External Affairs Canada / Affaires extérieures Canada

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ZSS/R.W.Clark/2-5124/ern

TO/À [redacted] RBR/Fraser

FROM/DE • ZSS/R. W. Clark (through ZSP)

REFERENCE • RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • SUJET Proposed Chapter 12 of Robert Ford's book

Security/Sécurité: CONFIDENTIAL

Accession/Référence:

File/Dossier: 29-7-2-CDA

Date: 13 June, 1985.

Number/Numéro: ZSS-1721

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

DISTRIBUTION

As you requested, I have reviewed the draft -- Chapter 12 (attached), for a forthcoming book which Robert Ford proposes to publish, from the point of view of security concerns regarding its content.

2. On the whole, the proposed Chapter seems unexceptionable but I have some reservations about five items included in the first 23 pages:

A) Page 2 - The reference in the penultimate paragraph on this page to the Safe Speech Room I believe goes beyond the information normally made public. Elsewhere in the Chapter (Page 5) Mr. Ford comments on the size of the room, its location [redacted] I would suggest you might consult MGT and if they agree, provide Mr. Ford with guidance on what would need to be omitted.

B) In the first paragraph on Page 6, Mr. Ford provides details on how a listening device was located. Again, MGT should be consulted about "sanitization" of this reference.

C) The reference to the Colonel Gold story in the middle of Page 10 may not have been made public before. Your files for 1980 would probably indicate whether Ford is providing information not previously made public. If so, the DND ought to be asked to approve this section.

D) The specific reference to the Watkins case might raise some legal problems. Although the Press has intimated several times that Watkins was a homosexual, I am not sure that the fact that he died during, or after, questioning is public knowledge. Legal Division might wish to comment on this reference and if Mr. Ford wishes to retain the part about Watkins' death, we would approach CSIS for their agreement that this could be made public.

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E) I believe that CSIS would object to the spelling out on Pages 23 and 23a of some of the procedures for identifying KGB agents and our policy of refusing entry to many of them. Again, if Mr. Ford is unwilling to "sanitize" these papers, we should ask for CSIS approval for their publication.

R. W. Clark
Director
Security Division

Chapter 12

ZSIR

29-7-2-:CDA

Living with the KGB and the Struggle for Human Rights

No matter how good Western intentions, there were at least two sets of problems which constantly created obstacles to good relations with the Soviet Union -- the activities of the KGB and the Soviet treatment of their dissidents. The first constituted a continuous and at times intolerable interference in the affairs of other countries. The second was such a flagrant violation of the political and religious rights of groups and individuals that it constantly evoked a response in the West either by people who had special ties to those persecuted, such as Jews, Ukrainians and Lithuanian Catholics, or by the public in general, revolted by the treatment of individual protesters. Canada was no exception and our relations with the USSR in the decade of the seventies were often set back by revelations of KGB machinations or by some particularly unpalatable attack on human rights which the Soviet acceptance of the Helsinki Act in 1975 only served to accentuate because of the glaring contrast between the solemn engagements they had undertaken and their actual performance.

The contest between the Embassy and the Soviet police organizations, the uniformed militia and the KGB, or Committee for State Security, which encompassed intelligence and counter-intelligence activities in Russia and abroad, never ceased during all the years I was in Moscow. The state of Canadian-Soviet

relations seldom altered the situation. The police were just as aggressively active when euphoria reigned as when relations were strained. Seldom a month passed without some evidence of their unceasing efforts to penetrate the Embassy's defence or to suborn our Canadian-based staff. These efforts also frequently extended to Canadian tourists. And, of course, the activities of the KGB and the GRU, the military intelligence agency, in Canada continued unabated.

The Canadian Embassy was not the only mission targeted. All the missions, NATO and non-aligned, merited the attention of the police in some form or other. Nor were the communist Embassies exempt, although the KGB task was obviously easier because of the existence of Soviet agents practically built into their missions.

The protection of our Embassy was a first priority. Five Canadian guards were the contingent assigned to the Embassy. Two were constantly on duty during the day and one at night. To prevent the electronic eavesdropping that every Embassy was subjected to, we had a "safe room" built to ensure free exchange of views without any chance of being overheard by the Soviets. Since perforce we were obliged to spend a fair amount of our working time there, I persuaded the government to send a photo-mural of the Canadian woods in autumn which helped prevent claustrophobia and was the envy of some of our less imaginative NATO partners.

Outside the Embassy, the Russian militia patrolled constantly. There were never less than two policemen on duty, ostensibly to

protect the Embassy against enraged Soviet citizens, but in fact primarily to survey our activities and to prevent ordinary Soviet citizens from entering. The zeal of the policemen was at times exasperating, and many Canadian tourists complained bitterly about being prevented from entering their own Embassy. Whenever possible, the guards attempted to make sure that legitimate visitors were permitted in. On one occasion, a diplomatic incident occurred when the Italian Ambassador, a mild-mannered man who spoke some Russian, decided to walk over from his Embassy, which was not far away, to call on me. When the policemen stopped him, he spoke to them in Russian, at which point he was abruptly and forcibly turned away. I had great pleasure in using this incident to make a formal protest against the excesses of the police in providing "protection".

Nevertheless, on a number of occasions, unauthorized Soviet civilians managed to slip by the guards. The most dramatic incident involved a private in uniform. I was alerted immediately to the fact that he was inside the Embassy and we attempted to find out what he wanted. He was from an infantry regiment stationed in Soviet Central Asia and was in Moscow on leave. He claimed to have read about Canada and it sounded like a country he would like to live in. He had used a week of his leave in studying access to the Embassy and he waited until the guard at the chancery entrance had strolled down the street for a cigarette with his comrade to dash across the street and into the Embassy. Within twenty minutes of his arrival, I had a call from the Soviet chief of protocol asking me to return the man and informing

me that they had information he was a fanatic who was trying to assassinate me. In the meantime, both ends of the street were blocked off by military vehicles and a dozen or so militia stood guard outside the Embassy. We had long discussions by telephone with the Soviet authorities and tried to convince them that the man seemed to be genuinely innocent and perhaps slightly unbalanced. When after 24 hours, the guard had not been lifted and the case seemed absolutely hopeless since there was no possible way that the Russians would permit a soldier in uniform who had taken refuge in an "imperialist" Embassy to leave the country, we had no alternative but to persuade him to give himself up.

On another occasion, a Soviet citizen half-entered the Embassy before the militia realized what was happening and tackled him at the door. A scuffle ensued with one of our guards, but the man was dragged off to the militia box on the corner. This time we protested again about the prevention of free entry to the premises and again were informed the police were acting on our behalf because the man was seriously ill and needed hospitalization. Mark Gayn, the highly-respected Toronto Star correspondent, who spoke Russian, was also the victim several times of the militia blockade. We frequently raised this question after the signing of the Helsinki Agreement in the context of the free movement of persons, but needless to say got nowhere.

The Russians made a special effort to "bug" every important Embassy in Moscow, even the communist Embassies. In 1964, the Romanian Embassy moved out of an old palace which they had occupied into a building they put up themselves. The old palace

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was then transferred to the new Nigerian mission. The Nigerians had the foresight to request British help in examining the premises and to their astonishment found it completely covered by eavesdropping devices which had obviously been there for some time and clearly were directed against those slightly recalcitrant communist allies, the Romanians. In the case of the Canadian Embassy, we took two measures to counteract Soviet activities. The first was the safe speech room, which was installed in the basement and had room enough for 16 people squeezed in around a table. [redacted] It was completely soundproofed and protected from even the most sophisticated listening device. We also "swept" the offices at regular intervals to make sure that they were "clean". Nevertheless, any particularly sensitive subject was only discussed in the safe speech room.

However, in January, 1976, the Soviets almost succeeded in placing an "ear" in the Embassy. For nearly a year and a half, we had been requesting the Russians to repaint the outside of the Embassy, to no avail. Suddenly, I was recalled to Ottawa for consultations. The day after my departure, the Soviets announced they were ready to paint although the temperature was 20 below. And indeed they turned up the following day with scaffolding and set to work with a will. Fortunately, a member of the staff well acquainted with listening devices was suspicious of the length of time it took them to paint outside my office, a corner room

with windows on two sides. The moment the scaffolding was removed, he proceeded to tear out the walls around the windows and discovered a listening device of extraordinary sophistication which would never have been detected under ordinary circumstances since there was nothing on the wall to hint at its existence. The one hole was about the size of a pin. Natur ally, it was removed and examined.

Some months later, I suggested that we should not let the Russians get away with an action of this sort in a period in which our relations were supposed to be good. I therefore called on the head of the Canadian department in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs and produced photographs of the device and said that we found it difficult to explain how the Soviets could indulge in this anti-Canadian activity at a time when they wanted better relations. My interlocutor, totally impassive, examined the photographs, said he knew nothing about it, and if any such things had been implanted in my office, it must have been done by another power unfriendly both to Canada and to the Soviet Union. Some time later, my minister-counsellor was called in to the Soviet official's office and told they had made exhaustive inquiries concerning the matter and could give categorical assurance that no Soviet organization or agency whatsoever had any part in that action. When the official was asked how, in that case, the "action" could have been carried out, the answer was simply that it was a matter for the Canadians themselves to sort out.

This exchange illustrated the old Russian system known as vranye. Vranye is a form of lying, quite distinct from the normal

lie (lyozh). When an individual is placed in an embarrassing position, instead of admitting the truth, he responds by an elaborate and usually obvious mistruth. Russian protocol requires that the other person, instead of denouncing him as a shamefaced liar, reply by another half-truth. In this way, both sides know what the facts are, but face is saved. This tradition cropped up frequently in life in Russia, not only on official occasions, but also in ordinary life. It was sometimes amusing, more often exasperating, occasionally so imaginative as to fit Leonid Andreyev's description of it as an art form. The best example was a lyrical description in 1945 by a Soviet diplomat in Rio of the Palace of Congress in Moscow. I knew the Palace existed only in architectural drawings, and in fact has never been built because the site chosen for it beside the Moskva River was too sandy, but it would have spoiled the fun to puncture his fantasy.

Some of the harassment of other Embassies was highly dangerous, such as the "bombardment" of the American Embassy by some kind of radar which apparently had a bad effect on the health of many of the personnel. Efforts to seek asylum in Embassies also occurred regularly, the most spectacular being the group of Russian Pentecostalists who by some fluke managed to get inside the American Embassy where they had to stay for several years before the case was finally sorted out.

Other forms of harassment took a slightly more amusing turn. The Embassy of Zaire was headed by a gentleman called Futu who,

the chief of an important tribe in his country, was not inclined to be pushed around by the Russians. On one occasion the latter asked him to send his car for a week to a Soviet garage in accordance with Soviet regulations "for a check-up". When it came back, Futu's staff examined it very carefully and found a listening device in the back seat. Instead of protesting, Futu persuaded his government to invite the Soviet Ambassador in Kinshasa "in accordance with government regulations" to submit his car for a week's check-up. The Zairians, of course, did nothing to the car and then returned it to the Embassy. Then they watched with great amusement as the Russians went mad taking the car apart in an effort to find the bug. On another occasion, the winter came early in Moscow, but the city council only turned on the central heating on October 15 when winter was supposed officially to start. Zairian protests got nowhere, so they simply turned off the electricity and the water in the Soviet Embassy in Kinshasa. This became known as le système Futu and was the great envy of other Embassies in Moscow, whose governments, like Canada's, were not so quick to play diplomatic tit for tat.

The most dangerous aspect of KGB activities was the attempt to entrap or suborn Canadian members of the staff. The military attachés were the most exposed and not a single year went by without an incident involving one or other of the three forces represented in Moscow. Sometimes it was a pure case of entrapment and the invention of accusations. On other occasions, the KGB utilized the most flimsy of evidence to accuse our attachés

of espionage. Naturally, the tough action the Canadian government took against spies operating out of the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa evoked a response in Moscow in the form of retaliation. The state of relations never seemed to act as a form of restraint on the continuing espionage efforts in Canada. When these activities were exposed, however, the Soviet reaction and retaliation were more restrained if Canadian-Soviet relations were good or if there was something they wanted from us, either in the form of trade or politics. Thus when the Canadian government expelled 13 members of the Soviet Embassy for espionage in February, 1978, almost decimating the Embassy at the time, we expected a very strong reaction on the part of the Soviets. The Russians, almost uniquely, did not respond by expelling a member of the Canadian Embassy, but they did cancel a number of high-level meetings and visits. I think the evidence in the 1978 affair against the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa was so clear and the outcry in Parliament and among the public so damaging to Soviet interests, that for once they simply swallowed their pride and decided to ride out the storm.

What they had not anticipated was that two years later evidence of the continuing activities of agents working out of the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa was so convincing and ~~in particular~~ that the Soviets were utilizing Canada to spy on third countries ~~that~~ it was necessary to expel three more members of the Embassy. January 1980 was not a propitious moment in our relations, coming immediately after the Soviet invasion of Afhganistan and the strong

Canadian reaction to it. This time the Russians reacted violently. Within a week, I was called to the Soviet foreign office and told that as a result of "campaigns in Canada to discredit officials of the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa and because for many years the Canadian Embassy in Moscow had been utilized as a base for intelligence activities in favour of a third power", the Soviet government declared it could no longer tolerate the presence in the USSR of Colonel Gold, the army attaché, and demanded his departure.

When the three Soviet officials were expelled, the Canadian government had advised the Soviet authorities that any unjustified retaliation against the Canadian Embassy would result in retaliation in turn by the Canadian government. The Soviet Foreign Ministry gave me to understand that it would not tolerate "such blackmail" and hinted darkly about information they had concerning the espionage activities of Colonel Gold and other members of the Embassy staff. Flora Macdonald, who was then Secretary of State for External Affairs, had her Scottish blood boiling at that point, refused to back down and expelled another member of the Soviet staff in retaliation for the Soviet retaliation. At this point, I was beginning to calculate how many members of the Embassy were going to be withdrawn and how to reorganize the work with a reduced staff. The reaction came in a totally unexpected way and startled the diplomatic community as well as our own Embassy. Instead of demanding the withdrawal of further Canadian personnel, the Soviets withdrew 20 members of the locally-engaged staff. Because of the expense of living in Moscow and the extreme shortage of housing and office space, all the

Western Embassies in Moscow employed large numbers of Soviet personnel in such jobs as telephone operators, translators, commercial assistants, drivers, maids and so on. All of these Russians were supplied by the ubiquitous U.P.D.K., the organization for the service of foreigners. This organization, which depended on the Foreign Ministry and was guided by the KGB, was the only organization through which Embassies in Moscow could find Russian staff. Naturally, the workers were all obliged to report on our activities; we treated them courteously and kindly, but guardedly, always keeping in mind their obligations to the secret police.

Nevertheless, they played an essential role in the Embassy and the withdrawal of even 20 of them, out of about 35, caused us enormous troubles. If it had not been so exasperating, it would have been amusing to see the ingenious way in which the operation was carried out. One worker would come and say his mother was dying in Stavropol and he had to leave to be with her. Another would say that her little sister needed her help in Leningrad, and another that he'd been offered a better job at twice the pay. The unkindest cut of all was when the Soviet help in the Ambassador's residence were withdrawn -- in tears, it should be added. While we didn't starve without the cook, it became almost impossible to carry on our normal, social-political functions without staff. Hosting numerous such functions was obligatory for the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps in Moscow, which I had become in 1971.

When we protested to the U.P.D.K. and asked them to provide

replacements for those who had been removed, the Soviets quoted the new constitution which said it was the employee's right to leave his or her employment at any time for any reason -- a marvellous piece of gobbledegook since not only was it a fact that no Soviet employee in any branch of Soviet activity could change his job, but it was well known that it was simply impossible for foreign Embassies to go into the labor market. U.P.D.K. replied that as there was no unemployment in the USSR, it would be very difficult to find appropriate candidates who might not in any case want to work at the Canadian Embassy in view of the hostile anti-Soviet campaign in Canada. I took the matter up with the Foreign Ministry and added that as Dean of the dipomatic corps, I had to report that the Soviet action had been very badly received by all missions. The Foreign Ministry official then looked quite happy and said "Good. I am glad they have got the point". He then asked me if I knew how many Russian employees there were in the American Embassy -- over 100. He suggested all the Embassies should think about it, or else we could all employ our own people. When I replied there was obviously no accommodation in Moscow for 35 Canadians, he replied with another of the mendacities which contributed to the irritation of dealing with the Russians, that accommodation would be no problem. In fact, it would have been a very serious problem for our Embassy and for most others if we had to fill all those jobs with Canadian staff. The expenses would have been prohibitive and the morale problems of so many Canadians, unaccustomed to living abroad and certainly to the unfamiliar and hostile atmosphere

of Moscow, would have been enormous.

However, after the Liberal victory in the elections of February, 1980, the atmosphere changed again and one by one, new employees suddenly appeared, provided by the U.P.D.K., and that particular incident was over.

During my entire stay in Moscow, the Soviets kept up constant pressure on the Canadian staff in an effort to find out some weak spot. Most of them stood firm, but inevitably there were a few who permitted themselves to be ensared. The bait was either sex or greed. Since Soviet women were on the whole not a particularly attractive lot, it always amazed me that they could be used as a lure. And some fell in the trap, fortunately without any dire consequences, although even my British colleague admitted years after his retirement that he had had an affair with a Russian maid.

The KGB did not confine its use of women agents to members of the Embassy. One of their most successful operations was against a senior official of one of the Protestant churches on a naive trip to Russia to preach religious fraternity and peace. Already in Moscow he had come under the charms of his interpreter. When he went to Central Asia, a local official of the Orthodox church invited him to a picnic in the countryside and asked if he could bring his sister along. The sister turned out to be the interpreter from Moscow. At the appropriate moment, the official disappeared, the interpreter took off her clothes and two militiamen jumped out of nearby bushes and arrested him for attempted rape, complete with photographs. He was released after

a few days and returned to Moscow with a threat of dire consequences to his career if he did not cooperate. Fortunately, he had the good sense when he got back to Canada to tell his superiors what had happened, thus destroying the possibility of blackmail.

On another occasion a Latin American Ambassador was confronted by the KGB with photographs of himself in bed with a Russian woman. They threatened to show them to his wife if he refused to cooperate. He simply laughed and said: You would do me a favour if you did. My wife thinks I am impotent.

Attempts were also made as the occasions presented themselves to suborn Canadian students in the USSR, businessmen or journalists, with remarkably little success. But the major effort of the KGB was against the support staff of the Embassy, the loyal, indispensable and on the whole competent staff who provided the administrative infrastructure -- guards, secretaries, communicators, clerks, non-commissioned officers etc. They were particularly vulnerable because they were less likely than career officers to have experience in living abroad under strange and difficult circumstances, because they were less likely to be able to profit from the rich cultural fare that Moscow provided, and they were not protected by the cover, flimsy though it might be, of diplomatic passports.

The Ambassador's residence occupied the second floor of one part of the chancery. All of the staff, with the exception of the minister-counsellor who occupied a small and ancient house in the compound, lived in several apartment blocks provided by the

Soviet authorities for housing foreigners. We had succeeded in putting at least three or four Canadian families in the same block to give them a sense of community and to facilitate transportation to and from the Embassy. And a considerable effort was made to provide each apartment with modern household appliances and Canadian furniture. But once outside the apartment they entered the shoddy world of Soviet construction with elevators that often stalled, peeling plaster and decrepit entrances. Beyond, at every possible entrance to the apartment blocks, were the unbiquitous police, recording every move and preventing unauthorized persons from entering.

Many of the staff, and some officers as well, found the isolation, the difficulty of communicating in a language they were never able to master, and the atmosphere of constant constraint and surveillance too hard and there were cases of nervous breakdowns. On the whole, however, the Canadian staff adjusted more easily to conditions in Moscow than most other foreigners, partly because of their ability to enjoy the winter, not just suffer from it as the Asians, Africans and Latin Americans did.

Nevertheless, there were always some who either thought they could beat the police system, or who ignored the consequences. There was the temptation to make money in the black market where roubles could be acquired at a more favourable rate than in the bank. One or two were trapped but not activated by the KGB until they were sent back to Canada or to other posts. Usually this came to light through Soviet defectors. However, others who felt the trap closing on them were sufficiently aware of the dangers to

come to me, admit their mistake and leave before it was too late. Getting them out of Moscow before the Soviet bureaucracy realized what we were doing was often an agonising operation.

For those who did not have the courage to do so, the results were sad. The best known case was that of John Watkins who was chargé d'affaires from 1949 to 1951 and who returned as Ambassador in 1954. Watkins was an admirable scholar, author of the best English translation of Madame Bovary, translator of the Icelandic sagas and an acknowledged expert on old Norse literature. Unfortunately, he was a homosexual in the days when this was considered reprehensible. The KGB found it easy to entrap him and, again according to Soviet defectors, enrolled him as an active collaborator.

The case was given considerable publicity in later years when he was retired from public service. Some papers accused the RCMP of police brutality because Watkins died of a heart attack after questioning, although he had had a heart condition for some time. Watkins was a sad case, but I do not think he was a spy for the KGB in the sense of transmitting documents or information. He was probably used rather as an agent of influence, which he was in a position to be when he became an Assistant Under-Secretary of State. But full knowledge of his secret died with him.

I was never subjected to any direct attack by the KGB, but as with several other Western Ambassadors, I was the object of not very subtle efforts at disinformation, usually by members of the Soviet Academy of Sciences who had no formal excuse for easy

association with foreign diplomats. "Disinformation" basically took the form of messages which seemed plausible, but whose purpose was to sow confusion. If we knew what was really going on, it was often useful to have this disinformation because it could be reconstructed to add to our over-all picture of a Soviet effort in some particular field.

My KGB "contact" was Anatoli Gorsky, alias Gromov, who in the sixties went under the name of Professor Nikitin. He had been the Soviet case officer of the British spies Philby, Burgess and Maclean, and was also the agent who attempted before my arrival in Moscow to suborn an officer of the Canadian Embassy. The way in which I met Nikitin was typical of the KGB. The Brazilian Ambassador, who had strong leftist leanings, was asked by Nikitin, who posed as a professor of history, to invite me to dinner with him. After dinner, the Ambassador discreetly withdrew and the point of the contact became clear. It was shortly after Pierre Trudeau became Prime Minister and Nikitin's task was to find out obliquely if Trudeau would accept an invitation to visit the USSR. This could have been done just as easily through a member of the Foreign Ministry, but the Russians obviously did not want a rebuff, and in their typical byzantine fashion, preferred the less direct approach.

I was instructed to keep up the contact and met Nikitin on regular occasions after that. Most of the time it seemed to be a straight case of disinformation, but there were a few other times in which genuine messages, concerning possible Soviet reactions if the Canadian government took certain steps, were passed along.

And on one occasion, there was an even stranger operation. The Soviets somehow discovered that I was a close personal friend of the detective-story writer Ross Macdonald, whose real name was Kenneth Millar and with whom I went to university. They had decided to launch the "socially conscious" detective story on the Soviet market and wished to start with Dashiell Hammett and Ross Macdonald. Although they had not signed the international copyright convention, they wished to have a tacit agreement from Macdonald. Instead of approaching the Embassy through the Ministry of Culture or the Federation of Writers, whose officials I knew well, they decided to do it through the KGB. I passed the messages on to Macdonald, who gave his permission and received in return a token number of roubles. Shortly thereafter, Blue City, one of the early novels [set in an unidentified city which in fact is London, Ontario], and The Moving Target were published in Russian.

I used the Nikitin channel and some others, in turn, to pass one some disinformation of our own. One such operation was carried out by my wife. We gave a dinner in honour of the Deputy Foreign Minister Valery Kuznetsov, who later became First Vice-President of the Supreme Soviet. My wife, in the course of the conversation, told him that she had heard ~~the~~ a story that Lin Piao, the Vice-President of China, who had just been killed in an airplane accident, had in fact been assassinated by Mao because he had been sleeping with Mao's wife. Kuznetsov looked at her steadily for a full minute and then said: "We have no such information". About a month later, Moscow radio was broadcasting

in its foreign language services (we first heard it, curiously enough, in Portuguese) that Lin Piao had been assassinated by Mao because he was having an affair with Mao's wife. The story was a total invention on the part of my wife who simply wanted to startle Kuznetsov.

On several occasions in a more practical way, my wife and I would discuss some problem, usually in the official car which was certainly bugged, so that the information would get back to the Soviets, in the hope that the problem would be resolved. Occasionally, when we had failed to get the Soviet authorities to act on certain matters, we would discuss counter-measures that I could recommend to Ottawa. This method often produced the right results.

One ~~Another~~ form of police harassment which was particularly irritating was the interpretation and arbitrary manipulation of the regulations concerning travel outside Moscow. In 1966, they had been modified marginally to permit foreigners to travel by car to some of the "villes d'art" in the Moscow region, ~~but~~ outside the 25-mile zone. It had been particularly exasperating to have to travel to the beautiful town of Suz~~dal~~dal, which was in an open area, by train and at night, because it passed through a forbidden zone on the outskirts of Moscow. In addition, we were permitted to advise the Soviet authorities of our travel intentions 24 hours in advance, rather than 48. It was all rather pointless since if we travelled by plane or train, we had to buy our tickets through a state organization, and if by car, our

Russian drivers knew what we were doing.

I had a constant struggle with the Soviet authorities in my efforts to push back and civilize a little bit these barbarous regulations. But the results were not always very satisfactory. At one point, in the course of an official visit to Leningrad, I requested permission to travel some 20 kilometres outside the free area, along the Gulf of Finland, to the town of Lomonosov where I wished to visit the Menshikov palace and other monuments of classical Russsian architecture. Lomonosov, unfortunately, is located almost directly opposite the island fortress of Kronshtadt, an important naval base in the Gulf of Finland and in a forbidden zone. But the Foreign Ministry made an exception and when I arrived in Leningrad, a member of the Leningrad Soviet presented me with a printed program which included a visit to Lomonosov. At the appointed time, a protocol officer met me and, in the official car with a Russian driver, we set out on our journey. We had scarcely arrived in Lomonosov when the car was surrounded by police, and my wife and I were ordered to go to the police station for having broken the regulations concerning entry to a military zone. The protocol officer was speechless with fright and indignation. I naturally refused to budge and for the next two hours the confrontation continued. We sat glaring at each other. Finally with great embarrassment, authorization arrived to permit us a quick look at the palace and an escort back to Leningrad. Incidents of this sort took place frequently with almost all members of the staff, above all the military attachés.

Some members of the staff found it quite impossible to live

in an atmosphere compounded of physical discomfort, shortages of almost everything, a language with which they could not cope, a totally alien culture and above all the constant and unavoidable presence of police surveillance. We found it possible to adjust to all this by an awareness of what the surveillance was and how to circumvent it, but it did require a long experience of the country to adjust to it and I felt a good deal of sympathy for many of the staff who came unprepared for a fairly brief tour of duty and who could hardly wait to leave. Fortunately, the case was not often repeated of one officer whose wife did not even unpack her suitcases for the first six months of their stay in the desperate hope that something would happen to have her husband transferred to another post.

Communications with the outside world even in the sixties and seventies were not easy. To telephone abroad, one had to go to the central telephone station and place a call from there, although by the middle sixties the situation improved and it was possible to do this from the Embassy. Conversations were often difficult because of the strain put on the line by the censors who were listening in. In the mid-70s direct dialing was introduced but was abandoned AFTER A awhile because of the possibilities this gave for private citizens to telephone directly abroad.

For confidential communications, we relied on secret cypher messages sent very rapidly by leased line. In the early sixties our cyphers had been acquired by the KGB through a Canadian code clerk who had been recruited by a Soviet girl friend. We were not alone as they also succeeded in obtaining the Japanese and

Swedish cyphers at the same time. By the mid-60s, however, we had an unbreakable cypher system and messages were coded and decoded in a totally soundproofed room. The line could have been interrupted by the Russians if they wanted, but they knew it would have invited immediate retaliation by the Canadian authorities against their Embassy in Ottawa. Mail came in normally once a week with a courier who operated out of London. While fairly slow, at least it was sure.

One of the few occasions on which we were able to baffle the KGB occurred during the 1972 hockey summit between Canada and the USSR when 3,000 Canadian fans descended on Moscow. The police had no idea of what to expect. One Soviet official said to me that it was the largest single group of foreigners ever to come to the USSR without guns in their hands. They were certain we had numerous intelligence agents infiltrated among the hockey buffs. At any rate they took no chances and surveilled them with care. But there was only one incident, involving Edgar Bronfman Jr. and it was handled in a particularly Soviet way.

I received an urgent call to receive a senior Soviet official who turned up with two unidentified individuals who were clearly KGB. After much skirmishing they came to the point. Bronfman had been distributing skull caps and religious material at the Moscow Synagogue. If he continued, the police would be obliged to arrest him. They were taking the unusual step of advising me because they knew he was a friend of mine and since he was invited to the Embassy for lunch that day [!] I could perhaps talk to him.

Otherwise the happy atmosphere of the games would be ruined. I strongly objected officially to this offense, but ✠ did speak to Bronfman and he, somewhat shaken, desisted.

Another problem with the KGB involved the issuance of visas for members of the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa, the Consultate General in Montreal and occasionally visiting delegations. In view of the past history of these missions we had decided to limit the size of their personnel, a quota which was deeply resented by the Soviets but fully justified in view of the percentage of employees who were professional KGB or GRU agents. But the result was a constant effort to foist them on us as legitimate diplomats and a constant refusal by Canada to accept any of those identified as KGB. This became slightly embarrassing when Vladimir Suslov was appointed head of the Second European Department which dealt with Canada in the Foreign Ministry. He had served for many years in the Soviet Delegation to the United Nations in New York and had been identified as KGB, and listed in John Barron's book KGB, published in 1974. There was only one sensible solution and that was to decide that Suslov had been co-opted by the KGB in New York, that he was not a professional agent, and that in any case it would have been totally counter-productive to treat him as an agent.

~~The quota on Soviet missions was maintained as one way of controlling the KGB, and as a means of bargaining for better conditions for the Canadian Embassy in Moscow and for Canadian journalists who at one time numbered three -- the CBC, the Canadian Press, and the Toronto Telegram, although all except~~

This problem also arose in 1975 in an intense form when it became clear that the two key officials in the Soviet Olympic Games were S. S. Pavlov and Alexander Gresko, both identified as KGB. Soviet participation in the 1976 Olympics in Montreal was, of course, very important but we were reluctant to admit these two individuals. We did refuse a visa in 1975 to Pavlov, but with the greatest of reluctance granted one to Gresko. The Deputy Foreign Minister was seething in the conversation I had with him over Pavlov in which he alternated between belittling our counter-intelligence service as "mere children", ridiculing the idea that they would ever use people as senior as Pavlov for espionage purposes, and refusing to accept our right to dictate the composition of Soviet delegations. I insisted on the right to do so and suggested it might be possible out of 260 million Russians to find a few who were not publicly identified as spies. My case had been undercut, unfortunately, by the Prime Minister who, in one of his more eccentric gestures, had received Gresko on his visit to Ottawa.

The quota on Soviet missions was maintained as one way of controlling the KGB, and as a means of bargaining for better conditions for the Canadian Embassy in Moscow and for Canadian journalists who at one time numbered three -- the CBC, the Canadian Press and the Toronto Telegram, although all except

the CBC disappeared as the expenses involved and the difficulties in reporting news grew. Peter Worthington, later editor of the Toronto Sun, had particular difficulty with the Soviet authorities and was constantly accused of writing libellous and inflammatory stories. He was not adverse to provoking the Soviets. The Embassy had a hockey team which played various Soviet ministries and Worthington insisted on wearing a sweater with the number 007. .

But this soon turned into something deadly serious involving his official translator, Olga Farmakovskaya. She had managed to get permission to go on a Soviet cruise ship in the Mediterranean, jumped ship in Beirut and asked for political asylum in Canada. It turned out that her husband was a Lieutenant-Colonel in the KGB and the latter reacted strongly. Worthington himself left before he could be expelled but this did not prevent the Soviets from levelling accusations against him, The Telegram and the Embassy for complicity in the defection. It continued to wrankle with the Russians and Worthington's successor was approached by the KGB with offers of cash to build up a case against Worthington and Farmakovskaya; and by the Press Department with threats of retaliation if he wrote "anti-Soviet" articles, by which they meant concentrating his reporting on the seamier side of life in the USSR.

Another very difficult case involved a Canadian citizen of Russian origin, Mrs. Asta Sokov, who made the mistake of returning to visit relatives and in January 1978 was arrested at Moscow airport on a charge of attempting to smuggle jewellery

and antiques out of the country. After six months detention in Lefortovo prison, she was convicted and sentenced to eight years imprisonment. I made frequent and strong pleas for leniency and finally in November she was released and permitted to return home, a distinctly chastened woman. The arrest and severe sentence for a minor charge were clearly intended by the police to discourage visitors in the future from attempting to circumvent Soviet regulations.

The miniscule Canadian Communist Party seemed to have an importance to the Russians out of all proportion. It did not seem to be used directly by the KGB, the Russians presumably having learned a lesson from the Gouzenko affair when Sam Carr, then the only Communist member of the federal House of Commons, was exposed as being directly involved in nuclear espionage on behalf of the Russians. The party itself had no influence on the Canadian political scene and yet the CPSU spent a good deal of rare hard currency in supporting the Canadian Communists. The answer seemed to lie in the mere existence of the party. Being small, weak and otherwise unimportant, the party was totally dependent on Moscow and therefore could be counted on to support the Soviet line on any given subject. This was then reported back duly from the Canadian Tribune, the newspaper of the Canadian Communist Party, and published in the Soviet press, giving the impression that an important Canadian political party supported the USSR. The party also was useful in supporting the Moscow line on occasions when there were disputes with other Communist parties such as the Italian, Spanish or Chinese.

The inflated idea of the Canadian Communist Party that was held in the Soviet Union was brought home to me when I was visiting the Crimea. Looking for the former palace of the Yusupovs, we came across a vast park and a monumental gate which was closed. We stopped to investigate when police suddenly appeared and told us to move on. Then, catching sight of the Canadian flag, the police officer remarked that "Your great leader has just been here". Somewhat mystified, I could not quite believe that Pierre Trudeau, unpredictable as he often was, could have slipped unperceived into the Crimea. It was only later that I discovered that the palace ~~is now~~ had become a resort for leaders of friendly communist parties and that the person in question was William Kashtan, head of the Canadian Communist Party.

Russia has always been to a greater or lesser degree a police state which justified its reliance on repressive measures as necessary to protect the homeland from the threat from abroad and the threat from within. In the Brezhnev era, in spite of the enormous increase in the military strength of the state, the foreign threat, communised into the concept of capitalist encirclement, and a siege mentality still existed. The heritage of slightly greater tolerance under Khrushchev had created the illusion among many individuals in the USSR that a measure of change was possible. In fact there was little real difference between the two leaders as regards the need for conformity. If repression under Brezhnev seemed tougher, it was because the

outside world was more aware of the activities of the dissidents. The response of the authorities was somewhat more sophisticated than in the past, but from the start of the Brezhnev régime there was little doubt that dissent of any kind would be crushed. And for this, a powerful KGB and militia was essential.

Human rights as we conceive them, and the Soviet system are almost totally incompatible. Religion is, inevitably, because of the ideology, anathema to the official dogma. And while tolerated if the practitioners are sufficiently docile, it is savagely persecuted if it appears a threat to the state. Nationalism also runs counter to the ideology, as communism is supposed to have outdated old-fashioned national aspirations. In practice, this meant nationalism on the part of the lesser groups, in particular the Balts and the Ukrainians, whereas great Russian nationalism was encouraged in order to reinforce the interests of the state and the party. Any musical, literary or artistic manifestation which does not correspond to the official doctrine of socialist realism, leads to severe penalties. Any political opposition or even criticism of the system or the party is automatically subject to persecution because it is interpreted as rejection of a system which allegedly meets the requirements of all citizens.

In practice, this means that persecution of human rights in the USSR is total. There are many countries where political dissidents are persecuted, Chile for example; there are others where religious minorities are attacked, such as Iran or Egypt; there are some where national minorities are suppressed, as in

Iraq or Turkey. But there are few outside the communist world where every form of dissent is subject to active and continuing repression.

It often seemed curious why a state which had been in existence for over 60 years, had survived the most severe tests, and which possessed the most powerful system of control and police probably ever developed, should be frightened of a few weak and unorganized critical voices. The answer was briefly that the Soviet leaders could not envisage criticism as anything but treason, nor permit even the slightest fissure in the edifice of power and privilege they had built up.

It was puzzling therefore that the Soviets accepted the Helsinki Final Act in August, 1975 since it was clear that the articles on human rights could never be applied by the USSR, nor have they been. These clauses in the Final Act were the price Moscow had to pay for what the Russians considered a legalization of the frontiers in Central Europe and for strengthening détente with the West which was already beginning to falter. Although the Soviets also gambled that détente was sufficiently important to the West that we would not press them too hard on the issue of human rights, they gravely miscalculated.

We did not hear very much in the West about dissent until Brezhnev came to power. All but the very bravest critics of the régime had been thoroughly cowed by the total terror of Stalin and it was only under the relatively more relaxed régime of Khrushchev that various kinds of dissent began to stir to life. They only really surfaced in 1965, perhaps because it took a

decade for the timid exponents of opposition to venture into action. Khrushchev, if he had remained in power, would probably have acted in no different way than Brezhnev in crushing dissent. He had used slightly more liberal tactics for his own purposes, but, as he showed in the repression of Hungary in 1956, he would have had no hesitation in destroying any opposition if he felt it endangered the régime.

There exists considerable confusion in the West about the nature of opposition to the Soviet ~~régime~~ because of the tendency to call it a dissent movement. ~~Unfortunately.~~ There is not and never was such a thing as a "movement", and dissent involved only a tiny number of people divided into as many as a dozen different groupings and tendencies, of which the most numerous and, after 1970 the most active and successful, was formed by Jewish activists, which I have described in Chapter 10. They constituted a special category because while made up largely of Jews who wished to emigrate for religious or personal reasons, there were among them a number of political activists, particularly among the refuseniks, those whose exit visas had been refused and who were inevitably forced into opposition. And they were the only group politically supported by the United States government, and by highly influential sectors of public opinion in the U.S., Canada and many other countries.

The political activists were, after the Jews, the most important category of dissidents. These are the people who were either totally opposed to the communist system, or believed it needed reforming. Almost every opponent of the régime had a

different prescription for the USSR, ranging from Solzhenitsyn who advocated a return to the purer forms of Russian Slav society as it existed in a kind of fantasy picture of 19th century Russia, to Roy Medvedev who believed in communism but thought the system only needed structural and ideological improvements. In between existed every variety of political view from those who rejected the system totally like Bukovsky, Amalrik, Zinoviev and others, to Sinyavsky who remained a communist of sorts. But there was no "movement" since they were only united in wishing to change or destroy the present régime.

A kind of outgrowth of the political activists was represented by those who seized on the Helsinki Act as a means of broadening the tolerance of the régime towards dissent in general. They formed the rather loose group intended to monitor the Soviet observance of human rights as spelled out in the Helsinki Document. Also associated with them were the Chronicle of Current Events, a Samizdat [illegal] publication which tried to keep Russians and the outside world informed of Soviet political repression, and the Solzhenitsyn Fund which was set up by Solzhenitsyn as a means of helping these groups financially.

Soviet attacks against all of these political dissidents were constant but the degree of pressure varied. Every major figure was either jailed [Shcharansky], sent into internal exile [Sakharov], or exiled abroad. Many of those who were arrested, ~~particularly in the crackdown of 1978, such~~ as Orlov and Ginsberg, were subsequently exchanged for Soviet spies in the West, ~~THE CASE OF BUKO~~ THE more troublesome other dissidents were simply physically dumped abroad. The Helsinki Monitoring Groups in Moscow and Kiev were

X OR WESTERN COMMUNISTS - BUKOVSKY AGAINST CORVALAN THE HEAD OF THE CHILEAN COMMUNIST PARTY IN 1976, FOR E.....

nearly all arrested as were all the members of the sub-group on psychiatric abuses. The Ukrainian member, Oksan Mechko, was himself confined to a psychiatric prison.

One other small category of dissent consisted of small and struggling groups such as SMOT, which attempted to defend trade union rights; another group protesting against the treatment of war invalids; and a fledgling feminist movement. The leading members of SMOT were soon arrested and three of the five women who contributed to an unofficial publication "Woman and Russia" and who founded the "Maria" feminist club in March, 1980 were expelled.

Another important dissident group was composed of persons fighting for the right to practise their religion. Although Article 52 of the Soviet Constitution guarantees the "right to profess any religion", the ideology of Marxism-Leninism rejects totally religious beliefs and practices as incompatible with Soviet man. Since, however, in practice it has proved impossible completely to destroy religious faith there has been a very limited tolerance of religion, governed in part by the degree of internationalism involved, and the amount of foreign attention engendered. This means that religions with strong foreign ties, i.e. the Roman Catholic Church and the Jewish temples, were subject to more severe attacks than the purely national Russian Orthodox Church, or the Lutherans, with fundamentalists like the Baptists and Pentecostalists somewhere between. The Moslem religion presents a special case, one which has not preoccupied the Soviet authorities until the recent revival of

fanatical Islamic fundamentalism in Iran, and the important political-religious role it has played in the anti-Soviet anti-communist resistance in Afghanistan.

The persecution of the Catholic Church has been most severe in two areas: the Western Ukraine where the Uniate Church has been almost destroyed, and in Lithuania. In both areas the religion was closely identified with Ukrainian and Lithuanian nationalism. Even so we continued to receive information in the Embassy about stubborn efforts in Lithuania to maintain the faith, and news of arrests of active laymen and priests.

Protestant religious groups were also subject to persecution. The resistance of Pentecostalists has been publicised by the case of the Vashenko and Chemykhalov families who took refuge in the American Embassy in 1978. Baptists were under constant pressure and subject to sudden arrests. Those who refused to comply with the officially state-sponsored church association were under constant harassment and many sought to emigrate.

The Orthodox Church contined to exist in a more flourishing ~~state~~ condition because, in line with Russian tradition, it is a state religion controlled by the government, with its head and priests chosen by and paid for by the state. The three small seminaries are state organizations. In these conditions, a very limited number of churches were permitted to function. But there were priests who tried to infuse something more spiritual into their religious tasks. They invariably ran afoul not only of the KGB but of their own superiers.

Dissent from the official political line and freedom of religious thought were particularly difficult for Orthodox priests because of the identification of their religion with Russian nationalism and the almost total control of the church by the state. The case of Father Dudko illustrated the problem. An outspoken supporter of human rights and religious feedom, he was arrested in January 1980 for anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda as part of an effort to get rid of the more troublesome dissidents before the Olympic Games. In June he appeared on prime time television to "confess" his anti-Soviet activities, to repudiate his previous views and to denounce his Western contacts who, Dudko claimed, had first stimulated his activities and later directed them from abroad. In a very Russian xenophobic fashion, he portrayed himself as a classic example of a Soviet citizen falling into the trap of a Western agent through contact with foreigners. He cited among others Christopher Wren of The New York Times and members of the Swiss-based International Christian Movement for the Freedom of the Faith. Dudko's message was widely reproduced ~~by the Soviets~~ to SOVIET CITIZENS as a warning to avoid the thousands of foreigners who were about to descend on Moscow for the Olympics. We took his "confession" with a grain of salt, realizing how difficult it would be for an Orthodox priest to resist the combined pressure of the KGB and his own superiors who were salaried appointees of the state.

With only 53 per cent approximately of the Soviet population of Russian origin, the problem of the lesser nationalities constantly occupied the minds of Soviet leaders of whom nearly all in the key positions by 1965 were Russians. The nationalities which gave the Russians the greatest difficulty were the Ukrainians, the Baltic peoples and the Tartars. The three Baltic republics, incorporated in the USSR by direct military intervention in 1940, and reincorporated in 1945 at the end of World War II, constituted the most European part of the USSR. In spite of being subjected to persecution for four decades, they still resisted Russification which was carried out in part by direct Russian immigration into the three republics, in part by various incentives to young people to accept the Soviet régime and to become assimilated culturally. It was remarkable that, in spite of the tremendous power of intimidation of the Soviet state, the small population and the very feeble means of resistance of the Baltic peoples, that the Soviets have not proved more successful. Resistance was strongest in Estonia, in part because of the proximity of their blood brothers, the Finns, just across the Gulf of Finland; and in Lithuania where the Catholic Church, in spite of severe persecution, was a strong rallying point for Lithuanian nationalism.

The resistance of the Tartars is better known than that of other Asian nationalities because of their forced evacuation from the Crimea after the retreat of the Germans in 1944. Dispersed throughout Siberia, they persisted in their efforts to return to the Crimea which in the meantime had been resettled by Russians

and Ukrainians. In my visit to the old Tartar capital of Bakshisarai in 1978, I found no Tartars at all. Their principal defender, General Grigorenko, was finally silenced, first by incarceration in a psychiatric prison, then by a term of forced labor and finally by expulsion from the USSR.

There was no problem during my period in the Soviet Union with the other Asian nationalities, partly because their level of national consciousness was low and partly because they had profited materially from the Russian régime. The Moslem resistance to the Soviet forces in Afghanistan and the call to a return to primitive Moslem virtues by Khomeini in Iran have had little effect as yet, although it is something the Russians are watching with great care. The Armenians and Georgians occupied a fairly privileged place in the Soviet state, but there were rumblings of nationalist discontent in Georgia from time to time, usually related to the question of language rights. As I was told frequently in my several visits to Georgia, young Georgians were torn between choosing to make a career in the Soviet Union itself, which effectively meant living and working in Moscow, or confining one's ambitions to the narrow confines of Georgia itself where one could resist assimilation and contribute to the preservation of Georgian culture.

However, it is the Ukraine which represents the biggest potential problem for the Russians. The largest and richest of the lesser republics with a long and proud history of its own, it has always been regarded as a potential source of trouble by the Russians. It was a severe shock for Stalin when a sizeable

number of Ukrainians welcomed the German invaders in 1941 and a fair number were recruited into a Ukrainian Freedom Army. The hatred of Stalin was turned against them after the Germans were driven out. The particular object of his emnity was the Catholic Uniate Church which combined the Orthodox rite and association with Rome. It was almost completely destroyed. The Ukrainians were cowed into silence, but news filtered through to us from time to time of the arrest of nationalists. The expulsion of the most active nationalist, Moroz, after many years in prison meant the decapitation of active opposition. The Russians also used more subtle means to destroy Ukrainian nationalism. There was an active campaign to discourage the idea that Ukrainian was a distinct language and it was made materially profitable for Ukrainians to speak and use Russian. At the same time, there was considerable immigration of Russians into the larger cities so that by now Kiev, Odessa and Kharkov are almost as much Russian as Ukrainian cities. At the same time the Ukrainians were encouraged to leave the Ukraine to settle in the Baltic states and in the Virgin Lands of northern Kazakhstan.

Very early in the Brezhnev reign the novelist Valery Tarsis was expelled and the writers Sinyavsky and Daniel were condemned to harsh prison terms for publishing abroad books, not particularly critical of the USSR, without the prior authorization of the Soviet authorities. A number of writers expressed some reservations about the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and were severely persecuted. The fact that some intellectuals opposed the

the invasion reinforced the influence of the hard-liners in the establishment who saw a lesson for themselves in the Czech experiment. The result was a clamping down on every variety of dissent.

In 1972 the trial and condemnation of Vladimir Bukovsky took place, followed the next year by the expulsion of Solzhenitsyn and somewhat later of the great cellist Rostropovich who had had the courage to give Solzhenitsyn asylum in his house. The number of writers, artists and critics who either fled to the West, were jailed or expelled in the succeeding decade is too long to repeat here. I was more directly involved in the defection of the ballet dancer Baryshnikov and in the problems of the poets Voznesensky and Akhmadulina.

In 1979, some young writers tried to publish their works, mostly apolitical and inoffensive, in a journal called the "Almanac Metropole", published outside the official system. They were nearly all hounded out of literary life and some, such as Aksionov and Voinovich, were expelled. Voznesensky and Akhmadulina were too famous and popular to be punished in this way, but they suffered almost total ostracism for some time for having contributed to the Almanac, for the crime of daring to publish material without passing through the censors. In a petty act of revenge by the bureaucracy, the husband of Akhmadulina was expelled from his job as a leading choreographer of the Bolshoi Ballet. Both Voznesensky and Akhmadulina realized they had pushed the limits of tolerance of the rigid literary bureaucracy too far and they were saddened at the violent reaction. They

had hoped to encourage younger writers who had no way of breaking into print and believed their prestige would help to cushion the official reaction. Akhmadulina, a lovely half-Tartar, half-Russian woman, tough and courageous under her fragile appearance, was shattered by the punishment administered to the less well-known writers and to her husband. But it was clear that the Soviets would not tolerate any infraction of the rules and the harsh reaction was meant as a warning both to the younger writers and those in the establishment to toe the line.

It is hard for us to visualise the effect of ostracism on those intellectuals who had offended the bureaucracy in some way, very often, as in the case of the Metropole writers, by what we would consider minor infractions. In the days of Stalin, the punishment would have been Siberia so that mere ostracism was in a peculiarly Soviet way a vast improvement. For some it meant expulsion from the Union of Writers, or the equivalent organizations of composers, musicians, actors etc. This involved the loss of any direct income and the inability to publish or perform. The same applied to the Jewish refuseniks who almost automatically lost any means of livelihood in a system which excludes any form of private enterprise. They managed to survive somehow through the generosity of friends, but the psychological effect of being treated as non-persons by the society in which they had played a not unimportant role was immense.

The hardier found ways of recovering. The poet Evtushenko, for example, who was ostracised in 1968 for criticizing the invasion of Czechoslovakia, remained out of sight for about a year and then gradually made his reappearance by writing some

poems acceptable to the establishment. Akhmadulina, before the Metropole affair, had paid for political indiscretions by exile to Georgia where she spent her time translating Georgian poetry into Russian. Voznesensky did not publish for a while after the Metropole and was not permitted to go abroad until he made amends. The possibility of depriving artists of foreign travel was in fact one of the more effective ways of keeping them in line.

The defection of Mikhail Baryshnikov in Toronto in June 1974 during a tour of the Bolshoi Ballet was a severe blow to Soviet pride and to the Russian theatrical world. Baryshnikov was just becoming recognized as the most promising dancer in the USSR and he had an impeccable Russian background. A year later when I was in Leningrad, where Baryshnikov made his career, a ballet specialist told me that everyone in the Kirov Ballet had burst into tears when they heard that he had defected. Another told me in some awe that Baryshnikov had really fooled the KGB. He had bought a car and an apartment which he had lavishly furnished, and it was on the basis that no one would abandon such wealth that he had been permitted to join the Canadian tour.

The Soviet authorities were convinced that the Canadian Government together with the Montreal impressario Kudriavtsev had engineered the defection. I had several stormy interviews with Soviet officials without being able to convince them that we were not responsible nor would we force Baryshnikov to return against his will. They finally dropped the accusations against

the Government, concentrating their venom instead on Kudriatsev who, in spite of having done a great deal to build up cultural exchanges with the USSR, was nearly bankrupted by the cancellation of a number of contracts by the Soviets.

The most famous defection was that of Svetlana Alliluyeva, Stalin's daughter. The Egyptian Ambassador, Murad Ghaleb, an old friend from my Cairo days, knew her well and used often to visit her and her Indian husband in their unpretentious flat in Moscow. As far as Ghaleb knew, he and his wife were the only foreign friends of Svetlana outside the Indian Embassy. Ghaleb had been a doctor and therefore studied with interest the health of her husband, Pradesh Singh, and Svetlana's personality which he said at the time showed all the symptoms of schizophrenia. He was convinced this grew out of her relationship with her father. As the only child Stalin was even vaguely fond of, she grew up adoring him to the extent that during the period of the Khrushchev revelations of Stalin's crimes she refused for a very long time to accept them as true. When she finally came to believe them, she turned to a very Russian kind of spirituality which, after her marriage to Singh, was transformed into an Indian type of mysticism. This period was marked by long monologues about the horrors her father had committed, alternating with sessions of reminiscences of her life with Stalin when she would produce dozens of photos of herself in her father's arms.

According to Ghaleb, she was wildly, hysterically in love with Singh, who was small, very dark, ugly, visibly dying from a very difficult ~~disease~~ disease, but a "sweet and intelligent man".

Svetlana's attitude towards him was strictly Dostoyevskian. She would throw herself on him and cover him with kisses, forgetting that he had a lung disease which made breathing very hard. He also suffered from a truly dreadful eczema of the feet and legs. In a typical Dostoyevskian way, Svetlana in front of guests would take off his shoes and socks and embrace and kiss his feet as if in some way she were expiating the sins of her father.

After Singh's death in 1966, Svetlana was enveloped in a state of total hysteria and religious mysticism. Once she terrified Mrs. Ghaleb, who was visiting her in her flat, by seizing her and crying out wildly, "Can't you see him? He is here with me now". She then set about with determination the process of getting permission to take her husband's ashes to be buried in his native village in India. Ghaleb is certain she did not marry Singh for the purpose of escaping and he felt after her defection that this idea did not really come to her until she reached India. He was particularly irritated with what she said about Kosygin in her book since it was his personal intervention which secured her exit visa. Indeed, Ghaleb was in Svetlana's flat when Kosygin telephoned personally to tell her she could leave. I noted in a conversation with Ghaleb in 1970 that he said he was convinced she would return to Russia some day. She is happy now, he said, but if she enters a period of melancholy she could slip back into her true spirit of Russian mysticism and heed the call of the motherland. He proved a true prophet.

Ghaleb told me he never detected in Svetlana any sign of

preparation to flee Russia. Whether or not she prepared her defection in advance, she was successful in hiding her true feelings, something the Russians became highly skilled at doing. For a number of years a Soviet historian, Mikhail Voslensky, called regularly on me to discuss developments and to pass on the Soviet version of events. We considered him a classical example of a disinformation agent of the KGB. Never once in all the years I knew him did he depart even slightly from the official line. But, after carefully preparing his credentials and getting himself included in a delegation of scholars to West Germany, he seized the first possible opportunity and defected. His book on the Nomenklatura reveals the way in which the privileged class live in the USSR, and the life of relative ease which he abandoned. The dissimulation required to reconcile over many years this outwardly conformist good life with seething inner dissent is hard to imagine.

What was noteworthy in the Soviet treatment of dissent was the fact that the state of relations with the United States and other Western countries played practically no role in determining Soviet policy. One of the most intensive series of arrests took place in 1973 after the exchange of visits between Nixon and Brezhnev. The signing of the Helsinki Act precipitated another tightening of the screws. The arrest and exiling of Sakharov in January 1980, while possibly part of the Soviet reaction to Western criticism of the invasion of Afghanistan, seemed almost like a deliberate affront to President Jimmy Carter

who had always tried to protect Sakharov.

What constantly astounded me was the immense courage of the handful of people who stood up to be counted in the face of the enormous power of the state and the repressive machinery of the KGB, and in spite of their feeble numbers and their widely diverging aims, the Soviets' inability completely to eliminate criticism. When the first major crackdown occurred in 1965, the Soviets must have thought it would be easy to crush or intimidate their critics. But every time the heads were cut off, new flowers appeared. Byt the end of the Brezhnev era, however, the garden had been decimated and the situation seemed desperate. Attacks on the opposition had eroded the quality of the leaders and their moral and popular standing. Only Sakharov remained in his brave and lonely exile in Gorki.

Opposition to the régime will never disappear completely. It seems to be a concomitant of the Russian character to seek to fight against hopeless odds, to welcome martyrdom, to oppose the strength of the spirit against the power of materialist forces. Nevertheless the following points must be kept in mind. The active dissenters are very few in number and divided in their aims. The chances of their upsetting the system or ever seriously modifying it are practically non-existent. The dissatisfaction of large numbers of people is directed at the low standard of living and irritants and frictions in everyday life; it is not politically oriented and the aims of most of the dissidents, even if they were widely known, would be incomprehensible, if not actually distasteful, to the bulk of the population. Only

nationalist feelings on the part of the non-Russian peoples, above all the Balts, the Ukrainians and eventually the Asians, has any degree of popular support. But religious feeling has not been stamped out and it is not likely to disappear.

The problem of dissent, of human rights, is not going to go away and will be a permanent object of friction between the West and the USSR. We would like to apply our moral standards to the USSR as part of a coherent over-all concept of the kind of relationship which ideally should exist between us. But the Soviets are not going to change their arims or society and will continue to exclude any place for human rights as we conceive them. The dilemma is therefore to fit our ideals into this brutal reality.

In view of some of the naive remarks by Westerners about Andropov when he was chosen to succeed Brezhnev in 1982, particularly that he was a closet liberal, it is worth recalling that for 12 years as head of the KGB he was the man responsible for implementing the policy of elminating dissent, a policy which was evolved at the highest echelons of the Party and which represented the wishes of the vast majority of its members. If there was disagreement, it was about methods.

In September 1977, a formal session was organized in the Bolshoi Theatre, in the presence of all the Politburo and leading officials of the Party and significantly all the heads of East European diplomatic missions, to mark the 100th anniversary of Felix Dzjerzhinsky, the first security chief of the Soviet state. Andropov made the eulogy of his illustrious predecessor. He

praised Dzjerzhinsky, the creator of the "Red Terror", after the assassination attempt on Lenin's life, as a hero of the Revolution and devoted to furthering communist ideals. The message was loud and clear. Sixty years before, in the midst of adversity, the Party could rely on unity and the drastic measures of the "security organs" to defend the Revolution. Sixty years later, confronted with similar hostile forces, the same tools existed to do the job again.

And if we foreigners, or the average Russian, ever felt inclined to minimize the role of the KGB, we were constantly reminded of it by the huge statue of Dzjerzhinsky standing in front of the monumental building housing the Committee on State Security, flanked on the other side by Detski Mir, the Children's World department store, the kind of contrast which characterized so much of life in Soviet Russia.