

John Timmerman, Ottawa, January 8, 1980

By Ann Hillman, who says J. T. Hillman

Treatment of homosexuals varied: some were let go or transferred, some were put in non-rotational positions, and some were kept rotational but not sent to sensitive posts. Robertson helped place people in other departments.

Canadian policies were based on Canadian experience and also that of the UK, which indicated that homosexuality made personnel vulnerable to blackmail by unfriendly agents.

Timmerman disagrees with Sawatsky's suggestion that attention concentrated on FSOs and neglected support staff.

He thinks the "fruit machine" was an invention of the RCMP.

Moscow had developed the technique of recruitment of security risks to a more sophisticated level than the satellites, but the Poles also became very skilful at this activity.

~~XXXXXXXX~~ Excessive drinking also made personnel subject to security risk. Hostile intelligence would get people drunk, then stage an apparently fatal accident and use that experience as the basis of blackmail. Often the victim would be asked ~~to~~ first to co-operate in innocuous ways, the co-operation would itself become more serious, and then that activity would be used to blackmail the victim into providing information that was clearly against the Canadian interest.

The "chamber of horrors" was developed to counteract the activity of unfriendly agents and was very effective. [See document filed under Training.]

Black-market activities, especially involving currency, were another problem. They were more serious with subordinate staff because they did not have diplomatic privileges. Officers could profit by importing cars every two years and selling them but support staff were ~~not~~ able to do this so looked for other ways of benefiting financially from a posting.

There were four major causes of security risk:

- ~~There~~
- a. Homosexuality
 - b. Heterosexual indiscretion

- c. Excessive use of alcohol or drugs.
- d. Black-market activity.

The "other side" was more successful in the early 1950s than later, after Canada developed techniques to counter them.

Timmerman found it difficult to convince people going to risky posts that they had to be on their guard all the time. He ^{nk} this this difficulty was related to uniquely Canadian characteristics--^{The overseas 1st time in this} Canadians seemed to find it harder to believe in the dangers than diplomats from other countries. The chamber of horrors was developed to deal with this problem and had a significant impact.

The one effective means of dealing with security risks was the promise of confidentiality. Hence External Affairs avoided publicity and prosecution as counter-productive. There was disagreement with the RCMP over avoiding prosecution--the outlook of the policeman and the security officer is very different. (Off the record.) But the Canadian operation was very effective--cf. the US experience. The promise of confidentiality has never been violated.

Candidates for jobs would be denied security clearance without being told the reasons. But no one was ever dismissed on security grounds without knowing why.

~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ Timmerman agrees that Diefenbaker was personally interested in what was happening to homosexuals. He thinks Diefenbaker became aware of the ^oproblem through MPs to whom civil servants complained when their security clearance was jeopardised as a result of homosexuality.

All ~~1~~ interviews of employees whose security clearance was in jeopardy were conducted by DL2. Personnel handled only the mechanics of these cases--arrangements for transfer, termination, etc.

DL2 did not encourage people in the department to spy on each other or to gossip. But the division was alert to weaknesses in the operation of posts, etc., which might indicate security problems, and would discuss these with the persons affected.

Local employees were a cause of concern regarding security. As they gained experience in a mission, they could widen t A0785351_2-000441

of their activities. Each new head of mission was an opportunity for them to extend their activities further.

There was no witch-hunt for homosexuals or other security risks.

UK experience and methods were particularly valuable to External Affairs in dealing with these problems.

Timmerman found Léger to be very businesslike in dealing with security risks. He did not procrastinate. Robertson seemed more humane, but he was very sensible.