; but lacking in relevance after the first hour with [REDACTED]. This presentation was considered more appropriate at the D.G. level.

They would like to see questions addressed such as: what does D.S.S. expect from us in a adverse brief? What do they do with it when they receive it? If they don't follow up, why not? The personnel security manager might be more effective.

One participant suggested that the D.S.O. of External Affairs give a presentation, since that ministry is also a major client.

BANKRUPTCY AND CREDIT PROBLEMS

40. [REDACTED] integrated a case study into his presentation as we suggested in the letter. Participants were very interested in his information both from a professional and personal perspective. They would have appreciated more explanation of the credit bureau printout.

ROLE PLAYS

41. The role playing scenarios were rated as very beneficial. The following comments were offered:

- The role players' scripts and the information received by the investigators were not always identical.
- In one case the French and English texts were not the same.
- Since the immigration screening cases are more difficult it was suggested that the source and subject interviews precede them in the syllabus in order to familiarize the participants with the role playing process.
- Some participants felt that they should be warned of the traps inherent in the immigration screening scenarios. This viewpoint was not unanimous. Others commented that the realism of the interview would be lost since we are not forewarned in real life.
- It was sometimes difficult to concentrate since the seminar rooms are not well insulated.
- Some mention could be made of what is missing in reports and our expectations of the report writing.
- The principles of non-verbal rapport, active listening, assertiveness and questioning techniques should be integrated into the evaluation format.

WORLD GEOPOLITICS

42. [REDACTED] of RAP gave a very pertinent session aligned to the needs of the group. Participants found him very interesting and requested that we increase his allotted time.

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER

43. [REDACTED] presentation was well received. The context of his material was well prepared by representatives of Treasury Board and D.S.S. Participants encouraged us to maintain the session.

CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS

44. [REDACTED] session was considered very valuable. Her knowledge of the material was clear and deep. Her delivery style was very enjoyable. Class members suggested that more time be given to this session.

COMMENTS OF CHIEF PDT

45. The chief of PDT supported the viewpoint of participants to the effect that the ⁹ greatest benefit of the course was the cross-pollination of ideas, approaches and styles between regions and individuals—where they always work in isolation.
46. My comments and recommendations will follow when the assessments of the participants' performance are completed.

[REDACTED]
Training Coordinator

Attachments: Course Syllabus
 Lists of participants
 Role Playing Schedule