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I prepared this shortly after my arrival in the Branch in October 1984. CD-35 was still in force, but the CSIS Act (s.13(15)) changed a lot about how the Service approached its security screening (gov't) mandate. This Guide is currently being re-written to bring it up to date with GSP, although the approach remains the same. Basically, we attempt to balance the rights of the individual with those of the government. When we can give the individual the benefit of the doubt, we do.

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P.S. examples of security assessments are real life cases, the names have been changed. A lot of assessments will go 5 to 10 pages.

CONFIDENTIAL

GOVERNMENT SECURITY SCREENING
FIELD ENQUIRIES

- GUIDANCE TO INVESTIGATING OFFICERS -

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GOVERNMENT SECURITY SCREENING FIELD ENQUIRIES
(Guidance to Investigating Officers)

INTRODUCTION:

No nation state today can ignore the very real dangers represented by the possibility of domestic subversion, foreign intrusion and espionage, and terrorism. While Canada has been relatively free from hostile activities of this kind there have been a number of occurrences in recent years that serve to remind us that we are not in any sense immune. There might well have been more if Canada had not been alert to the possibilities and guarded against them.

The personnel security screening policy of the Government of Canada is one, critically important precautionary mechanism developed for the protection of our national sovereignty. Security clearance principles and procedures are designed for the determination of the loyalty and associated reliability of all persons who are to have access to government assets classified in the national interest. The purpose is to prevent the unauthorized disclosure of classified information by public servants and others.

ORIGINS OF THE SECURITY SCREENING PROGRAM:

The need for a comprehensive security screening program in respect to government employees was first brought to public attention in 1946, when Igor GOUZENKO revealed the presence of espionage activities in some of the highest and most sensitive government positions in Canada. Other Western nations were (and continue to be) shocked similarly from time to time to discover that individuals who held high positions in their government were in reality disloyal to that country.

In the late 1940s and early 1950s, as a result of the revelations of Whittaker CHAMBERS, Elizabeth BENTLEY, and Hedda MASSING, all self-confessed Soviet agents, the Americans learned that some 40 people who held high positions in the United States Government and international agencies were, in fact, Soviet agents. From the case of Klaus FUCHS, a top-ranking nuclear scientist, England learned that vital information about the H-bomb was passed to the Soviets. Years later it learned that Kim PHILBY, the head of British counterintelligence, was also a Soviet agent - as were his confederates, both high-ranking officers in the Foreign Service, Guy BURGESS and Donald MacLEAN. All three defected to the Soviet Union before they could be apprehended although, in the late 1970s, the public learned that Anthony BLUNT was also a member of the same Soviet espionage ring. His knighthood was revoked and he died publicly humiliated.

In Germany in recent years there have been many instances of espionage by people who held important government positions, one of the best known of which was the case of Guenther GUILLAUME, a personal secretary to Chancellor Willy BRANDT. In Sweden in 1964, there was the case of Colonel Stig Eric WENNERSTROEM, a retired air force colonel who had served from 1952 to 1957 as air force attaché in Washington. He was convicted on the charge that he supplied information to the Soviets from 1948 to 1963 and had compromised Sweden's national defense. Switzerland went through a similar experience in 1976 when Brigadier General Jean-Louis JEANMARIE was convicted of spying for the Soviets for 18 years, gravely compromising Switzerland's defensive preparations.

This is only a random selection of early revelations indicating an appalling innocence in major Western countries on matters related to the protection of classified government assets. There has been a succession of cases - less spectacular, perhaps, but nevertheless highly important, involving disloyalty and unreliability by government employees of these countries. These and the recent case of Hugh HAMBLETON suggest the notion that, rather than counterintelligence successes, his and others like him are examples of security screening failures.

THE NEED FOR SECURITY SCREENING:

The need for a personnel security clearance program is accepted in principle by virtually every government, democratic as well as totalitarian. To protect classified government information from unauthorized disclosure, some form of screening mechanism is needed to ensure as far as possible that persons who have access to that information can be trusted. It is also necessary to ascertain the likelihood of employees attempting to subvert the institutions of government from within or influence its policies to the advantage of foreign or violence-prone organizations.

Canada launched its personnel security clearance system in the 1940s, one which, with various modifications, exists today. The document which currently governs security screening procedures is Cabinet Directive 35 (CD-35). It is the authority under which departments and agencies plan and execute their security clearance responsibilities in respect to federal public servants, including contract personnel, who need access to classified information of national security interests. Employees who require such access must be persons in whose reliability and loyalty to Canada the government can repose full confidence.

SECURITY SCREENING RESPONSIBILITIES:

Under Sections 13 and 15 of the CSIS Act the Service is authorized to conduct security screening investigations and provide government departments with the results of its investigation in the form of a "security assessment".

In the past, it was common practice for the Service to recite factual findings based upon an investigation but not to provide an evaluation or appraisal of the findings to assist departments in determining whether an individual is or may represent a security risk. Since the CSIS Act defines a security assessment as an appraisal of loyalty and reliability as it relates thereto, it is now also necessary for the Service to evaluate the security screening information provided to a government institution.

The security assessment must contain an evaluation of the information available assessed in such a way that the conclusion is corroborative and sustainable. It also includes a recommendation as to whether an individual should or should not be allowed access to classified government assets, and an evaluation of the sources used regarding the reliability of the information they have provided.

PURPOSE OF FIELD ENQUIRIES

The purpose of background security screening investigations is to supply the requesting government institution with a security assessment to help determine the fitness of persons to occupy positions requiring access to classified information. It is essential, therefore, that the investigator pursue enquiries until a sufficient depth of information has been obtained to enable such a judgement to be made.

SCOPE OF FIELD ENQUIRIES

Draft policy is instructive on the nature and extent of security screening field investigations. The investigator should carefully review these guidelines and develop a plan of action to meet security screening requirements. When making enquiries, interviews should be held with a sufficient number of the subject's present and previous acquaintances (neighbours, employers, co-workers, references, etc) to cover adequately his career over at least the previous 10 years in the case of Top Secret clearance requests, and 20 years in the case of Special Activity. (Note: there are exceptions to this rule of thumb and policy should be consulted to ascertain when these apply.)

Investigators should be careful to discover whether sources are well acquainted with the individual and are fit persons to express an opinion on the subject's loyalty and reliability as it relates thereto. If in the course of interviewing a source, the investigator acquires information which suggests that the source is or may be biased or unreliable, or lacks maturity of judgement, this information should be fully explained in his/her report.

FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH LOYALTY RISK:

The loyalty "rejection" criteria enumerated in CD-35, with almost exclusive emphasis on the international communist movement and fascism, reflect the concerns of the immediate post "cold war" period and, by today's standards, lack relevancy. Security assessments on matters of questionable loyalty should, instead, reflect the "threats to the security of Canada" as defined in the CSIS Act.

Normally, information questioning a subject's loyalty will surface in the initial check of our subversive indices. Nevertheless, investigators should be alert to any one or combination of the following indicators:

- (a) Commission of any act of sabotage, espionage, treason, or sedition, or attempts thereat or preparation therefor, or conspiring with, or aiding or abetting, another to commit any act of sabotage, espionage, treason, or sedition.
- (b) Establishing or continuing an association with a saboteur, traitor, seditionist, anarchist, or revolutionist.
- (c) Establishing or continuing an association with an intelligence officer or representative of a foreign nation whose interests tend to be inimical to the interests of Canada, or with any person who advocates the use of force or violence to overthrow the government of Canada or the alteration of our form of government by unconstitutional means.
- (d) Advocacy of the use of force or violence to overthrow the government of Canada, or the alteration of our form of government by unconstitutional means.
- (e) Membership in, or affiliation or support for, any foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group, or

combination of persons, which has adopted, or shows, a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution Act (1982), or which seeks to alter our form of government by unconstitutional means.

- (f) Intentional, unauthorized disclosure to any person of information classified in the national interest, or wilful violation or disregard of security regulations.
- (g) Performing or attempting to perform government duties, or otherwise acting, so as to serve the interests of another government in preference to the interests of Canada.

FEATURES ASSOCIATED WITH RELIABILITY RISK:

Listed are some of the problem areas and features of character which may lead to indiscretion or dishonesty, or make an individual vulnerable to blackmail or coercion. The presence of one or more of these warning signs does not necessarily mean that the individual is a security risk. They do indicate, however, a possible need for concern by the employing government institution which might require guidance or assistance to eliminate the problem. The following list is meant as a guide only:

- (a) Any deliberate misrepresentations, falsifications, or omissions of material facts.
- (b) Any criminal, infamous, dishonest, immoral, or notoriously disgraceful conduct.
- (c) Habitual use of intoxicants to excess, or drug addiction.
- (d) Heavily in debt or other financial problems such as living beyond means, or excessive desires or expectations to be exceedingly well off in a short time, or expectations well beyond ability.
- (e) Personal problems which appear to place the individual under a high degree of stress.
- (f) Noticeable changes in established work pattern or in personality.
- (g) Loner, consistently disassociates himself/herself from other employees and does not seem to have any friends.

- (h) Lingering bitterness over an employment related matter.
- (i) Evidence of apparent mental or emotional instability.
- (j) Any family or other close continuing relationships with persons who reside in Scheduled Countries or who may, on reasonable grounds, be suspected of engaging in activities constituting "threats to the security of Canada".
- (k) Any facts which furnish reason to believe that the individual may act contrary to the best interests of national security.
- (l) Illicit or abnormal sexual behaviour; for example: voyeurism, exhibitionism, gross indecency or bestiality.
- (m) Sexual orientation, i.e. homosexuality.
 - (i) Homosexuality by itself is not proof of unreliability or a bar to obtaining a security clearance;
 - (ii) As with other features of character, the relevance of homosexuality to security can only be correctly assessed when all the interrelated circumstances are considered;
 - (iii) Ascertain whether the person is embarrassed or secretive in dealing with their homosexuality and if vulnerable to compromise, blackmail or indiscretion.

ACTION WHEN FIELD INVESTIGATION COMPLETE:

Upon completion of a security screening field investigation, the Service must:

- (a) If adverse information is revealed, provide the government institution with a security assessment including conclusions and recommendations.
 - (i) before any recommendation is made that, based on adverse information, a security clearance should be denied, an interview shall be held with the individual to allow him/her the opportunity to comment on the allegations.

- (b) If no adverse information is revealed, provide the government institution with a security assessment showing the investigative action taken and period covered together with any conclusions or recommendations considered necessary.

From the foregoing and our discussion of what constitutes a "security assessment", it should be obvious that the Service is obligated not only to provide and fully explain information which may have an adverse bearing on a person's suitability for a security clearance but, also, provide an elaboration of positive information to that effect.

REPORTING ELEMENTS - POINTS TO CONSIDER:

The granting, denial or revocation of a security clearance is not an easy decision to make; government is, on the one hand, obligated to protect its classified information from unauthorized disclosure while ensuring at the same time that the human rights and freedoms of its citizens are not undermined in the process. This is why security screening field enquiries are perhaps some of the most difficult to face an investigator. Conducted properly, they require a high degree of sensitivity to the issues, tact, discretion, maturity of judgement and the absence of bias or malice.

It is likely also that public and government perceptions of the Service on such matters as "professionalism", "competency", "thoroughness", "judgement", and "reliability" will be based primarily on observations and opinions formed as a result of the way we discharge our security screening responsibilities. Moreover, the types of evidentiary tests likely to be required in defending security assessments before bodies such as the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC) necessitates the most thorough investigation possible into the loyalty and associated reliability of individuals who require access to classified government assets to perform their duties.

It is in the context of the above that the following reporting elements are identified as areas requiring investigative consideration.

1. Investigators should not fail to explain satisfactorily the purpose of the screening interview. Failure to do so can lead to confusion or misunderstanding on the part of the person being interviewed.
2. There is a misconceived notion that the investigator is obligated only to elaborate on adverse information supplied by a source. Investigators should conduct the most thorough investigation possible into the character, lifestyle, loyalty and background of a security clearance candidate.

Elaboration of positive and negative features of character are required so as to provide a factual, corroborative and sustainable basis for our security assessments. Security assessments provided to government institutions must be defensible, not only when recommending the denial of a security clearance but, also, when recommending its issuance. It is possible that each case will be critically examined by such review mechanisms as the SIRC. The Service would, for example, be equally hard pressed to show the basis for a favourable security assessment if, subsequent to a security clearance, the candidate was found to be disloyal and unreliable.

3. It follows that investigators are required to be just as thorough in reporting the circumstances of activities suggesting questionable reliability. The definition of a "security assessment" clearly creates a causal connection between the reliability of an individual and loyalty; reliability factors cannot, therefore, be judged independent of loyalty considerations.

Standalone source comments are inadequate and care must be taken to clearly identify: (a) what the problem is; (b) the validity of the information in terms of the source and his/her ability to comment; and, (c) its relevance in terms of loyalty and associated reliability.

For example, evidence of criminal behaviour and/or convictions requires thorough exploration in order that a determination can be made as to whether there is a relationship between this feature of character and the subject's suitability for a security clearance. In the business world an employer may have a valid reason for refusing to employ, as a truck driver, an individual convicted of impaired driving. In our context, serious reservations might equally be held over someone convicted of embezzlement as an accountant.

Another example might be the subject's sexual preference. Assuming it is avowed, homosexuality may create difficult personnel management considerations but without more, it is difficult to argue that it can be considered reasonable grounds for concluding that an individual is likely to pose a security risk.

4. Do not ignore or fail to thoroughly explore investigative leads or follow-up questions during screening interviews.

For example, the source may describe the subject under investigation as "dependable" and provide support for this opinion by stating that the subject always "pays back the money I loan him". While this is a good example to support the source's statement, the investigator should attempt to discover the possibility that the subject suffers from chronic indebtedness.

Debts may be an indicator of financial irresponsibility and our concern should be whether the subject is likely to discharge his debts by betraying the trust reposed in him. Alternately, if the subject has declared bankruptcy it is an indicator, although not necessarily, that the person is prepared to pursue the legal options available to him rather than engage in illicit activity ("rob the till").

5. Avoid the misconception that the quantity of sources interviewed and information reported will somehow make up for quality. Instead, field enquiries should be pursued until a sufficient depth of information has been obtained to enable an informed judgement on whether or not the individual is of unquestionable loyalty, integrity and trustworthiness and such character, habits and associations as would cast no doubt upon his/her discretion or good judgement in handling classified information.

As far as possible and as the circumstances dictate, seek out sources who are able to comment meaningfully on such matters. For example previous or present employers, managers and co-workers are often able to provide informed comment and opinion about the subject's attitude to document security and discretion, and provide concrete examples of a favourable or questionable nature.

6. Persons being interviewed should be allowed the opportunity to describe the subject under investigation in their own words, without prompting in order to elicit a specific response. Reports should be confined, insofar as possible, to facts and any opinions regarding the suitability of the subject under investigation should be those of the person interviewed, not opinions based on hearsay. It is important to distinguish clearly between statements of fact and statements of opinion. When an opinion is expressed, it

should be shown as an opinion and the source's supporting reasons given.

7. It is assumed, for example, that most people are not likely to use the words "loyal", "discreet", "reliable", "trustworthy" when they describe someone. These words actually represent summations of a person's character. If the individual is prompted by the investigator, he or she may agree to the use of these words to describe the subject, but how can we be sure this individual has the same understanding of the words? In an effort to describe an individual's character, examples are essential.

What is required is some explanation of how the person being interviewed arrived at his or her summation. When the investigator writes his report, the proper place for his/her summation is in the "Investigator's Comments". Examples are important to the analysis and final preparation of a security assessment to enable an understanding of what is meant by descriptions such as trustworthiness or reliability. Examples also assist in establishing which traits of character may be significant by providing us with the context and circumstances surrounding any assessment of dishonesty, indiscretion, etc.

8. Consistent with the above, investigators should themselves be familiar with the meaning attached to such words as "reliable" and "trustworthy". Both can apply to persons, objects, ideas, or information that can be depended upon with confident certainty.

"Reliable" suggests consistent dependability of judgement, character, performance, or result; (i.e. a reliable car). "Trustworthy" emphasizes the steady and honest dependability which encourages one's confidence, belief, or trust; (i.e. trustworthy and accurate reports).

The words "trust", "confidence", "assurance" imply a feeling of security. "Trust" implies instinctive unquestioning belief in and reliance upon something or someone; (i.e. to have trust in one's parents). "Confidence" implies conscious trust because of good reasons, definite evidence, or past experience; (i.e. to have confidence in a person's discretion). "Assurance" implies absolute confidence and certainty; (i.e. to be completely assured of a person's loyalty).

9. Investigators should provide an evaluation of the source's relationship to the subject of enquiry. We are obligated to provide well-balanced, accurate security assessments to government departments. As such the Headquarters analyst needs more than a brief statement identifying the source as a neighbour/friend/employee/ co-worker who has known the subject for "X" number of years. In order to properly weigh and assess information provided by a source, we need to know: for example, (a) some of the circumstances behind the source's association with the subject; (b) why or why not the source is in a position to comment on the subject in terms of loyalty and/or reliability; (c) whether or not the source offered his comments in an apparently objective manner; (d) if the investigator suspects biased comments, a full explanation of the factors contributing to this suspicion; and, (e) in the case of a recommendation for a position of trust, why the source is able to comment in this regard.

FIELD ENQUIRY INTERVIEWS - SOME SUGGESTIONS:

Each security screening investigation is by its very nature different and circumstances will dictate the approach taken in each case. It is for this reason that no ready-made scenario can be offered as to the specifics of who should be interviewed during the enquiry, or exactly which questions should be asked during the interview. The responsible investigator is likely the best judge of such matters.

No interview, however, should be entertained without considerable preliminary preparation. The successful outcome of an interview may well hinge on how well acquainted the investigator is with available information concerning the subject. Armed with a thorough understanding of the purpose of security screening enquiries, the investigator must have some idea about which type of question is appropriate to the occasion and likely to elicit meaningful comment from the person being interviewed.

Against this backdrop a number of possible questions are suggested. The list is neither all-inclusive nor inflexible; the questions are offered with the caution that they might not suit every situation or circumstance. Points to remember are:

1. Some questions are phrased in such a way that they can be used only to introduce a given area of security screening concern and encourage a narrative from the person being interviewed. Others can be used only as a supplement for follow-up, clarification, or to extend the attention given to an area. Probably no one question alone will be sufficient to draw out an adequate narrative from the individual or create responses growing out of introspection.
2. Few of the questions are universally applicable. What may be appropriate to a neighbour with limited knowledge of the subject or our security screening requirements may be offensive to a high-ranking departmental manager.
3. Few questions can be used "as is". Rather they should be part of a larger group of questions and used to enhance the "routine" the investigator prepares for himself/herself. They are not listed in any order of sequence in which they should be asked.
4. A question which is too long or consists of too many subquestions or ramifications has two drawbacks:
 - (a) the interviewee may intentionally neglect certain discomfoting subquestions or may answer only those he or she is able to readily recall; and,
 - (b) if the investigator asks all parts of a question at one time, little may be left to prompt a flow of communications.
5. The test of a question is its relevance. If the investigator can show a direct connection to a personnel security screening issue, (i.e. not through circuitous thinking) then the question will normally be appropriate.
6. As noted in the preamble, there is no single proper technique or proper question. Every component of the interview - (person being interviewed, subject of enquiry, investigator, uncertainty felt by one or the other) - all offer a number of situations to which the investigator's questions must be adapted.

7. If the questions which the investigator prepares result generally in "yes" and "no" or limited responses, then the questions should be re-evaluated. The best questions are those which generate a narrative response from an individual, and introspection by the person before, or as, he/she answers. Together they promote rapport and elicit indepth information.
8. The investigator should not hesitate to use general follow-up questions when the response to the first question is not wholly satisfactory, such as: "Tell me more about ..., Would you be more specific, Did you miss any information about ..., Would you elaborate on ..., Would you recount the ... again, Did you answer all of the questions, I don't understand ..."
9. While a repertoire of questions is essential to the interview, it is preferable, when the person mentions an item of interest during a discussion on another topic, to rephrase that "mention" in the form of a question (when the investigator is prepared to pursue it).

For example, if the person makes passing reference to a subject's honesty when talking about his work history, it would be preferable to say: "You mentioned that the subject was honest a while ago, would you tell me more about that?" rather than, "Is the subject trustworthy?" In short, it is preferable to use the person's words to introduce a topic whenever possible, especially if it is a potentially sensitive area.

10. In critiquing the interview questioning process, the investigator may ask himself/herself, "What did the person tell me that convinced me of the subject's suitability to occupy a position of trust. Was there sufficient positive "proof" information to convince me that a favourable recommendation is justified - or did the interview consist of negative one-word responses?"

At the end of the field enquiry, the investigator and headquarters analyst should feel they know much of the "whole person" in substance, and not merely in the simple language of "reliable, honest, loyal, or trustworthy, possessing no traits of character likely to render him susceptible to coercion or blackmail."

11. In the same vein, investigators should avoid talking too much. Prefacing remarks to questions are often necessary to take the edge off sensitive questions or to show why we have a security screening interest, but the person being interviewed should be encouraged to talk, and then permitted to talk. Once the person begins to speak, the narrative can often be kept flowing with brief remarks or interrogatories (or even by non-verbal quizzical expressions).

These are but a few comments on the investigator's formulation and posing of questions. It should again be emphasized that these comments and the suggested questions which follow are provided for guidance and perspective, and should be adapted as needed.

EMPLOYMENT

Can you tell me about the subject's employment history? When, where, his/her tasks, why he/she left, etc.?"

Has the subject had any difficulties during employment that resulted in him being fired or asked to resign?

Has the subject ever been accused of dishonesty or indiscretion in connection with his employment?

During the subject's employment history, what were the reasons for changing jobs?

Were there any periods when the subject was unemployed? (If so) how did the subject support himself?

Did the subject ever leave an employment to avoid being fired or disciplined?

Has the subject ever had disagreements with his employer that resulted in him being fired or asked to resign?

What was your relationship to the subject? (This question can be modified to other areas (education, residence, social groups) where the subject was under the observation and/or evaluation of others).

Has the subject occupied a position of trust requiring access to classified government or confidential corporate assets? (If so) how did the subject handle this responsibility?

Do you have a security clearance? (If so) would you recommend the subject for a position of trust requiring access to classified government assets? Why?

EDUCATION

What extra-curricular activities did the subject engage in while attending school, college, university?

Any clubs, organizations, etc.?

How did the subject spend his/her free time?

Was the subject ever suspended or expelled from school?

Was the subject ever charged with any disciplinary offenses while in school?

What were the subject's drinking habits while at school? (Drugs?)

Was the subject ever involved with the police during his/her educational days?

RESIDENCE

Was the subject ever evicted from any residence?

Did the subject ever have any problems with landlords or neighbours?

Were any complaints about the subject made by neighbours to officials?

Has the subject ever been accused of failing to pay rent or keeping up with mortgage payments?

Did the subject ever leave a residence owing money for utilities, rents, damage, etc.?

Did neighbours or landlords ever have to call the police because of the subject's behaviour?

USE OF ALCOHOL/DRUGS

To establish whether or not the subject is a chronic user to excess of alcohol or drugs, first of all determine if the subject drinks or uses drugs?

How would you describe the subject's drinking habits?

What are your views on drinking? (this question establishes contexts to sources comments)

How much does the subject drink?

Has drinking ever caused the subject to lose a job?

Has drinking resulted in the break-up of subject's marriage?

Has the use of alcohol ever resulted in disciplinary action? In a lowered performance rating?

Has anyone (spouse, friends, co-workers, managers) complained about the subject in regard to his use of intoxicants?

Has the use of alcohol ever caused an embarrassing incident?

Has the subject's use of alcohol caused any financial or health problems?

Has anyone suggested that the subject should receive treatment or counseling?

Has the subject ever been arrested, charged or in anyway involved with the police because of his/her drinking? Does subject abide by law governing the use of drugs, including marijuana?

With respect to legal substances, has the subject ever misused or abused drugs prescribed by a doctor?

MENTAL OR EMOTIONAL STABILITY

Does the subject have a history of mental or nervous disorder?

Has any nervous disorder resulted in any psychological or adjustment problems which led to counseling?

Has the subject ever sought assistance from a mental health professional?

Has the subject ever sought out psychological counseling from (any) others, such as teachers, clergymen, school counselors, etc.?

Have there been any periods of mental instability or anxiety which affected the subject's job, family life, personality, etc.?

Has anyone ever recommended that the subject seek mental counseling?

Was psychological counseling or consultation ever a requirement following any incident at work, at school, or any other occasion?

Has the subject ever had a nervous breakdown or any nervous condition?

MORAL BEHAVIOUR

Should a person being interviewed ask what is "moral behaviour", the response given should be sufficiently broad to include not only ethical practices, honesty, conformity to laws, etc., but also sexual misconduct (promiscuity, voyeurism, child molesting, etc.).

Would you characterize any incidents (behaviour) in the subject's life as immoral or personally disgraceful?

Has subject's moral behaviour and conduct always been within the bounds of propriety? In other words, could someone hold it over the subject with a threat?

What do the words "moral" or "moral behaviour" mean to you?

Is there any incident or behaviour which might cause the subject fear if learned by his/her family, employer, co-workers, etc.?

POSITIVE VETTING: SEXUAL PREFERENCE

Are you homosexual or bi-sexual?

If you classify yourself as bi-sexual, how often do you have homosexual affairs? (e.g. once a month, once or twice a year, etc.).

On a scale of one to five, how comfortable with your sexual preference would you rate yourself?

Have you ever sought psychiatric help or counseling in relation to your sexual preference? With what result?

Do your parents, brothers, sisters, co-workers, employers know of your sexual preference?

How close are you to your parents, brothers, sisters? (i.e. very close, close, not very close).

Has your relationship with your parents, brothers, sisters, co-workers, etc. been affected, (a) by their knowing your sexual preference; or, (b) by their not knowing of your sexual preference?

Do you frequently pick up tricks? (If so) in what places do you seek out contacts? (i.e. in gay bars, bath houses, public washrooms, parks, through friends, private parties or other situations).

If you have a long standing relationship, including a marriage partner, does your partner know of your promiscuity outside of the relationship?

Given that he/she becomes aware of your having a homosexual relationship outside your partnership, would he/she be comfortable with this knowledge or would you be vulnerable to his/her reaction to this knowledge?

If you ever found yourself being compromised because of your sexual preference, what procedures would you follow?

What is the average age of your preferred partners?

FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

Do you know if the subject has ever received any late notices?

Have any creditors ever complained to the subject's employer?

Does the subject owe, or is he/she paying off, any judgements?

Has anyone ever filed a suit against the subject for his/her financial obligations? Liens?

Do you know if the subject has ever issued bad cheques?

To your knowledge, has the subject ever been denied credit? Denied a credit card? Had one recalled?

Does the subject live beyond his/her means? In your opinion, does the subject spend more than what you think his/her income would permit?

Are you aware if the subject gambles? (If so) to what extent has the subject lost money wagering?

Does the subject go to places where gambling is available? (the track, casinos, etc.).

Has the subject ever lost a wager which caused him/her to borrow money?

ORGANIZATIONS

What organizations or activities has the subject ever been a member of?

Does the subject belong to any organization that you might consider communist or subversive?

LOYALTY

Are you aware of the subject's views and activities in regards to his loyalty to Canada?

Has the subject ever endorsed any anti-Canadian or anti-democratic position?

Has the subject ever deliberately refused to obey a law for ideological reasons? Are there any laws which, if faced with the decision, the subject would not comply with?

Where his employment is concerned, do you have any reservations about the subject complying with regulations or policy?

Does the subject have any friends or family who have ever advocated or been involved or associated with any actions to promote violent or illegal action to change our form of government by unconstitutional means?

Do you have any reservations about the subject's loyalty to Canada?

CRIMINAL HISTORY

How would you describe the subject in terms of conforming and adhering to rules, regulations, laws, etc.?

Have you ever suspected the subject of criminal activity? (If so) to what extent was the subject involved? Has the subject ever been investigated by the police? What happened?

SECURITY

What are your views on the security clearance process? Do you hold a security clearance? Would you recommend the subject for a position of trust?

In your experience, does the subject believe that some information or material requires special protection?

Are there any factors which would make it difficult for the subject to hold classified information in complete trust?

Are you aware of any areas about which a person could subject the candidate to blackmail or coercion?

Would the subject, as a person with access to classified information be subjected to any pressure from family, friends or associates?

Would you assess the subject's security reliability, or the handling or protection of information as being "loose"?

Are you aware if the subject has ever been confronted with the claim that he/she did not handle information properly? Such as personal or private data? In-house private discussions not yet made public?

Has the subject ever been involved in any violations of trust?

CONCLUSION

Are you aware of anything which might preclude the subject from a security clearance?

Considering all that has been said, do you have any reservations about the subject which might have a bearing on a security clearance, or which you feel should be further explained?

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Considering all that has been said, which areas would you suggest should be explained better or amplified?

Before we began, were there any areas which you felt should have been discussed but which I have not touched upon?