

ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEW

Interview with Mr. C. E. McGaughey

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WELLINGTON - 1957-58

The mission in Wellington used book cypher, which made communications very slow. McGaughey learned that the British High Commission, which was in the same building, was getting new cypher equipment and scrapping their old machine. He therefore got the British to give them the old machine, which could be operated by his secretary who had once worked for the New Zealand High Commission in Ottawa (which used the same equipment).

PERSONNEL DIVISION - 1959-62

Green liked to take officers from the Department with him to their home towns in Canada when he had to make speeches there. McGaughey was asked to accompany the minister on one occasion when he was making a speech in Timmins. McGaughey, who came from North Bay, was the officer whose home town was closest to Timmins. He was very cordially treated on the trip. On the way back, Green was asked by an MP in his party why there was not more political appointees as heads of mission under the Conservatives, and he got McGaughey to explain.

On one occasion, Green refused to post an officer to Latin America because he did not speak Spanish.

McGaughey did not object to political appointees but he thought they should resign at the end of each administration. The Liberals' political appointees did not have to resign when the Conservatives came in, however. McGaughey thinks the Con-

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servatives probably gave the same number of political appointments as the Liberals had done, with the result that twice as many positions were taken up by such heads of post at the end of the administration as there had been at the beginning.

McGaughey suspected that Ross Campbell [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] McGaughey, however, was not aware of any particular issues on which Campbell initiated action, and did not think that Green's positions on disarmament, nuclear weapons or Latin America [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

McGaughey considered Gill to be effective in dealing with administration in the O/USSEA. Much of what concerned him was of insufficient importance to concern the USSEA. The latter's chief administrative responsibility was staffing, on which McGaughey found him reasonable. When there was a delay regarding an appointment, McGaughey felt it was likely for political reasons known to Robertson but not to himself. Both Robertson and Gill were well-informed about the backgrounds and abilities of FSO's, but McGaughey felt that the knowledge of both was somewhat circumscribed by the concentration of their own social lives within Rockcliffe. People from outside that set were less well-known to them and so might receive less attention when the qualifications of various candidates for a post were being weighed.

McGaughey had to deal with a large number of security cases as Head of Personnel. He had to act on the instruction of DL2 which in turn was guided by the RCMP. The latter, he

thinks, may have been influenced by Fulton, who had a reputation for taking a rigid Roman Catholic view of morals questions. Most of the cases McGaughey had to deal with involved homosexuality and he considers Sawatsky's book to be substantially correct. He disliked dealing with these matters, which involved arranging for the resignation or transfer of employees considered security risks, because in many instances, he did not feel he was given sufficient information, and there was no possibility of appeal. He does not think that the Department offered much resistance when advised that an employee was under suspicion: in other words, in his view almost all those reported as security risks lost their clearance. Most of the cases he had to deal with involved officers.

McGaughey required officers as well as stenographers to take the Health and Welfare psychological test, because he thought it was unfair to have it apply only to the former.

The Civil Service Commission did not cause any serious problems. It was difficult to deal with Treasury Board because their officials, who were in Ottawa throughout their careers, had more expertise in financial matters than the rotational officers in External Affairs. However, McGaughey also felt that his experience abroad gave him an advantage in dealing with Treasury Board, since he could speak with authority on the requirements of a rotational service. But he had to be careful because he did not know the Ottawa scene so well as the Treasury Board staff.

The Department managed to meet the requirements of the government in establishing new posts, despite financial stringency, but the strain on resources was considerable. McGaughey himself

was affected, because at one point his doctor prescribed tranquilizers. But the real price of meeting the government's requirements was paid by individual officers, who accepted postings at considerable personal inconvenience, or agreed to a number of hardship postings which many of their colleagues turned down.

McGaughey found that it was difficult to recruit more than about twenty good new officers a year. He was reluctant to accept marginal candidates because he knew that, once they were in the Department, no one would recommend getting rid of unsuitable ones at the end of the probationary period (which he considered too short). So once a candidate was accepted, he was likely to remain in the Department for the rest of his working life, and McGaughey thought it advisable to err on the side of caution in order to avoid lumbering the Department with a great deal of dead weight.

McGaughey found it difficult to recruit francophones at this time. Because it was expected that there would be francophones in each class, he felt that standards with regard to them had to be somewhat more relaxed. He was also under pressure to increase the recruitment of women, and thinks it may have originated at the political level.

McGaughey thought of economic officers as a "union within a union". They favoured postings in the more desirable parts of the world, and there was no pressure from the economists for specialists in their field east and south of Suez. McGaughey thought there should be an economic specialist in Delhi, and had to fight for about three years to get one sent there.

McGaughey regarded language training as a luxury in a

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department as small as External Affairs. An officer who learned one of the difficult languages could only occasionally be sent to a post where he could use it, or his career prospects would suffer. When an officer studying Japanese in Tokyo failed to attain honours standing, McGaughey had him withdrawn from the course, despite the objections of the mission (all previous students had got honours).

When he was in Pakistan, McGaughey sent Dan Molgat to the frontier to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Having to resort to this device however, reinforced McGaughey's view of language training.

McGaughey considered it essential to morale to develop a service offering officers a desirable career path and for that reason was opposed to lateral transfers from other departments. Each such transfer cut off a promotion prospect not only in the rank of the appointment, but also in each level below it.

KUALA LUMPUR - 1962-65

McGaughey did not find accreditation to Burma and Thailand a problem. His main problem was with External Aid, as a result of a bridge in Burma which collapsed and which it took them a very long time to decide to rebuild.

Especially when he was in Ghana, McGaughey found the most distracting feature of multiple accreditation to be the requirement of presenting credentials and then making formal farewells. Another head of mission in Accra responsible for the same countries as McGaughey was not formally accredited to them. He

had just as easy access, but with much less time-consuming formality, and McGaughey thought Canada should try the same approach.

McGaughey was received by Diefenbaker before going to Kuala Lumpur. Diefenbaker talked about only two subjects; his disapproval of a dinner he had attended with Lee Kwan Yew in Singapore where everybody was expected to help themselves from a single bowl of food, and a recent incident in Ottawa involving a butcher (who Diefenbaker had patronized) who had gotten into trouble for selling tainted meat. McGaughey was also taken to lunch at the Rideau Club by Robertson at this time and believes it was the Under-Secretary's practise to entertain all officers in this manner before their first posting as head of mission.