



MEMORANDUM

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

A/DSI

YOUR FILE No.
Votre dossier.

OUR FILE No.
Notre dossier

FROM
De

Insp. Vaughan

DATE 30 June 1970.

OLD

SUBJECT
Sujet

Re: Recommendations of the Royal Commission
on Security - SP-238

Personnel Security

Item (a):

Universal screening of all public servants prior to their being employed would be the ideal situation if those upon whom adverse information was discovered were rejected. However, the Commission recommendation contemplates entry into the public service even though adverse information is uncovered. The advantages to be gained, therefore, if this recommendation were implemented would be minimal insofar as the Security Service is concerned and doubtless would cause many problems for those responsible for staffing the public service. All things being considered, the present situation, whereby CD 35 requests that those persons who are "likely to be required eventually to have access to classified information" should be screened, provides for an adequate degree of security in government. The RCMP view is that "access" should continue to be the determining factor with regard to security screening in the public service and that universal screening as recommended by the Commission is not practical.

Item (b):

As noted, this is a requirement now. The stepping up and improving of selection and training of departmental security officers would probably be the best way to ensure that proper clearance was

•• 12
A0053081_1-005022

obtained for persons about to be employed on classified work.

The security officer should also be required to determine what positions within his department actually entail access to classified information.

Item (c) (i): Formal recommendation re clearance

The RCMP is prepared to give formal recommendation regarding security clearance; however, if this comes about, criminal records, which are now handled directly by the department security officers, will have to be channelled to "I" Directorate after processing by the Identification Branch of the RCMP.

Note: Reference is also made here to the forwarding of "investigative reports". The RCMP is prepared to send more comprehensive briefs but we object to sending investigator's reports. The Privy Council Office (Mr. Wall) has been pressing for the forwarding of reports rather than briefs for some time. The issue is raised twice more, at Item (d) and Item (i), in this paper.

Credit Bureau Checks

With regard to Credit Bureau checks, these are made automatically when a department requests a field investigation. A field investigation is compulsory for Top Secret and SA clearances and at the discretion of the department can be requested for clearance to the "Secret" level. The RCMP view is that Credit Bureau checks should continue to be

made for Top Secret and SA clearance or when a field investigation is requested, but that the Commission's proposal to extend the checks to all Confidential and Secret clearances should be rejected because the added advantages from a security standpoint would not be worth the considerable additional effort and cost which would be involved.

Departmental check with referees

The RCMP feels that departments should check with referees, and that any adverse information should be passed along to the RCMP to assist in further investigation.

Item (c) (ii): Departments should formally record a judgement noting that the individual being cleared requires, or is likely to require, access to classified information. In Fact, CD 35 only gives authority to investigate if the man has, or is likely to have, access and at the present time this is how we justify security investigations, on university campuses, of individuals who did not need access. Under the present terms of reference people are sometimes cleared because they might need access.

Item (c)(iii): The RCMP supports the recommendation for the regular updating of all clearances to the level of "Secret" and above. We now provide

updating of clearances for persons in certain particularly sensitive departments and jobs. If all clearances are to be regularly updated this would greatly increase our work. We would ask, therefore, that if such a program is to be undertaken it be done gradually, with those departments most involved with classified material being processed first and with priorities being set by the Security Service so that the increases we may require in manpower and equipment to handle the increased workload could be dealt with through departmental estimates.

A regular updating would of course require updated personal history forms. The present practise does not, thereby making updating enquiries more difficult. Regular updating enables the Security Service to keep abreast of subjects moves within the Public Service.

Item (d): Security Service to provide copies of investigator's reports

The RCMP is prepared to provide more detailed information and to comment on the relevance, significance and importance of that information (in fact we have been doing so since early in 1968) but we are not prepared to send "investigator's reports". Our ob-

jection stems primarily from the need to protect the identity of those persons who have provided information to the investigator.

Formal recommendation regarding clearance

The RCMP is prepared to provide a formal recommendation regarding clearance.

Item (e): The matter of the Security Secretariat is before Ministers; however, the position of the Solicitor General, supported by the RCMP, is that the Security Secretariat should fall under his supervisor, within his Department. It should not remain in the Privy Council Office.

Items (f) & (g): We support retention of CD 35.

Item (h): The RCMP does not object strongly to the employment of homosexuals in non-sensitive areas in Canada, or, when the element of compromise has been largely negated through interview, allowing access to secret information.

It does object to them having access to Top Secret or SA material, or being posted overseas in any capacity.

Item (i): The Government should "make clear" its policy regarding separatists. This would give the Security Service a clear mandate to investigate such separatist activity as the Government indicates is prejudicial to

Canada's interests. It would also give security officers firm guide lines.

Note: Contrary to what is noted here, "investigation reports" are not sent to the Privy Council Office, only briefs or letters outlining the results of the investigation.

Item (j): The Government should permit the Security Service to get back on campus. Whether it needs to warn the CAUT that we are coming is debatable, but it certainly should be prepared to support our presence there if it is brought to public attention by CAUT or any other group once we do go back on campus.

Item (k): We are prepared to abide by the criteria laid down; however, a New Canadian should not be able to get clearance with a lesser check than other Canadians are subjected to.

Item (l): Fingerprints for all clearances

 This would provide a better security clearance. The RCMP supports this recommendation.

Item (m): Access to criminal records

 The RCMP supports the recommendation that criminal records should be made available for security clearance purposes.

CARDING DATE 18 2-70

With reference to the Security Panel minutes which were distributed on February 19th, 1970, the minutes dated 1A-10-3-7. November 3, 1969, should read the "85th" meeting instead of the "84th" meeting. Would you be good enough to amend your copies accordingly? The minutes of the 84th meeting will be forthcoming.

A0053081_7-005028