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(1.1.1)
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

BRIEF

FOR

THE ROYAL COMMISSION

ON SECURITY

Ottawa, Ontario
26 December 1967

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ROYAL COMMISSION ON SECURITY



Canada]

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COMMISSION ROYALE SUR LA SECURITE

Commissioners:

Commissaires:

M. W. Mackenzie

Y. Pratte

M. J. Coldwell

P. O. Box

466 Ottawa, Ontario

C. P.

FILE: RCS 1-6/DND

January 16, 1968

Mr. R. J. Sutherland,
Departmental Secretary,
Department of National Defence,
OTTAWA, Ontario.

Dear Mr. Sutherland:

I am returning herewith, under separate cover, the five copies of the "early edition" of the DND Brief for the Royal Commission on Security which were obtained from you by Messrs. Trotman and Munro. The ten copies of the "final edition" are quite sufficient to meet our needs.

Please acknowledge receipt on the duplicate copy of this letter and return it at your early convenience.

Thanking you for your kind co-operation, I remain

Yours sincerely,

P. A. Lemieux,
Security Officer.

Receipt acknowledged

R. J. Sutherland

January 17, 1968.

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FILE: RCS 1-6/END

January 16, 1968

Mr. R. J. Sutherland,
Departmental Secretary,
Department of National Defence,
OTTAWA, Ontario.

Dear Mr. Sutherland:

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P. A. Lemieux,
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R. J. Sutherland

January , 1968.

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DEPUTY MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE



SOUS-MINISTRE DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE


January 2, 1968.

The Royal Commission on
Security,
116 Lisgar Street,
Ottawa,
Ontario.

Dear Sirs:

Enclosed are ten (10) copies of the
Department of National Defence Brief for the Royal Commission
on Security.

Yours sincerely,


for E. B. Armstrong
Deputy Minister

Encl. 10

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DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE



MINISTÈRE DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE

D 1200-0050/125 (DEPSEC)

Ottawa 4, Ontario
22 November, 1967

Mr. C.D. Munro
Research Staff
Royal Commission on Security
116 Lisgar Street
Ottawa 4, Ontario

Dear Mr. Munro:

As I agreed on the phone yesterday, I am enclosing a copy of what I hope is the last draft of the Department of National Defence Brief for the Royal Commission on Security. It is for your information, as you know, and has not as yet received the endorsement of the Department. I would be grateful, therefore, if you would not give it any circulation.

Yours very truly,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "R.J. Sutherland".

R.J. Sutherland
Departmental Secretary

1 Encl.

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DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

BRIEF FOR THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON SECURITY

INTRODUCTION

General

1. The security policy for the Department of National Defence (DND) stems initially from the Cabinet Directive and Privy Council Security Panel documents pertaining to Security in the Public Service of Canada. The Deputy Minister (DM) is responsible to the Minister of National Defence for the security of the DND in accordance with the security policies and directives laid down by the government. Subject to these overall responsibilities, the Chief of the Defence Staff is responsible for the security of the Canadian Armed Forces and has issued the security arrangements to be followed in CFP 128 "Security Orders for the Canadian Forces". Similarly, the Chairman Defence Research Board is responsible for the security of the Defence Research Board (DRB) and its establishments which are governed by the DRB Security Regulations.

Threat

2. In general, the threat to security as contained in the Joint Intelligence Committee Paper, "The Threat to Canada from Subversion, Sabotage and Espionage" and the RCMP Paper, "Revolutionary Organizations in Canada", guides the Department's security policies and arrangements.

Function of Security

3. The basic function of DND security is to prevent information, which in the interests of the Government of Canada should not be divulged, reaching the hands of a potential enemy. Prevention is exercised through the control of classified information and materiel and the individuals who have access to it.

SECURITY ORGANIZATION IN THE DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

General

4. DND, by virtue of a number of agreements with other Western Powers, particularly the US and the UK, occupies a privileged position which re-

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sults in the receipt of a large amount of highly classified scientific and technical information which requires special protection. For this reason it is considered that this Department may be singled out as the primary target for foreign espionage operations in Canada. Two major factors are the large number of personnel within DND requiring access to classified information and the immense volume of classified information held. The DND employs approximately 150,000 personnel, of which approximately 104,000 are military and the remainder civilian. Most of these personnel, in the normal course of their duties, require access or have the opportunity to gain access to classified information and accordingly require a security clearance. Approximately 250,000 classified documents, annually, are either received or generated within the Department.

5. At the interdepartmental level, the DM is the DND representative for security matters and as such he represents the Department on the Security and Visits Panels. Departmental policy is coordinated within DND through the Security & Information Release Committee (SIRC) the terms of reference of which are contained in Annex "A". Briefly, this committee is responsible to the Deputy Minister for formulating security policy and guidance on matters of common concern within the Department. The recommendations of the SIRC may, subject to the degree of importance, be referred by the DM to the Defence Council for final approval.

National Defence Headquarters

6. Security arrangements for NDHQ, which comprises some 20 buildings or groups of buildings throughout the Ottawa and Hull area, are the responsibility of the Commandant of CFHQ Administrative Unit. DRB is responsible for security within its own area. To meet its responsibilities, the Administrative Unit has a security section of fifty-nine personnel. The responsibilities of this section are listed in Annex "B".

The Canadian Forces

7. General. Security within the Canadian Armed Forces is a function and responsibility of command at all levels. Security staffs at each

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level of command provide advice to commanders and administer and direct the security forces and other security resources, and maintain liaison with civilian law enforcement agencies. The organization of security at command level varies to meet the different requirements of the functional commanders. In general, police matters, security measures and standards are co-ordinated by a command staff officer.

8. CFHQ Directorate of Security. The Director of Security is responsible to the Director General of Intelligence and Security for assessing and advising on the state of security within the Canadian Armed Forces. This responsibility includes the development of policy, procedures and regulations as well as advice to commanders arising from inspections, surveys and enforcement. The functions of the Directorate of Security are grouped in three areas under separate staff control; security standards and procedures for the protection of information and the physical security of material and units; the security clearance of personnel; technical supervision of military police and security staffs employed at commands and bases. Annex "C" contains terms of reference for the Directorate of Security.

9. Command Organization. Each of the six functional Commanders has a security staff whose functions consist of policy control, enforcement of standards and co-ordination of base and unit security requirements.

10. Base Organization. Each base normally has a full time professional security officer who is responsible to the base commander for security and police standards and administration.

11. Security of Lodger Units. Units belonging to a different functional commander than that of their base are known as lodger units. These units normally receive support for physical security requirements from their base but are responsible to their own functional command for the state of their internal security and the security of personnel.

12. Special Investigation Unit. This organization is under the functional command of the Director of Security. The Commanding Officer

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of the unit is located at CFB Rockcliffe. Six subordinate detachments and 22 sections are stationed at various locations across the country and in Europe. They are the DND organization which carries out field investigations in the support of the personnel security clearance program for the Canadian Forces and the Administrative Branch. In addition, they conduct criminal investigations at the request of any Commanding Officer.

Security Organization in the Defence Research Board

13. The Security organization of the DRB is designed to accomplish a comprehensive program based on procedures derived from the DND security policy and applied in a manner calculated to meet the particular requirements and conditions of a defence research and development organization.

14. DRB security policy formulation is centralized at Board Headquarters; implementation of security is decentralized. Heads of Branches and Establishments are responsible for security measures within their own organizations in accordance with DRB policy. The DRB Security Regulations provide basic direction in all aspects of security and these are augmented for particular operational purposes by DRB Security Letters.

15. The security requirements of DRB are subject to periodic review and security measures are examined in detail at least once each year by on-site inspections and consultation with Heads of Branches and Establishments. Every new employee is given a security briefing and on-the-job security instruction is provided for. General and particular security education is provided through lectures and film showings.

16. The DRB Security Officer (DSO) is responsible to the Deputy Chairman for the administration of the security program and for the formulation of security policy for approval by the Chairman of the DRB. He advises on the threat to security and the means to counter it and he provides the staff channel on all security policy matters with the Canadian Forces, the RCMP and other government departments. He is the DRB representative on the SIRC. He is responsible for ensuring that adequate safeguards are established and maintained to protect all classified in-

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formation in the custody of DRB Headquarters. To discharge his responsibilities for all aspects of security, the DSO is assisted by three professionals and a supporting staff of five.

17. An "Establishment Security Officer" (ESO) is appointed in each of the seven DRB Establishments. In addition to his professional duties, he undertakes primary responsibility for establishment security and reports directly to the Head of the Establishment on all security matters. Additional suitable persons may be given part-time duties to assist the ESO in supervising and encouraging good security.

18. In addition to the administrative part of the organization, security guarding and a physical security organization are provided for. A copy of DRB Security Letter No. 3 which describes this organization is attached as Annex "D".

Security Organization in the Administrative Branch

19. Security in the Administrative Branch of the DND is concerned with the safe-guarding of classified information and restricting access of classified information to authorized personnel on the "need-to-know" basis. The Administrative Branch Security Officer reports directly to the Departmental Secretary (who is also the Chairman of the SIRC) and is responsible for the preparation and issue of Administrative Branch and Security Standing Orders, the indoctrination of personnel and the investigation of security infractions. Detailed orders are based on policy instruction emanating from the SIRC and appropriate governmental directives.

20. For security purposes the Administrative Branch is divided into eight divisions, each with its own security officer reporting to the Administrative Branch security officer, who is also the Chief of the Records Management Division. Personnel clearances on civilian personnel are obtained from the Director of Security, CFHQ, through the Chief of the Personnel Division of the Administrative Branch. In non-working hours security supervision of the Branch offices is provided by the

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National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) Security Guard in the same manner and under the same requirements as that provided for the Canadian Forces Headquarters.

SECURITY OF INFORMATION

Requirement for Security

21. The security of information comprises both classified documentary information and information that can be gained from access to classified equipment. The DND is the recipient of much scientific and technical and intelligence information from other countries and, in addition is the custodian of certain Allied plans. A large part of the information received is classified and provided under the condition that Canada maintain security at least as adequate as that of the originating country. The principal agreements under which DND receives classified information are contained in Annex "E". It is interesting to note that DRB alone receives over twenty thousand documents per year from our allies and of these about four thousand are classified.

Principles of Control

22. The security of information is primarily a matter of proper classification of the material and subsequent control of access based on the security clearance of the individuals and the "need-to-know" principle. No person is entitled to classified information solely by virtue of rank, position or appointment. Regulations governing the care and control of classified information in the DND are derived from government regulations for security in the public service and guidance from the Security Panel and Sub-Panel.

Classification

23. The security grading determines the degree of protection a piece of information is to receive. The DND security classification system includes gradings and protection for information which are of:

- a. purely Canadian origin;
- b. NATO origin;
- c. other country origin.

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24. The gradings used for purely Canadian originated information are those used throughout the Public Service of Canada and, in addition, the terms used have the same connotation among the allies of Canada, particularly NATO. Definitions of the Canadian security classification terms are:

Top Secret - applied to documents, information, or material the security aspects of which are paramount, and the unauthorized disclosure of which could cause exceptionally grave damage to the nation;

Secret - applied to documents, information, or material the unauthorized disclosure of which could endanger national security, cause serious injury to the interests or prestige of the nation, or could prejudice any government activity thereof, or would be of great advantage to a foreign nation;

Confidential - applied to documents, information or material, the unauthorized disclosure of which, while not endangering national security, could be prejudicial to the interests or prestige of the nation or could prejudice any government activity, or would be of advantage to a foreign nation; (individual personnel files and documents may, however, be accorded the protection provided by this classification).

Restricted - applied to documents, information, or material (other than Top Secret, Secret, or Confidential) which should not be published or communicated to anyone except for official purposes.

Unclassified - Information which does not require protection is marked Unclassified to indicate that a security evaluation of the information has actually been made.

25. Security classification of matter originated under the authority of DND is the responsibility of the originator. Security gradings are selected and applied in accordance with the criteria described in the previous paragraph. TOP SECRET classification may be applied only when

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approved by specified officers of the parent organization.

26. Classified information originated in NATO, or prepared by member countries for distribution within NATO, is identified by the use of the prefix NATO which is placed in front of the security gradings in the following manner:

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

NATO RESTRICTED

NATO CONFIDENTIAL

NATO SECRET

For Top Secret information only, the prefix COSMIC is added as follows:

COSMIC TOP SECRET

In accordance with NATO security requirements a special registry is operated by the Department for the control of COSMIC documents.

27. Classification systems similar to that used by Canada are in effect in other countries. Classified matter received from such countries is provided with the appropriate Canadian security classification and protection.

28. There are, in addition to basic classification categories, special caveats such as "Canadian Eyes Only" and "Canadian/U.S. Eyes Only" etc. These caveats denote that documents are restricted to members of the nations indicated. In the case of "Canadian Eyes Only", this caveat is applied to documents that it would not be appropriate for other nationals to observe, whether hostile to Canada or not. Code words may be applied to specific projects or operations and are usually associated with cover stories to mask the real purposes of an activity. At the same time this procedure can be used to reduce to an absolute minimum the number of personnel exposed to information on a sensitive project. In some cases special access lists are maintained.

29. Personnel security clearance files are classified to protect the individual as well as for security reasons. Personnel administrative files for career management, medical and other such personal reasons are also pro-

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vided with appropriate security classifications.

30. The overall classification ratio of current file holdings in the DND, excluding the DRB, is:

Top Secret	- 2%
Secret	- 11%
Confidential	- 11%
Restricted &	
Unclassified	- 76%

These percentages vary from area to area, depending on the sensitivity of Branch or Section tasks. The figures do not include 105,000 CONFIDENTIAL personnel files.

Downgrading and Declassification of Documents

31. The Department receives a vast amount of classified information from other countries requiring security to the second party standard. Because DND files are maintained by subject without regard to source except in certain special cases such as NATO, downgrading of an individual file would require perusal of each document on the file. In the case of documents of foreign origin not specified for automatic downgrading permission of the originator would be required to downgrade. Downgrading in this manner would be very costly in man-hours. Such a declassifying system would not necessarily be suitable. The failure to obtain permission to downgrade or declassify a single second party item contained in a file would necessitate destruction of the item or the creation of an additional file for it at the appropriate classification.

32. The U.S.A. has an automatic downgrading system that is applied to some but not all documents. The United Kingdom restricts the declassification of files for a period of thirty years. Release to the public of Canadian files held in the Public Archives is currently under review in the Privy Council.

33. "The DRB has a semi-automatic downgrading and declassification system for scientific and technical reports and in addition, every classified report proposed for publication is examined to determine in advance the downgrading group for which it qualifies."

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Release of Information and Equipment

34. One of the most important handling procedures in the protection of information is the control of its release outside of the department. Requests or requirements for release may originate from other government departments, civil agencies and foreign nations with respect to:

- a. export of equipment;
- b. friendly nations;
- c. civilian contracts for research, development or construction.

Requests are also received from the Press.

35. All release authorizations must include safeguards to ensure continued protection at the level dictated by the classification of the information or equipment. Where release to the press is involved, or where the national interest dictates an open release, a re-assessment of the sensitivity is required to de-classify the information. DRB has considerable relationships with the manufacturing and research communities in Canada, involving release and exchange of information. DRB orders on Release of Information in Canada are attached as Annex "F".

36. The release of classified information through civilian contracts or arising out of the export of military equipment involves the transfer of custody through the Department of Defence Production (DDP). In the case of contracts a "Security Requirements and Check List" is raised by DND which specifies the levels of protection required. Control and enforcement is then the responsibility of DDP. A copy of the DDP paper on Security in the Canadian Defence Industry is attached at Annex "G".

37. The export of military equipment in support of Canadian policies for foreign aid and export sales are examples of range of interest and involvement of more than one government department or agency. Applications to export military equipment are received from the Department of External Affairs by the Defence Secretariat who is the coordinator for DND. The Director General of Intelligence and Security comments upon intelligence and security aspects, particularly concerning the possibility

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of trans-shipment to a nation potentially hostile to Canada. The Department of Trade and Commerce is authorized by Cabinet Directive to export equipment up to a specified value without reference to DND. The Cabinet Directive relating to export of military equipment is attached as Annex "H".

38. The following guidelines are used in DND for assessment of requests for release of information:

- a. if to another friendly nation, the "need to know" must be established;
- b. the degree of reciprocity received must be ascertained;
- c. if a third party interest is involved, the approval of the third party must be obtained.

39. Because of numerous requests received, the policy order on release of information allows an individual component to release to specified countries up to a specific classification level. The CFHQ Directorate of Security maintains a library for ready reference on individual classified subjects, which includes the record of precedence, second country content and other useful guidance detail. By utilizing the references available and consulting with the specialists concerned, the full implications of a release can be assessed and a qualified decision achieved. Requests for release of information are usually received directly from Foreign Attaches or Liaison Officers, or through the Department of External Affairs or DDP. Attached at Annex "I" is the DND policy governing the release of information to foreign countries.

Preparation and Amendment of Security Orders

40. Security orders of the DND are under constant review to ensure that changing and new situations are adequately controlled. These orders are based on policy direction issued by the SIRC, the Security Panel or Cabinet Directive. In addition, revisions to NATO, U.S. or U.K. security orders, which have application to Canada, give rise to amendment to Canadian orders.

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Care and Destruction of Classified Waste

41. An important security responsibility is the care and adequate destruction of classified waste. Classified waste includes all papers, notebooks, typewriter ribbons, carbon copies, stencils, maps, recordings and unrepairable classified equipment or any matter that may contain information of possible value to a second party. Combustible material is destroyed by burning or pulping under the jurisdiction of an authorized staff. Where the destruction of highly classified combustible material, such as "TOP SECRET" and special information is concerned, witnessing officers are required and certificates confirming destruction are completed.

International Visits Panel

42. The Interdepartmental Visits Panel was formed in 1956 to control the exchange of visits between Canada and Communist Bloc Countries. The terms of reference which were revised in 1966 are contained in Annex "J".

43. The requirement for the Visits Panel is based on security considerations. Guidance for the Visits Panel on the exchange of information with communist bloc countries is derived from the Cabinet Directive on this matter, dated 23 August 1953 at Annex "K".

Visits to Defence Establishments

44. The coordination and control of visits to DND establishments and to industrial plants holding classified defence information is essential to the security of information.

45. Visits by Canadian nationals concerned with the manufacture of military equipment are normally sponsored by the DDP Director of Industrial Security or representatives of other government departments. Coordination is done through the appropriate security officer.

46. Foreign military visitors are normally sponsored through the Foreign Liaison Office of the DND in conjunction with the DDP Director of Industrial Security. Other foreign nationals are screened by the Director of Industrial Security in consultation with DND.

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47. All visit applications are reviewed in the light of the release policy to determine the full scope and classification of what may be seen or discussed during the visit. Then in accordance with the SIRC disclosure policy, the extent of information to be released is authorized. At every installation, unclassified visits and visits by persons without acceptable clearances are controlled to deny access to classified information.

Data Processing and Photocopying Machines

48. Modern technology has created additional difficulties in security of information. These difficulties arise primarily from two sources. The first is the large number of copy machines available within government departments from which it is possible, within a few minutes, to reproduce copies of documents. The second problem involves the use of data processing equipment. Within a standard data processing system there is a huge capacity for information. Essentially, the problem is the same whether the system is a punch card type installation or random access computer operating with either tapes, disc or a data cell storage system. In all cases, data processing facilities must be given a security classification and necessary protection for the highest classification of the information processed. Where classified information on paper from punch card systems or computers must be destroyed standard procedures for classified waste apply. Where tapes, cylinders or data cell discs are employed, destruction must be accomplished by burning. There is no positive proof that the wiping will obliterate information.

Control of Social Contacts

49. Of interest to security is the association of DND personnel with representatives of the communist dominated countries. It has been demonstrated both in Canada and other Western nations, that social contact between members of communist bloc embassies and nationals of host countries is used for intelligence purposes and controlled by hostile intelligence agents attached to embassies. Because of this the Department issues

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guidance concerning social contact with nationals of communist nations.

Travel to Iron Curtain Countries

50. The Department controls travel by DND personnel to communist dominated countries. The procedures require that a member or employee receive permission before travelling to these countries. Permission is granted if there is no security objection. When the travel is approved, the individual is given a security briefing prior to departure.

Security Education

51. Military personnel and civil servants who are required to handle classified information must be continuously aware of their personal responsibility and familiar with the Department's security policies and regulations. This is the objective of the Security education program.

52. Responsibility for security at each level of command rests with the commander concerned. He will normally implement security measures through an appointed security officer whose security duties may be secondary to his primary appointment. Security courses are provided for such officers. Security officers conduct security education programs to explain security regulations and the rationale behind them by means of lectures, films, security posters etc.

SECURITY OF PERSONNEL

History of Security Clearance Policy

53. During World War II each government department developed and implemented its own system for the security screening of personnel requiring access to sensitive information pertaining to the war effort; there was no overall governmental policy. The need to develop a uniform policy to prevent the infiltration of disloyal and unreliable persons into positions of trust was mentioned in the Report of the Royal Commission under Order-in-Council PC 411 of 5 February, 1946. As a result, a Cabinet Directive was produced to outline policy and procedures governing the security investigation of government employees. Through the years, the original Cabinet Directive has been revised. The latest

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revision was quite extensive resulting in the issue of Cabinet Directive 35, dated 18 December, 1963.

National and International Policies and Agreements

54. In addition to the requirement to clear personnel for access to Canadian defence information there is an obligation on the part of Canada to clear personnel for access to NATO, US and UK defence information. Those national, international and service-to-service agreements which govern the DND Security Clearance Program are listed below.

- a. Cabinet Directive 35 (CD 35). CD 35 is the government policy which lays down the minimum security clearance standards.
- b. Department of National Defence Instruction 4.2 (DND 4.2).
DND 4.2 defines the application of CD 35 to the Department of National Defence. A copy is attached at Annex "L".
- c. CAN/US Agreement - On Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence Purposes - 22 May 1959. This agreement contains the special requirements for access to atomic information. Canadian citizenship and a field investigation to support the SECRET level of ZED clearance are prescribed as mandatory.
- d. NATO Document CM(55)15(Final). Security Within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This document prescribes the clearance levels and supporting investigative criteria for persons selected to serve in NATO appointments or occupying positions having access to NATO classified documents.
- e. CAN/US Arrangement - On Special Activity Information - May 1949. This arrangement prescribes the stringent standards for persons requiring access to "Special Activity" information.
- f. RCAF/USAF Supplementary Arrangement - Human Reliability Program. This arrangement concerns control, safety and security of nuclear weapons with special reference to the human reliability factor of personnel who have access, or control access to nuclear weapons.

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The DND Security of Personnel Program

55. General. In the DND the Directorate of Security of the Canadian Forces carries out field investigations prior to granting a security clearance for military personnel and civilians attached to the Canadian Forces, including those employed by the DM's office. The RCMP conduct the necessary investigations for DRB personnel. In the granting of clearances common standards are followed by the Department. Because the preponderance of security clearances involves the military and civilian personnel of the Canadian Forces and the Administrative Branch, detailed procedures for these areas are delineated in the following paragraphs. DRB procedures are similar. Unless the procedures for establishing security clearances are effective other precautions to safeguard information and material can be nullified; thus the importance of the security clearance of an individual is paramount in the field of security. In the final analysis good security depends on the reliability and integrity of the individual.

56. Security Clearances. The security clearance program includes the investigation and assessment of the suitability of persons to have access to, or knowledge of, classified matter; and the granting of an appropriate clearance. Different clearance levels for different personnel does not necessarily indicate relative loyalty or reliability. The clearance level is established on "the need-to-know" principle. This program is continuous and involves new clearances and the updating or upgrading of clearances.

57. Granting New Clearances. There is a constant demand within DND for the processing of candidates for positions requiring a security clearance. This stems from recruiting requirements of both military and civilian personnel and the acquisition of increasing amounts of classified equipment and information.

58. Applicants for initial appointment to classified DND positions are checked for suitability relative to the granting of a security clearance. Because of urgent requirements and competition, pre-employ-

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ment screening is not always possible. Pending the granting of a security clearance the individual is denied access to any sensitive information.

59. There are a number of cases where it is important to establish suitability from a security viewpoint prior to enrolment, for example: officer candidates and applicants for re-enrolment or re-appointment.

60. The inability of the RCMP to obtain positive information concerning the former nationals of many countries makes it necessary to identify foreign born applicants and those with foreign born parents and establish suitability prior to employment or enrolment.

61. DND School Teachers. Canadian teachers for DND schools in Europe are not granted a security clearance. All applicants for these positions are checked regarding place of birth, next-of-kin and places of residence. Prospective teachers are also checked against the RCMP subversive indices.

62. Persons Other Than DND or Potential DND Employees. The IRB maintains a number of committees, panels and sub-committees as advisory bodies to the Chairman on the various fields of research in which the Board participates. Members of these advisory bodies are chosen from other government departments, outstanding scientists in universities, or members of industry. Accordingly, it is necessary to maintain clearances on several hundred scientists who are not government employees. In many cases their supporting staff are also vetted. In the case of NATO fellowships seated in Canada a NATO Clearance is accepted but access is limited to that prescribed in Annex L, Appendix 1.

63. Upgrading Security Clearances. Bearing in mind "the need-to-know" principle, upgrading is the term used to describe the function of raising the level of a security clearance consistent with an individual's requirement to have access to higher classifications of information.

64. Updating of Security Clearance. The term "updating" relates to the review process to establish the continuing validity of clearances and includes the acquiring of up-to-date information on a person. In

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practice, it has been found reasonable to assume that a demonstrated pattern of reliability over a number of years is not subject to sudden deterioration; thus a maximum of five years has been considered to be the acceptable interval for "updating". This function is internationally recognized as an integral part of a security clearance program. Some international agreements covering the exchange of classified information and equipment make it mandatory. Within this context the security clearance program includes:

- a. Pre-Marriage Checks. When a serviceman or civilian employee of the Department overseas announces his intention to marry a foreign national he must submit details on his intended wife. These details are processed through the RCMP to establish that there is no situation which would affect the clearance level of the person and the acceptability of the intended wife to proceed to Canada.
- b. Special Lists. In the interest of the individual as well as DND, it may be acceptable to grant a clearance to a person on the proviso that he is not transferred for employment into certain locations within Canada and abroad. Personnel staffs are advised of the name but not the problem. They must then obtain the approval of the security staff for each transfer.
- c. Clearances for Special Appointments. Personnel management staffs usually request a security clearance before:
 - (1) approving special assignments such as attaches and truce commissions;
 - (2) granting Permanent Commissions to short service officers;
 - (3) approving remusters to sensitive trades; and
 - (4) final selection of personnel for classified courses abroad.
- d. Air Division Transfer Notices. The sensitivity and geo-

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graphic position of 1 Air Division necessitates that the security and other records of all personnel selected for duty in that formation be thoroughly examined.

- e. Human Reliability Program. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by the RCAF introduced the Human Reliability Program as a mandatory requirement. All persons selected for positions where they have access or control access to nuclear weapons must be cleared to at least the SECRET level (supported by a field investigation) and have their personal reliability checked.

65. NATO Clearances. Before a person may be accepted in a NATO function his security file is reviewed as to suitability for employment in a NATO environment before issuing a special NATO clearance certificate. (NATO Document CM(55)15(Final)).

66. Assistance to Other Departments. There are numerous services provided other departments in the field of personnel security that, although not in direct support of the DND program, are in the interest of the overall government program. These services include:

- a. Personnel Information. Other Governmental departments such as the RCMP, DDP, etc. request information covering the security clearances of persons (military and civilian) who have served with DND, for use in assessing them for other governmental employment.
- b. Control of Suspected or Known Subversives. On an annual basis the RCMP is supplied with a report giving the current physical location and nature of employment of all currently serving DND personnel on whom the RCMP have forwarded adverse reports.
- c. Special Assignment - Patent Attorney Firms. DND provides security clearances for the facilities and the staff of attorneys handling classified patent applications of defence interests.

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Security Indoctrinations Arising From International Agreements.

67. The difference between an indoctrination and a clearance is that in addition to being cleared to the appropriate level, a specific security briefing (indoctrination) is involved which the individual must acknowledge by a signature before his name is included on the control list. Indoctrination procedures are followed for personnel holding appointments that require access to atomic (ZED), special activity (SA) or COSMIC information.

Volume of Security Clearances

68. Approximately seventy percent (70%) of all DND personnel, both military and civilian, require a security clearance. Within some establishments, such as DRB and RCN, there is a requirement to obtain security clearances for all members. To this volume must be added the additional processing required in relation to upgrading, updating, special clearances and indoctrinations.

Types and Scope of Investigations

69. DND Instruction 4.2 attached as Annex "L" outlines the types and scope of investigations required for security clearance purposes.

Investigators

70. Field investigations required for the security clearance of military personnel and civilians attached to the Canadian Forces, including those employed in the DM's organization, are performed by members of the Special Investigation Unit whose organization is described in para 12. The investigators are of sergeant rank or above and are selected for this work only after having obtained broad investigative experience in the military police and security fields. The qualities of intelligence, discretion, exemplary conduct and effective report writing are of prime consideration in this selection. Precise training in field investigations is done "on-the-job", with close supervision throughout. Attached as Annex "M" is Special Investigation Unit Instruction 2/67 which describes how field investigations are to be conducted. Appendix

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1 and 2 of Annex "M" provide examples of standard security clearance case reports.

Implementing Procedures

71. The Directorate of Security and DRB carry out the security clearance program for the Department and, in general, follow the same procedures. The principle is to ensure the appropriate enquiries applicable to the level of clearance required are made and evaluated as soon as possible in order to segregate the problem cases: these cases then receive special attention. Responsibilities for the granting and denying of security clearances with respect to the Canadian Forces and the Administrative Branch are as follows:

- a. Clerical - In general this includes the making, maintenance and control of security records which consist of some 600,000 index cards and 175,000 security files retained on permanent charge.
Related to incoming requests for security clearances, the clerical responsibilities are:
 - (1) an index search to see if there is any previous record of the individual;
 - (2) the initiation of an index card and a security file when there is no previous record, or
 - (3) drawing the appropriate file where there is.
- b. NCO Reader
 - (1) determine and initiate the investigative requirements applicable to the request received;
 - (2) evaluate the information obtained from records and enquiries;
 - (3) recommend to section officer that clearance be granted when information is satisfactory, or
 - (4) re-direct for special processing those cases where there is doubt about the suitability of the individual.

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Judgement concerning the requirement for further investigations and evaluation of information pertaining to problem cases is the responsibility of officers in a special section for this purpose.

c. Security Officer ~~Responsible Officer~~

- (1) quality control by reviewing each clearance file in sufficient detail to ensure the clearance criteria have been met;
- (2) assessing final judgement and signing authority for clearance certificates;
- (3) liaison with careers staff when certain restrictions should be imposed, and
- (4) initiation of CD 35 denial procedures in adverse cases of sufficient magnitude to warrant such action.

72. A flow chart depicting the processing procedures is attached at Annex "N".

Assessing

73. Information obtained through appropriate enquiries is evaluated against the criteria for loyalty and reliability as provided in CD 35, paragraphs 3 to 6, inclusive. Assessing entails a full examination of the background environment of the individual, his reputation, degree of maturity and other known personal factors which are considered in conjunction with the level of clearance required. In this process the application of criteria is the art of judging what set of facts and circumstances, when combined, constitute an acceptable security risk. The principle that is always born in mind is that, while the interests of national security must take precedence where there is a reasonable doubt, the interest of the individual must also be safeguarded. This judgement requirement, for which there is no formal training, has been met by staffing the relevant positions with officers possessing a depth of experience in personnel investigations and in the assessment

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and evaluation of this type of information.

74. Loyalty. When loyalty is in question, it is primarily a matter of determining and verifying if any of the five situations outlined in para 3 of CD 35 apply. These cases usually fall into the relatively clearly defined categories of acceptable or unacceptable.

75. Reliability. In applying the criteria of CD 35 it must be accepted that, because situations and circumstances surrounding people are subject to change and variation, assessment of a persons background is not in all cases clear cut. It may be found that the areas of doubt concerning reliability are such that they could be controlled and improved to the point where it would be a reasonable risk to grant a clearance if the individual were appraised of the situation. In these instances the requested level of clearance may be denied; but the individual is made aware of the situation and given an opportunity to remove the doubt rather than released. This interim step is also appropriate in some instances where it is necessary to downgrade or rescind a clearance by reason of deterioration in the reliability factor. Another area in the field of reliability which requires special attention is where the subject is a relatively young person who is to be employed in a trade requiring a high level of clearance. His youthful past, due to immaturity or environment, might be such that it is not reasonable to take the risk of granting a high security clearance at the time it is first requested but would be quite reasonable at a later date when sufficient time has elapsed to determine that the subject has matured or otherwise corrected the problem area.

Procedural Steps for Granting or Denying a Security Clearance

76. With the advent of CD 35, new policy was introduced which made the Governor-in-Council the sole approving authority for dismissal from the public service on grounds of security, and specified certain mandatory review procedures before the case reached that level. General terms were used so as to be applicable to all departments.

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77. To implement this policy, procedural steps were developed. A copy of these procedures is attached as Appendix 2 to Annex "N". It should be noted that Step II of the procedures is not a specific requirement of CD 35. This is the interim step referred to in para 76 above which makes provision for an individual to improve his reliability factor up to an acceptable degree when it is deemed to be within his ability to do so.

78. A summary of clearance denials within DND for an eleven year period, 1 January 1956 to 31 December 1966 is contained in Annex "O".

PHYSICAL SECURITY

General

79. Physical security is defined as that aspect of security concerned with the physical measures taken to safeguard personnel; to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, facilities, material, and documents; and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage and theft.

80. Regulations for the physical security of DRB establishments are contained in Annex "D" and those for the Canadian Forces in Annex "P".

81. Except where specifically provided by international or service-to-service agreements, physical security measures are determined in the light of various RCMP, DND and Canada/Allied intelligence estimates of the threat to security, and on-site physical security surveys.

Implementation

82. Basically, the security of DND establishments is a function of command at all levels. Commanding Officers and Directors/Generals of DRB establishments are required to have their establishments surveyed by specialist security personnel to determine the security measures that are most appropriate in the light of categorization criteria and local conditions, and to determine the security personnel and material requirements for both peacetime and emergency conditions. Establishment security orders and procedures are based on the findings and recommendations of the security surveys.

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Inspection and Assistance

83. Defence installations are periodically inspected by qualified security personnel in order to assess the effectiveness of security measures and assist in improvement. The inspections are mandatory for certain installations in accordance with the Annex to the CAN/US Agreement on Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence Purposes. In other cases inspections are made at the request of the Commanding Officer.

84. Departmental operational staffs advise the security authorities with respect to what is vital and the degree of priority required. It is then a security staff responsibility to devise suitable security systems and to recommend the most prudent distribution of security manpower and equipment resources to achieve effective and economical protection for these elements.

85. Physical security planning staffs keep current with modern developments in physical security techniques, equipment, and procedures through training, research and close liaison with staffs of friendly military and civil security and police agencies.

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Annex "A"
TO DND BRIEF
FOR THE ROYAL
COMMISSION ON
SECURITY
DATED: 26 DEC 67

TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR
SECURITY AND INFORMATION RELEASE COMMITTEE (SIRC)

1. The Department of National Defence Security and Information Release Committee is responsible to the Deputy Minister for formulating security policy and guidance on matters which are of common concern within the Department of National Defence for the protection of information, personnel and materiel.
2. It will consider only those matters of security policy that are of common concern in the Department of National Defence. It therefore shall undertake to initiate, formulate and promulgate approved security policy for use within the Department of National Defence which includes, but is not limited to, the following:
 - a. security classification of matters of common use among two or more components of the Department of National Defence;
 - b. personnel security policy;
 - c. the care, custody and physical security of classified matter and materiel;
 - d. codewords and nicknames;
 - e. intrusion alarm installation policy;
 - f. technical inspection policy;
 - g. censorship;
 - h. international security agreements; security arrangements between the Department of National Defence and other Government Departments and Agencies;
 - i. review the policy for the release of classified information to other nations;
 - j. consider proposals for the release of classified military information which bears a higher security classification than that authorized for release by the component concerned.
3. These terms of reference do not preclude individual components of the Department of National Defence from making such additional arrangements as required provided the agreed DND minimum standards are maintained.
4. The Committee may amend the list of subjects in Paragraph 2 as necessary to conform to changes in conditions and requirements.

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5. The Committee may refer such security matters as it considers necessary to the Security Sub-Panel of the Privy Council for consideration. It may recommend to the Deputy Minister such matters as it considers necessary, be referred to the Security Panel of the Privy Council.

6. The Committee shall comprise:

- a. the Departmental Secretary as Chairman;
- b. the Director of Security, CFHQ;
- c. a representative of the Defence Research Board;
- d. a representative of the Director General of Intelligence;
- e. a permanent Executive Secretary;
- f. representatives of the Department of External Affairs and Department of Defence Production as Ad Hoc members concerning matters dealing with the release of military information;
- g. ad hoc representation by members of other Government Departments as the occasion demands.

7. The Chairman of the DND Security and Information Release Committee will be the DND representative on the Security Sub-Panel.

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ANNEX "B"
to DND BRIEF FOR THE
ROYAL COMMISSION ON
SECURITY
dated 26 DEC 67

SECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE CFHQ ADMINISTRATIVE UNIT

1. Physical security of NDHQ buildings.
2. Security surveys and inspections.
3. Advice on all aspects of military security.
4. Supervision of Canadian Corps of Commissionaire personnel employed in NDHQ security duties. (over 1,000 hours per week).
5. Security arrangements for CFHQ classified conferences.
6. Security clearance processing for CFHQ and for all units and establishments in the Canadian Forces not functionally controlled by one of the six major commands.
7. Parking and traffic control in Cartier Square.
8. Miscellaneous military police duties including initial investigation of criminal and service offences.
9. Destruction of classified waste for all of elements of NDHQ.

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ANNEX "C"
to DND BRIEF FOR THE
ROYAL COMMISSION ON
SECURITY
dated: 26 DEC '67

DIRECTOR OF SECURITY
(SHORT TITLE: DSECUR)

The DSECUR is responsible to the DGIS for:

1. Advice on the state of security within the Canadian Forces.
2. Developing policy and procedures for the security of information, personnel and materiel, including inspection of security at nuclear units.
3. Establishing the classification of documents and materiel and controlling the release of classified information.
4. Advice on, and implementation of, security policy respecting control of visitors to Canadian Forces establishments.
5. Implementing the personnel security clearance programme for the Canadian Forces, including civilian employees.
6. Controlling the operations of special investigation units and detachments, Service detention barracks, and technical supervision of personnel employed on police and security duties.
7. Advice on the selection, training, organization, employment and career planning for police and security personnel.
8. Advice on policy and procedure for collection and custody of prisoners-of-war.
9. Establishing and maintaining liaison with recognized police and security agencies.
10. Representing the Canadian Forces on the DND Security and Information Release Committee.

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ANNEX "D"
TO DND BRIEF
FOR THE ROYAL
COMMISSION ON
SECURITY
DATED: 26 DEC 67

DRB SECURITY LETTER NO. 3

REGULATIONS FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF
DEFENCE RESEARCH BOARD ESTABLISHMENTS

GENERAL

1. These Defence Research Board regulations are based upon the Department of National Defence regulations which prescribe the minimum physical security standards for all establishments within the Department of National Defence including Defence Research Board establishments and such additional property that may be acquired under Article 206 of the National Defence Act, (Control of Property in an Emergency).

2. Physical security is defined as that part of security concerned with physical measures designed to safeguard personnel, to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, facilities, material and documents, and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage and theft.

CATEGORIZATION OF DEFENCE RESEARCH BOARD ESTABLISHMENTS

3. The Department of National Defence has set out five categories, each requiring specific physical security measures, for all defence establishments. Three of these, Category A, Category B, and Category C apply to defence research establishments. The current overall categorization of all DRB establishments, except DRML, is A. DRML is Category B with a special area requiring the standards of Category A. Individual components or elements within an establishment may require separate categorization depending on their importance or contents.

4. The security categorization of DRB Establishments is based on location, operational role, vulnerability, sensitivity and contents. The security classification of supporting facilities such as reference material and equipment as well as highest security classification of actual research and development projects determine the category selected. In the event of an emergency or whenever there is a significant change in the factors which determine the category, the Head of the Establishment shall, in consultation with the DSO, decide whether a security survey is required to confirm or change the current category.

5. Standards of protection for each category are:

Category A

This category applies to all defence research establishments which may be conducting research within the Secret and Top Secret classifications or which have supporting research

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facilities such as reference material, stores or equipment of that classification. Security measures shall include controlled entry by guards at all times, controlled access* to sensitive areas and patrols by guards during silent hours. Areas of particular sensitivity may require security to be augmented by the use of intrusion alarms.

Category B

This category applies to all defence research establishments which do not carry out research and development above the level of Confidential, nor which have supporting facilities of reference material, stores or equipment above the level of Confidential. Security measures shall include controlled entry at all times by guards except that during working hours a receptionist may replace the guards when convenient to do so. Areas within the establishment requiring more protection than that required for the establishment overall, such as concentrations of valuable stores or equipment, may require controlled access* or the use of intrusion alarms to augment security. Depending on the size of the establishment, arrangement of buildings or other local factors, patrols by guards or watchmen shall be carried out to ensure the early detection of fire or intruders.

Category C

This category includes those establishments, components or outstations, which do not fall within the preceding categories and which, in many cases, may be located on other than Department of National Defence property or in isolated locations. Buildings and offices shall be locked during silent hours and when unattended for prolonged periods during the day, and will be checked periodically by employees, civilian or company police, building superintendents, commissionaires, or watchmen. Areas of particular sensitivity or importance may require protection to be augmented by intrusion alarms. This category will also include unmanned communications and test sites.

* Controlled access (as opposed to controlled entry which is perimeter control) is the descriptive term used for special measures, adapted to local circumstances, which restrict entry into specific areas to those who are security cleared and have a need-to-know and who, in the course of duty, require access. The term is also used for special measures which are used to facilitate the entry for official purposes

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of others accompanied by an authorized person, whereby knowledge of classified matter is denied and theft, tampering, etc., is prevented.

6. In the event of emergencies, or when changes in activities qualify an establishment, laboratory or out-station, for a change in category, changes in security measures commensurate with the situation shall be made.

PHYSICAL SECURITY MEASURES

7. The measures taken to protect Defence Research Board establishments shall include as applicable:

- a. Security Surveys - Whenever a Head of an establishment, in consultation with the DSO, decides that a complete physical security survey is required to confirm or change the current category, the survey shall be conducted by the DSO and the ESO.
- b. Security Plans - Each DRB establishment, with the advice of the DSO as required, shall maintain a security plan based on the results of the most recent physical security survey. This plan shall show the current security categorization and shall provide a detailed description of all security measures used in the establishment, including guards, patrols, fences, gates, anti-intrusion devices, pass systems, and the means by which access to classified matter is controlled. An up-to-date copy of this plan, together with copies of establishment security orders shall be forwarded to DRB Headquarters for information.
- c. Security Areas - A DRB establishment may have a uniform degree of categorization and thus need only one level of restriction and control. However, establishments may have different degrees of security importance within their areas and laboratories. The integral areas of an establishment shall be designated as follows:
 - (1) Open Area - An area within or adjacent to a DRB establishment in which no restrictions or control are normally imposed, subject to the provisions of the Defence Establishment Trespass Regulations and the Government Property Traffic Regulations.
 - (2) Restricted Area - An area within or adjacent to an open area in which only authorized persons have freedom of movement.

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- d. Special Conditions - There may be within a restricted area or structure, things or activities of vital importance that require continuous guard. Only specially authorized personnel may enter or have access to such an area or structure.
- e. Access Control Systems - The security of DRB establishments is accomplished primarily by denying access to unauthorized persons. In determining the access control systems most appropriate to a particular establishment, the following principles shall be considered:
 - (1) The designation of restricted areas, and the definition of these areas by fencing, barriers or signs.
 - (2) The establishment and manning of the minimum number of authorized access points consistent with operational requirements.
 - (3) The limiting of access to persons who are appropriately cleared and who require access in the performance of their duties.
 - (4) The implementation of suitable pass systems.
 - (5) The establishment of Access Lists which specifically name those persons who are authorized to enter certain highly sensitive areas.
 - (6) Visitor escort.
 - (7) The establishment of procedures to facilitate the search of persons, vehicles and material entering DRB establishments and restricted areas.
- f. Physical Safeguards - The type and extent of physical security safeguards at DRB establishments shall be determined by the importance, vulnerability and sensitivity of the establishment or area to be protected. In determining the physical security safeguards most appropriate to an establishment, the Head of the Establishment shall take cognizance of the fact that physical safeguards will not necessarily prevent unauthorized access, and that to be effective they must be supported by properly organized and trained security forces.

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Physical safeguards designed to deter, delay or detect unauthorized entry, include security fencing, security lighting, intrusion alarms, structural safeguards and perimeter marking.

- g. Passes - Passes shall be used as prescribed in the DRB Security Regulations, Part 4, and nothing in these regulations shall preclude a particular establishment from devising additional pass systems to meet local situations or to satisfy access control criteria imposed by international agreements.
- h. Security Guards - The term "Security Guards" or "Guard" means any person, (service, Commissionaire, or civilian) employed or designated to guard any property and the personnel and matter therein from theft, willful damage, unauthorized entry, sabotage, compromise, espionage, subversion and other hazard which could endanger the safety and security of DRB property and employees.

SABOTAGE REPORTING

8. Specific or suspected acts of sabotage directed against Defence Research Board Establishments in Canada that could, if successful, affect the operational or research role of an establishment, shall be reported immediately by the quickest means to:

- a. DRB Headquarters.
- b. RCM Police.
- c. The appropriate local Canadian Defence Force Command Headquarters.
- d. All defence establishments in the immediate area.

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ANNEX "B"
TO DND BRIEF
FOR THE ROYAL
COMMISSION ON
SECURITY
DATED: 26 DEC 67

LIST OF PRINCIPAL INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

The principal international agreements under which we receive classified information are as follows:

- a. The General Agreement between Canada and the U.S. for the Exchange of Classified Information dated 30 January, 1962.
- b. The Canada/United States Agreement for the Exchange of Atomic Information.
- c. The NATO Agreement dated 29 December, 1949.
- d. The Technical Cooperation Program between the ABC Countries which began in 1957 and has been modified since this to include Australia.
- e. The Information Exchange Program between Canadian and the United States Military Forces.
- f. The ABCA Standardization Agreement. First approved in 1960 and later expanded to include Australia.
- g. The various bilateral agreements between Canada and NATO countries.
- h. A number of other agreements.

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ANNEX "F"
TO DND BRIEF
FOR THE ROYAL
COMMISSION ON
SECURITY
DATED 26 DEC 67

RELEASE OF DEFENCE INFORMATION IN CANADA

1. The DRB Security Regulations define Canadian military information as that information which originates in the Department of National Defence, in the Department of Defence Production, or in other government departments, concerning matters affecting the defence effort. This includes scientific and technical information that has resulted from research and development carried out under National Defence auspices.

2. It is maintained that unclassified information pertaining to defence matters and information classified in any of the four security classifications are the property of the Department of National Defence and not of the individual. DRB employees are forbidden to make any unauthorized disclosures of information pertaining to defence research, the Defence Research Board or their duties with the Board. This prohibition includes unauthorized communication of such information in radio broadcasts, TV appearances, public addresses, public forums, round table discussions, press releases or interviews, official or private conversation and correspondence, the presentation of displays of any kind, the showing of motion pictures or "still" films and in any other form and by any means.

3. Classified information is not authorized for release until need-to-know has been confirmed, and security clearance of persons and facilities to handle and safeguard classified matter has been certified. Need-to-know means that Canada's need for the government agency, organization, company or individual to know has been established by showing that the release of the information in question will further Canada's defence aims by preventing wasteful duplication and by enabling government agencies, organizations, or individuals to meet defence commitments under agreement or contract. After the Directorate of Scientific Information Services at DND Headquarters has completed the initial distribution, Chief Superintendents are authorized to distribute their unclassified reports to individuals and agencies who have an interest in the subject of the report, and with whom an exchange of information would benefit the Defence Research Board program.

4. Documents, such as books, booklets, pamphlets and papers proposed for release outside DRB but excluding advertising and recruiting material, reprints and news releases, are printed or stamped with one of the following summaries of release conditions in addition to the security classification:

a. If Unclassified

"This information is furnished with the express understanding that:

- (1) Proprietary and patent rights will be protected.

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- (2) It will not be released to another nation without specific approval of the Canadian Department of National Defence.

b. If Classified

"This information is furnished with the express understanding that:

- (1) It will be used for defence purposes only.
- (2) It will be afforded essentially the same degree of security protection as provided by the Canadian Department of National Defence.
- (3) Proprietary and patent rights will be respected.
- (4) It will not be released to another nation without specific approval of the Canadian Department of National Defence."

5. Subject to the conditions outlined above, information may be released through official channels within DRB and DND, and to other government departments and agencies, to members of DRB Panels and Committees, to DRB consultants, grantees, and other extra-mural workers, and to civilian defence contractors. The result of DRB research are not normally released to the public, to non-governmental agencies, societies and organizations, nor to commercial firms except as related to defence contracts. When information may be released, the procedure is as follows:

a. Within DRB and DND

Accreditation with DSIS is a prerequisite for those who require access to documents and information. The principle governing accreditation is "the need-to-know". The Branch or Directorate confirms this and identifies the person authorized to receive information and supplies his security clearance and areas of official interest.

b. Other Government Departments and Agencies

The requirements of other government department and agencies normally require a formal request in each instance. When need-to-know and security clearance has been established,

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documents are forwarded to the registered security officer of the department or agency concerned for controlled distribution.

c. DRB Panel & Committee Members

DRB Panel and Committee Members who may require access to classified matter are:

- (1) Cleared for security.
- (2) Briefed in security procedures.
- (3) Required to complete, a Security Declaration signifying their understanding of Security Regulations and their willingness to abide by them.
- (4) Given the Oath of Fidelity and Secrecy and
- (5) Supplied with secure storage.

Then DSIS Information Scientists make abstract cards available in their particular field of interest and Panel & Committee Members may request documents and secure them on loan.

d. Consultants

Consultants are normally retained under contract and the procedure for obtaining access to classified matter is the same as described for contractors in (f) below. Otherwise consultants are dealt with in the same way as Panel & Committee Members in (c) above.

e. Grantees and Extra-Mural Workers

Grantees and Extra-Mural Workers do not normally require access to classified matter. When they do, they are dealt with in the same way as Panel & Committee Members in (c) above.

f. Civilian Defence Contractors

Civilian Defence Contractors may be given access to classified information subject to confirmation of need-to-know, facility clearance, and personnel clearances. The necessary security and access procedures are performed in consultation with the Industrial Security Branch of the Department of Defence Production and are described in the attached brochure entitled "Guide to Defence Scientific and Technical Documents for Industry under Defence Contract".

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SECURITY IN CANADIAN DEFENCE INDUSTRY

POLICY

1. The Department of Defence Production is responsible for the security of classified information entrusted by the Government of Canada to Canadian industrial firms and other non-governmental organizations (hereinafter referred to as Industrial Firms) within the terms of a contract between the Department and such Industrial Firms. The security of secret and confidential information in the possession of Industrial Firms may be placed in jeopardy either by persons who may be disloyal to Canada and her system of government or by persons who are unreliable because of defects in their character.

2. Employees in Industrial Firms who are required to have access to classified information in the performance of their duties must be persons in whom the Government of Canada can repose full confidence to safeguard such information. It has been clearly demonstrated that such confidence cannot be placed in persons whose loyalty to Canada and our system of government is diluted by loyalty to any Communist, Fascist, or other legal or illegal political organization whose purposes are inimical to the processes of parliamentary democracy. It is, therefore, an essential of Canadian security policy in relation to defence industry that persons described in paragraph 3 below must not be permitted to have access to classified information.

3. The persons referred to in paragraph 2 above are:

- a. A person who is a member of a communist or fascist party or an organization affiliated with a communist or fascist party and having a similar nature and purpose.
- b. A person who by his words or his actions shows himself to support a communist or fascist party or an organization affiliated with a communist or fascist party and having a similar nature and purpose.
- c. A person who, having reasonable grounds to understand its true nature and purpose, is a member of or supports by his words or his actions an organization which has as its real objective the furtherance of communist or fascist aims and policies (commonly known as a front group).
- d. A person who is a secret agent of or an informer for a foreign power, or who deliberately assists any such agent or informer.
- e. A person who by his words or his actions shows himself to support any organization

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which publicly or privately advocates or practises the use of force to alter the form of government.

4. It must be borne in mind that there may be reason to doubt the loyalty of a person who at some previous time was a person described in paragraph 3 above, even though this doubt may not be confirmed by recent information about him.

5. In addition to loyalty, reliability is essential in any person who is to be given access to classified information. A person may be unreliable for a number of reasons that do not relate to loyalty. To provide as much assurance of reliability as possible persons described in paragraph 6 below may not be permitted to have access to classified information, unless after careful consideration of the circumstances, including the value of their services, it is judged that the risk involved appears to be justified.

6. The persons referred to in paragraph 5 above are:

- a. A person who is unreliable, not because he is disloyal, but because of features of his character which may lead to indiscretion, or dishonesty, or make him vulnerable to blackmail or coercion. Such features may be greed, debt, illicit sexual behaviour, drunkenness, drug addiction, mental imbalance, or such other aspect of character as might seriously affect his reliability.
- b. A person who, through family or other close continuing relationship with persons who are persons as described in paragraphs 3(a) to (e) above, may be induced, either knowingly or unknowingly, to act in a manner prejudicial to the safety and interest of Canada. The kind of relationship, whether by blood, marriage or friendship, may not be of primary concern; the degree of such relationship, and most particularly the degree of influence that might be exerted, will dictate a judgement as to reliability, a judgement which must be taken with the utmost care; and
- c. A person who, though in no sense disloyal or unreliable, is bound by close ties of blood or affection to persons living within the borders of such foreign nations as may cause him to be subjected to intolerable pressures.

7. To carry out its responsibility for the safekeeping of the secrets of the Government of Canada and her allies, the Department of Defence Production must first obtain sufficient information about a person to be given access to

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these secrets in order that a reasonable judgement might be made as to his loyalty and reliability. In making this administrative judgement, it must always be borne in mind that, while the interests of the national security must take precedence where there is a reasonable doubt, the safeguarding of the interests of the individual is also essential to the preservation of the society we seek to protect. Information bearing on the security status of an employee will be treated as confidential, and will not be transmitted by the Department to the employing Firm.

PROCEDURES

8. The following procedures by which this policy is to be implemented are designed to provide that the most careful screening possible be given, particularly to persons who will have access to highly classified information. It is the continuing responsibility of the Department of Defence Production to ensure that the security of classified information held by Industrial Firms remains unimpaired.

9. Information about persons who are being considered for access to classified information must be obtained at least from the persons themselves, from referees named by the persons, and from investigations conducted by authorized investigative agencies. An official of the Industrial Firm who will be appointed the Firm's Security Officer, will be responsible for:

- a. Ensuring that, prior to being employed in a position requiring access to classified information, each employee being considered for such employment completes a Personal History Form (DDP-54 Rev.).
- b. Informing such persons of the reasons for seeking background information about them.
- c. Explaining to them the dangers to themselves as well as to the national security in their attempting to conceal any information which may have a bearing on the degree of confidence that can be reposed in them.
- d. Submitting the completed Personal History Form to the Director of Industrial Security of the Department of Defence Production.

10. The Director of Industrial Security will submit the completed Personal History Form to an authorized investigative agency, requesting that either a records investigation or a full background investigation be conducted, depending upon the level of clearance required.

11. The functions of an investigative agency are to conduct promptly and efficiently such investigations as are

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requested by departments to assist them in determining the loyalty and reliability of the subject of investigation; and to inform departments of the results of their investigations in the form of factual reports in which the sources have been carefully evaluated as to the reliability of the information they have provided.

12. On the basis of these reports and such other pertinent information as may have been utilized, the Department of Defence Production will arrive at a considered judgement of the person's loyalty and reliability, and of the degree of confidence that can be reposed in him to carry out the duties to be performed without jeopardy to the security of classified information to which he may have access.

13. If a favourable determination is made, the Department of Defence Production may grant to the Industrial Firm a security clearance in respect of the employee to the level required for the efficient performance of the duties of the position concerned.

14. If, on the other hand, there is in the judgement of the Deputy Minister of the Department of Defence Production, a reasonable doubt as to the degree of confidence which can be reposed in the subject, the granting of a security clearance will be delayed until the doubt has been resolved to the satisfaction of the Deputy Minister.

15. Where a person is being considered by an Industrial Firm for appointment to a position requiring access to classified information, and a doubt has arisen as to his suitability for such access, the following courses of action may be taken by the Department of Defence Production with a view to resolving that doubt:

- a. Further specific investigation may be requested of an authorized investigative agency; or
- b. The Department may at any time seek the advice of the interdepartmental Security Panel.

16. Should neither of the courses set out above (paragraph 15) result in a satisfactory resolution of the doubt concerning the person, the Department of Defence Production shall preserve security by notifying the Industrial Firm that the individual must be denied access to classified information. Should the firm nevertheless decide to employ the applicant in a position where he does not require access to classified information, and subsequently decides to release him, for whatever reason, the termination of his employment must not be related in any way to the earlier denial of security clearance.

17. Where a person is already employed in a position in which he has access to classified information and a doubt

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has been raised as to his suitability to continue to have access to classified information, the Department must inform the Firm that the employee must be denied access to classified information until the doubt has been resolved, and may take the following courses with a view to resolving that doubt:

- a. Request further specific investigation of an authorized investigative agency.
- b. Seek the advice of the interdepartmental Security Panel.
- c. Consult with the Industrial Firm to review the requirement for security clearance, confirm the nature of the present employment, and obtain comments as to the apparent loyalty, trustworthiness and integrity of the subject, in order to assist in further assessment of the case.

18. Should these actions fail to resolve the doubt, or appear to the Department to be inexpedient under the circumstances, the assistance of the employee shall be sought in an attempt to resolve the doubt. After reassessing all relevant information obtained from above sources and appropriate consultation with the investigative agency or other source of the information which raised the doubt, a senior officer of the Department appointed by the Deputy Minister shall interview the subject and inform him, to the fullest extent that is possible without jeopardizing important and sensitive sources of security information, of the reasons for doubt, and shall give the employee an opportunity to resolve it to the satisfaction of the Department of Defence Production.

19. Should the employee be unable to resolve the doubt to the satisfaction of the interviewing officer, no further action shall be taken until:

- a. The Deputy Minister or head of agency has personally made a complete review of the case, and has himself interviewed the employee in question, in a further attempt to resolve any reasonable doubt as to his trustworthiness.
- b. The employee has been advised, to the fullest extent possible without jeopardizing important and sensitive sources of security information, why doubt continues to be felt concerning his loyalty or reliability, and has been given a further opportunity to submit any information or considerations that he thinks ought to be

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taken into account on his behalf by the Deputy Minister or head of agency; and failing a satisfactory resolution.

- c. The advice of a board of review drawn from the members of the Security Panel has been sought on the basis of all the information available. (The board of review shall consist of the Chairman and at least two members of the Security Panel, with the proviso that no member who is directly concerned with the case shall sit as a member of the board.)

20. In arriving at a final decision as to whether a security clearance can or cannot be granted, the Minister of Defence Production will take into account all of the relevant information and advice that has been provided, but the Minister is not bound to act on such advice.

21. Should none of the courses set out in paragraphs 17 to 20 result in a satisfactory resolution of the doubt concerning the employee, the Minister of Defence Production shall notify the Industrial Firm concerned that the employee must continue to be denied access to classified information, in accordance with the provisions of the contract between the Minister and the Industrial Firm. In order that the interests of the employee may be protected, the Firm should be urged to retain the employee in a position in which he does not require access to classified information.

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ANNEX "H"
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RECORD OF CABINET DECISION

Meeting of June 25, 1963

POLICY AND PROCEDURES IN GRANTING PERMITS FOR
THE EXPORT OF ARMS

The Cabinet agreed with the recommendation of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, concurred in by the Minister of Trade and Commerce:

- a. That the Minister of Trade and Commerce, in exercising his power to issue export permits, shall, in certain cases as set out below, issue permits only with the concurrence of the Secretary of State for External Affairs and in the light of advice from the Minister of National Defence.
- b. That applications for the export of unclassified arms and military equipment (as listed in Group 7 of the Control List) may be approved on the authority of the Minister of Trade and Commerce alone when the destination is one of the following:

NATO countries and commands (except Portugal)

Australia
Austria
Eire
Jamaica
Japan
Malaya (Malaysia)
Mexico
New Zealand
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Trinidad-Tobago
Canadian Forces outside Canada.

- c. That applications may be similarly approved on the authority of the Minister of Trade and Commerce alone in respect of unclassified military equipment valued at not more than \$10,000 per application when the destination is one of the following:

Argentina	Iran
Bolivia	Nigeria
Brazil	Pakistan
Burma	Paraguay
Ceylon	Peru

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Chile
Colombia
Equador
Finland
Ghana
India

Philippines
Tanganyika
Thailand
Uruguay
Venezuela

subject to the requirement that whenever an application coming within this category is received, the officer of the Department of Trade and Commerce receiving the application shall, by telephone, obtain confirmation from the Department of External Affairs that the status of the country of destination, for purposes of arms export control, has not changed.

- d. That applications involving the export of classified equipment, of military equipment of a total value exceeding \$10,000 to the countries named in c. above, or where the destination in a country not named under b. and c. above, shall be issued on the authority of the Minister of Trade and Commerce only after having obtained the concurrence of the Secretary of State for External Affairs and the Minister of National Defence.
- e. That recommendations as to the policy governing the export of arms and military equipment to the following countries or groups of countries shall be submitted for Cabinet approval as soon as possible, and thereafter export permit applications shall be approved or rejected in accordance with the established policy.

Caribbean Area
Central America

Dominican Republic
Haiti
Costa Rica
El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
Nicaragua
Panama

Indonesia
Middle East

Iraq
Israel
Jordan
Syria
United Arab
Republic

Portugal
South Africa
Yugoslavia

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- f. That it shall be the responsibility of the Secretary of State for External Affairs to keep the country lists under review and, where necessary, to alter the designations of countries as between b. and c. above, or to delete any country from the two lists, thereby making it subject to treatment under d.

(sgd) E.F. Gaskell
Registrar of the Cabinet

Privy Council Office,
July 3, 1963

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ANNEX "I"
TO DND BRIEF
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RELEASE OF MILITARY INFORMATION TO OTHER COUNTRIES

GENERAL

1. The purpose of this order is to outline the Canadian policy on the release of Canadian military information to other countries.
2. Canadian military information is defined as that information which originates in the Department of National Defence, the Department of Defence Production, or in other Government Departments on matters which affect the defence effort. This includes scientific and technical information when this has resulted from research and development carried out under Federal Government auspices.
3. Canadian military information is only released to friendly countries when a need-to-know has been established. "Need-to-know", which means Canada's need for the country to know, is established by showing that the release of the information in question will secure for Canada defence information of comparable value in return from that country, or will further that country's defence aims when they coincide with Canadian defence aims, or will prevent wasteful duplication of defence effort as between the two countries.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR RELEASE OF INFORMATION

4. Policy concerning the release of military information will be administered by the Security and Information Release Committee under the direction of the Deputy Minister.

PROCEDURE FOR RELEASE OF INFORMATION

5. On receipt of a request for classified information, the component of DND to which the request has been directed may release information up to and including the classification laid down in Column 1 of Appendix "1". In those cases where the request is of concern to other components or Departments, the component or Department to which the request has been directed will obtain the concurrence of the other interested components and/or Departments to the proposed release. If general approval cannot be obtained, the request shall be referred to the Security and Information Release Committee for decision. If the information is classified higher than that authorized for release under Column 1, the request shall be referred to the Security and Information Release Committee which has the authority to release information up to and including the classification listed under Column 2. If the release of information over and above the highest classification in Appendix "1" of this paper is proposed, the Committee will seek the authority of the Deputy Minister.

6. Military information may be released to other countries within the scope of this policy by the Components

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through their own channels or by other Departments through the Department of External Affairs.

7. Categorization of countries is shown in Appendix "1". Category one consists of countries to which Canada is closely allied. Category two contains members of NATO. Category three contains countries with which Canada has constant association and is satisfied that Canadian information is afforded adequate protection; this category has been established primarily to minimize the administration of releases to these countries. Category four is self explanatory, containing all Communist dominated countries. Category five consists of the remaining countries.

8. At Appendix "2" is an example of a warning which should be placed on all classified and unclassified releases to other countries except that it may be omitted from unclassified releases of a non-technical nature in which there are no patent and proprietary implications. This example covers all the points which could possibly arise in any release. These are, physical protection, defence use only, release to third parties and patent and proprietary rights. However, an individual Component or Department may impose such additional release conditions as it may require for its own purpose.

9. Each Component should issue orders putting the above policy into effect and ensuring that all information for release to other countries, except Britain and the U.S., is channelled through one source in the Component concerned. Copies of these orders should be forwarded to the Security and Information Release Committee for information.

NOTES FOR THE GUIDANCE OF THE COMPONENTS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE AND THE SECURITY AND INFORMATION RELEASE CTEE

10. The following paragraphs are intended as guidance for the Components and SIRC. Paragraphs 10 to 23 inclusive outline the agreements and rules affecting the release of certain categories of information. Paragraphs 24 to 27 inclusive contain observations on the release of information to certain countries or categories of countries. All these notes were taken into account in preparing the Appendix "1" mentioned in paragraphs 5 and 7 above.

STANDARDIZATION INFORMATION

11. There are three standardization agreements between the Components and their counterparts in the U.K. and the U.S. as follows:

- a. Naval Standardization is based on agreement agreed to in 1949 by representatives of the RN, RCN and USN; (IEFs).
- b. Basic Standardization Agreement Among the Armies of the U.S., U.K., CDA and Australia, 1 June 1960; (ABCA).

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- c. Airforce standardization is based upon an arrangement agreed to in 1949 by representatives of the RAF, USAF and RCAF.

12. Information which is specifically listed as coming under the terms of the standardization agreements will only be released with the agreement of the participating countries.

NON-CANADIAN CLASSIFIED MILITARY INFORMATION

13. The NATO Security Agreement contained in Enclosure "A" of NATO document C-M(55)15 (Final) dated 31 July 1964, to which Canada subscribes, governs the security of information released to NATO by member countries.

14. There is in addition, a general understanding with Britain and the U.S. that their information, classified or unclassified, not governed by a particular agreement, will not be released by Canada without prior consultation and approval except as provided in paragraphs 21 to 25 inclusive.

15. The preceding agreements all prohibit the release of classified information given to Canada by the nations concerned to any other nations without the consent of the originator.

PROTECTION OF PATENTS

16. While the Agreements named in paragraph 11 provided for patent protection, precautions should be taken to protect patent rights when information of that type is being released.

17. Military information owned either wholly or in part by another country, whether classified or not, shall not be released to a third country without prior approval of the owning nations. The only exception to this rule shall be as stated in paragraph 24 in its application to NATO unclassified military information.

ATOMIC ENERGY INFORMATION

18. The release of atomic energy information for defence purposes is governed by the Agreement between the Governments of the United States of America and Canada for Co-operation Regarding Atomic Information for Mutual Defence Purposes of 22 May 1959.

19. While there is no formal agreement with Britain, no British information on atomic energy will be released to any other country without British consent.

20. The Control of ATOMAL information within NATO is governed by the NATO Agreement providing for the Co-operation Regarding the Exchange of Atomic Information for Mutual Defence Purposes.

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RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT INFORMATION

21. 

CONTINENTAL DEFENCE INFORMATION

22. Continental defence information, which is that information pertaining purely to the defence of North America, is only releasable to other countries with the consent of both the U.S. and Canada. Good judgement must be used as to what is continental defence information. Basically, it consists of the plans for the defence of North America when used specifically for that purpose and for no other. Appendix "3".

NATO INFORMATION

23. NATO unclassified military information may be released at the discretion of Canada to non-NATO organizations and nations without reference to contributing nations, on the understanding that the same degree of control and supervision will be exercised as in the case of unclassified information originating in Canada. Authority to release such information is delegated to the Component having major responsibility or concern with the information.

24. NATO information classified COSMIC or NATO, which has been received from a NATO organization or agency, is not releasable to other countries. NATO document C-M(55)15 (Final) of 31 July 1964 is the basic paper on this subject.

RELEASE TO NATO INTERNATIONAL COMMANDS AND AGENCIES

25. Canada will release to NATO International Commands and Agencies, Canadian information of any category which is required to further the aims of NATO.

RELEASE TO NATO COUNTRIES OTHER THAN BRITAIN OR U.S.

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RELEASE TO NON-NATO FRIENDLY COUNTRIES

27. Reciprocity will be a main factor in releasing classified military information to these countries.

RELEASE TO THE USSR AND SATELLITE COUNTRIES

28. Canadian Government policy on this subject is expressed in Security Panel Memorandum to Deputy Ministers of Government Agencies of 24 August 1953 "Distribution of Unclassified Information to the USSR and Its Satellites". Normally no information will be released to those countries unless there is a possibility of obtaining comparable information in return.


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APPENDIX 1
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Category	Country	Highest Classi- fication to be Released by the Components of DND	Highest Classi- fication to be Released by the SIRC.
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
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Category	Country	Highest Classi- fication to be Released by the Components of DND	Highest Classi- fication to be Released by the SIRC.
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
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APPENDIX 1
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TO DND BRIEF
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Category	Country	Highest Classi- fication to be Released by the Components of DND	Highest Classi- fication to be Released by the SIRC.
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APPENDIX 2
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CAUTIONARY WARNING

This information is furnished with the express understanding that:

- a. It will be used for military purposes only.
- b. It will be afforded essentially the same degree of security protection as provided by the Department of National Defence, Canada.
- c. Proprietary and patent rights will be respected.
- d. It will not be released to another nation without specific approval of the Canadian Government - Department of National Defence.

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APPENDIX 3
TO ANNEX "I"
TO DND BRIEF
FOR THE ROYAL
COMMISSION ON
SECURITY
DATED: 26 DEC 67

POLICY GOVERNING THE RELEASE OF CLASSIFIED
WESTERN HEMISPHERE DEFENCE INFORMATION TO OTHER NATIONS

AIM

1. The aim of this paper is to outline the Canadian policy governing the release of classified Western Hemisphere defence information to other nations.

DEFINITION

2. For the purpose of this paper Western Hemisphere defence information is defined as information of the following categories:

- a. The strategic concept or details of defence plans and agreements between Canada and the United States or between Canada and any other nations of the Western Hemisphere.
- b. The details of bilateral plans and agreements between Canada and any non-Western Hemisphere nation for the defence of territory in the Western Hemisphere under the control of that nation.
- c. The strategic concept or details of:
 - (1) Joint Canadian Service plans pertaining to the defence of the Western Hemisphere.
 - (2) Plans of the Royal Canadian Navy, Canadian Army or Royal Canadian Air Force pertaining to the defence of the Western Hemisphere.
 - (3) Plans and related documents prepared by the Canadian/United States defence agencies.
- d. Canadian operational and logistical plans for the employment of home defence forces.
- e. The number, location, operating schedules of radar sites, anti-aircraft sites, communication centres, air defence bases and other specific details concerning the overall employment of air defence units.
- f. The number, location, designation or operating potential of radar picket ships employed in the defence of the Western Hemisphere.

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- g. Detailed information on Canadian military equipment reserved specifically for the defence of the Western Hemisphere, or information concerning the operating potential of such equipment including the Aircraft Control and Warning System capabilities of a given site.
- h. Specific data concerning air defence communication and radar in connection with a particular site, including information on:
 - (1) Communication and radar nets.
 - (2) Communication frequencies.
 - (3) Security measures.
 - (4) Daily or periodic codes.
 - (5) The identification of all stations or units normally concealed by frequently altered call signs or code names.
 - (6) All statistics pertaining to:
 - (a) Data transmissions.
 - (b) Number and type of radar intercepts.
 - (c) Ground observation reports.
 - (d) Vectored intercepts of unidentified aircraft.
 - (e) Any other factual data on daily operations of such systems which may reveal either successful or unsuccessful operations.
- i. Any information relating to the vulnerability of any area, facility or installation in the Western Hemisphere.
- j. Any other military information on the Western Hemisphere which, by its nature, is peculiarly sensitive in terms of Canadian security or with respect to Canadian collaboration with a foreign government.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR RELEASE

3. Classified Western Hemisphere defence information may only be released by, or with the approval of, the Canadian Navy, Army, Air Force or the Defence Research Board whichever

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had primary interests therein and upon the receipt of a written request from the owner requesting its release. This applies even when the information is the property, in whole or in part, of a Canadian company, corporation, partnership or individual. In those cases where the request is of concern to other Services or Departments, the Service or Department to which the request for release has been directed will obtain the concurrence of the other interested Services and/or Departments to the proposed release. If general approval cannot be obtained, the request shall be referred to the Security and Information Release Committee for decision. When it is decided that information should or should not be released, the Service or Department to which the request was originally directed will be responsible for passing on the decision.

CONDITIONS FOR RELEASE

4. In considering the release of Western Hemisphere defence information, the "Conditions for Release of Information" as outlined in paragraphs 5 and 6 of Canadian policy on "Release of Classified Military Information to Other Nations" are to be borne in mind.

TO WHOM RELEASABLE

5. Generally speaking, classified Western Hemisphere defence information will not be released to foreign governments except as outlined below:

a.

b.

c.

d.

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e.



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ANNEX "J"
TO DND BRIEF
FOR THE ROYAL
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SECURITY
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VISITS PANEL ORGANIZATION

1. The Visits Panel, which is responsible to the Cabinet through the Secretary of State for External Affairs for the supervision and direction of the exchange of visits with communist countries, as presently constituted, is not a fully effective instrument for taking initiatives in the promotion of Canadian visits to communist countries, nor for exercising a desirable level of control over the number of visits from communist countries to Canada, as was originally intended.

2. While these problems will be diminished by the negotiation of a cultural agreement with the Soviet Union, effective machinery will still be required for the administration of exchange proposals and the supervision and control of initiatives from communist countries including the Soviet Union.

3. The Visits Panel is responsible for:

- a. Co-ordination of the plans of government departments and agencies for official exchanges between Canada and the communist countries with the purpose of obtaining comparable advantages in reciprocal exchange agreements.
- b. Participation, where appropriate, in the arrangements for unofficial visits to and from communist countries which it considers would be in the national interest, and the provision of advice to the Canadian sponsors of such visits.
- c. Co-ordination of the views of government agencies on the security and intelligence aspects of exchanges. The Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs may exercise final responsibility on these aspects of visits proposals, subject to an appeal to the Cabinet.
- d. Recommendations for the provision of financial support for Canadian groups and individuals in the professional, academic and performing arts fields who are visiting the Soviet Union, may be made by the Visits Panel to the Interdepartmental Advisory Committee on Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries.
- e. Direction of the Visits Panel Secretariat and the Visits Panel Working Group.
- f. Review of Canadian policy and practices and the current trend of exchanges with communist countries in an annual report.

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4. The members of the Visits Panel, in addition to the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, who is Chairman, are:

- a. Secretary to the Cabinet.
- b. Deputy Minister of Citizenship and Immigration.
- c. Commissioner of Royal Canadian Mounted Police.
- d. Deputy Minister of National Defence.
- e. Deputy Ministers of other departments and Heads of other agencies in accordance with their interest in the agenda.

5. In addition, the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, representatives of European Division and Cultural Affairs Division of the Department of External Affairs attend all meetings. The Secretariat of the Visits Panel is to be provided by the European Division of External Affairs.

6. A sub-committee of officers delegated by their departments and agencies as a Working Group will be responsible under the Chairmanship of the Head or Deputy Head of the European Division of the Department of External Affairs, for the day-to-day functions of the Visits Panel. It will also refer to the Visits Panel questions of policy which it cannot itself resolve. It will be convened on a periodic or ad hoc basis by the Secretary and will be attended by the representatives of those departments which have an interest in the agenda.

7. To improve the day-to-day administration of Visits Panel business, a Secretariat will be formed. The Secretariat should be headed by a non-rotational Secretary of suitable seniority assisted by another officer. This will require an addition to the External Affairs establishment of a position for the Assistant Secretary.

8. The Secretariat will be an administrative and advisory agency of the Visits Panel and the Visits Panel Working Group under the immediate direction of the Chairman of the Working Group. On the basis of Visits Panel policy, terms of reference, and such specific direction as it may from time to time receive, it will:

- a. Provide advice and information liaison services for governmental and non-governmental agencies.
- b. Be the media for conveying Visits Panel decisions to governmental and non-governmental agencies.

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- c. Consult other western governments in order to obtain the latest information on their policies and practices in exchanges with communist countries.
- d. Be responsible for the writing of an annual report on the basis of statistical and other information received in the preceding year.

CATEGORIES OF VISITS

CATEGORY A

9. Visits to and from communist countries which are normally outside the purview of the Visits Panel but which remain subject to normal security and immigration controls are:

- a. Tourist visits or private visits by individuals to relatives.
- b. Delegates and observers to bona fide international conferences.
- c. Business visits including trade and commercial delegations.
- d. Diplomatic and consular officials and their suites.

CATEGORY B

10. Other proposals for visits to or from communist countries will be referred to the Visits Panel when they are under the sponsorship of a Canadian government department or agency or when there will be government participation in the visit.

CATEGORY C

11. There remains a broad range of visits which may be referred to the Visits Panel in the interests of obtaining reciprocity as well as safeguarding security interests. These include exchanges involving business, industrial, and professional associations, academic bodies, performing arts and other forms of artistic exchanges, trade unions, churches and other reputable and responsible private organizations and individuals. Since there can be no requirement for such groups to consult the government on their exchange proposals, it is incumbent upon the Federal Government to demonstrate to them the benefits of obtaining government advice and co-operation in order to avoid the pitfalls they frequently encounter when acting on their own behalf.

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CATEGORY D

12. As in the past, visits under the sponsorship of communist or communist-front organizations in Canada should not be permitted.

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ANNEX "K"
TO DND BRIEF
FOR THE ROYAL
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SECURITY
DATED: 26 DEC 67

DISTRIBUTION OF UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION
TO THE U.S.S.R. AND ITS SATELLITES

During 1948 and 1949 arrangements were evolved whereby all interested Canadian Government departments and agencies might channel through the Department of External Affairs any unclassified information destined for government or private organizations or individuals in Soviet or satellite countries. The Department of External Affairs was to examine whether or not reciprocal information was being obtained in return from Soviet and satellite countries. In addition, when any security question arose as to the desirability of any unclassified information being forwarded, the Department of External Affairs was to consult the Security Panel for advice. The Panel's concern stems from the fact that although the individual item of information may be unclassified, security considerations can arise - particularly when the information is in the form of a collated report.

This procedure has recently been reviewed by the Security Panel and the Security Sub-Panel which concluded that reciprocity, as we understand it, is not normally to be obtained in an exchange with Soviet and satellite countries. The following recommendations have therefore been made:

- (i) that in future unclassified information should be given to persons or organizations in Soviet or satellite countries or in the People's Republic of China only when some useful return can be anticipated, or when it was felt some other advantage might be gained by providing the information;
- (ii) that this should in future be a departmental responsibility and should not be channelled through the Department of External Affairs; and
- (iii) that before any unclassified information is sent to Soviet or satellite countries or the People's Republic of China the departmental security officer should be consulted and may in turn consult the Secretary of the Security Panel in cases of doubt.

In addition, it was agreed that it would be desirable to ask departments and agencies to report twice a year to the Secretary of the Security Panel on information which they may have sent to Soviet or satellite countries or to the People's Republic of China. Since this new arrangement will throw further responsibility on your departmental security officer, you may wish, for his guidance, to know in more detail the policy which the Security Panel considers should govern the distribution of unclassified information to the Soviet sphere.

It is clear that each government department or agency is normally best fitted to assess the intrinsic value which any item of unclassified information in its control may have. There will, however, be occasions when the value of an item should be assessed in the light of other information which may be the concern or another department, or where the security considerations involved may call for advice. In these cases the Secretary of the Security Panel may be consulted.

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SECRET
CDN EYES ONLY

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DATED: 26 DEC 67

Security Officers are asked to bear in mind that, while a number of individual items on a given subject may be unclassified, the total information obtained by putting these items together should perhaps not be unrestricted. Therefore, before a decision is made to give unclassified information on any subject, an examination should first be made of what previous information on that subject may have been given. The value of the individual item should then be assessed in the light of the whole. In making such an examination your Security Officer should assume that, although previous publications on any given subject may not have been sent to a Soviet or satellite country by your department itself, any publication printed by the Queen's Printer on behalf of your department will be in the hands of any interested foreign mission.

It is also the opinion of the Panel that distribution of unclassified information to Soviet and satellite countries should be governed primarily by self-interest. We have not in the past received genuine reciprocal information from communist-controlled countries. It is probable that certain Soviet publications are regularly allowed to leave the country while others are not, and it is most unlikely that any unclassified information which departments may send will seriously affect this policy. However, in the few instances where unclassified Canadian information does already produce a reasonable return continuance of the exchange would be a matter for the discretion of the department concerned, taking into account the advantage that it derives from the exchange. In cases where a reasonable offer of reciprocal information accompanies a request, again it would be a matter for the department to decide whether the request should be filled for as long as a fair return is made. In other cases a decision to send an unclassified publication into the Soviet sphere should be based upon whether or not the issuing department considers that there is some indirect benefit to be gained by the publication being read by Soviet or satellite officials or experts.

If, in the light of the above, you should decide that any unclassified information which your department may at present be sending to Soviet or satellite countries should be stopped, it is recommended that this be done gradually over a period of time in order that the change of policy shall not be immediately apparent to the recipient.

On occasions private organizations in Canada receive requests for information and sometimes consult an appropriate department or agency for advice. When this occurs, organizations may be given guidance along the lines set out in this memorandum, provided that it is made clear that the guidance given is for their private information only.

It is appreciated that a number of Canadian government departments and agencies are not normally faced with the problem discussed above. In these cases, this memorandum is being sent only as a guidance should the problem arise at any time in the future.

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ANNEX "L"
TO DND BRIEF
FOR THE ROYAL
COMMISSION ON
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DATED 26 DEC 67

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE
INSTRUCTION
SECURITY OF PERSONNEL

AIM

1. The aim of this instruction is to define the application of Cabinet Directive 35 dated 18 December 1963 entitled "Security in the Public Service of Canada" as it pertains to the Department of National Defence.

GENERAL

2. No person is entitled to access to classified information or material solely by virtue of rank, appointment, or security clearance. Access to such information will be authorized only when the governmental duties of the individual require such access and he has been cleared to the appropriate level. A security clearance serves only to indicate that the person is eligible for access to classified military information as required by his duties and does not, in itself, authorize access.

3. This instruction is applicable to all personnel, military and civilian, employed by or on behalf of the Department of National Defence.

4. All personnel requiring a security clearance in the Department of National Defence will be required to complete a Personal History Form, DND 450 or 453. Personnel who contract marriage following their completion of DND 450 or 453 are required to re-submit DND 450 or 453. Personnel are to be made aware of the necessity for completing these forms and a suggested statement to personnel in this respect is contained in Appendix "1".

AUTHORITY TO GRANT SECURITY CLEARANCE

5. The Deputy Minister, the Chiefs of Staff and the Chairman, Defence Research Board and such officers as they may delegate, may on behalf of the Minister, issue security clearances to personnel placed under their jurisdiction for security clearance purposes.

STANDARDS OF INVESTIGATION

6. The standards of investigation as detailed hereafter are related to the level of clearance required and are to be interpreted as a minimum. Higher standards may be ordered by the authorities listed above.

TYPES OF INVESTIGATIONS

7. Personnel security investigations are of these types:
- a. a check of the subversive and fingerprint indices of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (hereafter referred to as an "indices" check);

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- b. a background investigation which, in addition to sub-paragraph a. above, will include a detailed examination of all federal government records* applicable to the individual's service in the federal government covering an uninterrupted period of ten years of federal government service immediately preceding the clearance. This investigation may also include the taking up of references.
- c. a field investigation, which in addition to sub-paragraphs a. and b. above, as applicable, will normally provide a minimum of ten years continuous coverage immediately prior to clearance.

SCOPE OF INVESTIGATIONS - CANADIAN CITIZENS

8. The types of investigation required to support a clearance are as follows:

- a. TOP SECRET - Before a person is employed in a position requiring access to TOP SECRET information, he must be the subject of a field investigation by an appropriate investigative agency. This procedure is mandatory.
- b. Interim TOP SECRET clearances will not normally be granted. However, in exceptional cases interim TOP SECRET clearances may be authorized by the Deputy Minister or the Chief of Staff of the Service concerned or the Chairman, Defence Research Board. Whenever an interim TOP SECRET clearance is granted immediate action shall be taken to support the clearance in accordance with paragraph 8 a. above. Interim TOP SECRET clearances shall not be granted personnel who are not cleared to SECRET level.
- c. SECRET - Before a person is employed in a position requiring access to SECRET information, he must be the subject of:
 - (i) an indices check; and
 - (ii) a background investigation; or
 - (iii) a field investigation.
- d. Interim SECRET clearances will not normally be given. However in special cases interim SECRET clearances may be authorized on the basis of an indices check. Whenever an interim SECRET clearance is granted, immediate action

*As applicable, Citizenship & Immigration
External Affairs (Passport Division)
Department of Veterans Affairs

Civil Service Commission,
Department of National
Defence
Other Departments & Agencies

shall be taken to support the clearance in accordance with paragraph 8 c. above.

- e. CONFIDENTIAL - Before a person is employed in a position requiring access to CONFIDENTIAL information he must be subject to an indices check.
- f. RESTRICTED - No clearance is required.

SCOPE OF INVESTIGATION - NON-CANADIAN CITIZEN

9. It is usually difficult to assess the loyalty of non-Canadian citizens to Canada. Therefore, careful consideration must be given before clearance action is initiated that the advantages of clearing a non-Canadian citizen clearly and substantially outweigh any risks involved. Then, non-Canadian citizens shall be cleared to the investigative standards outlined in the preceding paragraphs for Canadian citizens. Interim TOP SECRET clearances shall not be granted to non-Canadian citizens.

CRITERIA

10. In assessing information obtained as a result of the investigation outlined previously, the following criteria shall be used. Information of the type listed hereunder shall preclude the issuance of a security clearance.

- 11. Loyalty - Persons of doubtful political reliability are:
 - a. a person who is a member of a communist or fascist party or an organization affiliated with a communist party and having a similar nature and purpose;
 - b. a person who by his words or his action shows himself to support a communist or fascist party or an organization affiliated with a communist or fascist party and having a similar nature and purpose;
 - c. a person who, having reasonable grounds to understand its true nature and purpose, is a member of or supports by his words or actions an organization which has as its real objective the furtherance of communist or fascist aims and policies (commonly known as a front group);
 - d. a person who is a secret agent of or an informer for a foreign power, or who deliberately assists any such agent or informer;
 - e. a person who by his words or his action shows himself to support any organization which publicly or privately advocates or practices the use of force to alter the form of government.

12. Character Defects and Weaknesses - In addition to loyalty, a person may be unreliable for a number of other reasons which may preclude or limit the issuance of a security clearance. These are:

- a. a person who is unreliable because of features of his character which may lead to indiscretion or dishonesty, or make him vulnerable to blackmail or coercion. Such features may be greed, debt, illicit sexual behaviour, drunkenness, drug addiction, mental imbalance, or such other aspects of character as might seriously affect his reliability;
- b. a person who, through family or other close continuing relationship with persons who are persons as described in paragraph 11 above, is likely to be induced, either knowingly or unknowingly, to act in a manner prejudicial to the safety and interest of Canada;
- c. a person who, though in no sense disloyal or unreliable, is bound by close ties of blood or affection to persons living within the borders of such foreign nations as may cause him to be subjected to intolerable pressures.

NATO CLEARANCES

13. Clearances granted in accordance with this instruction to TOP SECRET, SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL are adequate to indoctrinate personnel to the equivalent NATO security clearance. (Details of NATO security requirements are contained in the NATO Confidential Supplement to C-M(55)15(Final), Article 2.1 of the DND Security Orders).

ATOMIC INFORMATION

14. Within the Department of National Defence, clearance for access to atomic information classified TOP SECRET, SECRET, or CONFIDENTIAL will be governed by the clearance procedures set forth in this instruction. Where indoctrination to the ZED LIST is required, a field investigation is to be completed prior to granting a clearance to TOP SECRET and SECRET. Non-Canadian citizens shall not be indoctrinated for ZED information.

REVIEW OF CLEARANCES

15. Clearances will be reviewed:
- a. on change of marital status;
 - b. not exceeding a period of five years from granting or previous review;
 - c. on any occasion of doubt concerning an individual.

ADVERSE CASES - INTERVIEW PROCEDURES

16. In cases where security clearance investigation has raised a doubt in respect to the loyalty and/or reliability of a subject already employed by the Department, the matter will be referred to the primary granting authority concerned for further consideration and decision in accordance with the referral and interview procedures contained in Cabinet Directive 35.

SECRET
CDN EYES ONLY

APPENDIX 1
TO ANNEX "L"
TO DND BRIEF
FOR THE ROYAL
COMMISSION ON
SECURITY
DATED: 26 DEC 67

STATEMENT RELATIVE TO THE PREPARATION
OF THE PERSONAL HISTORY FORM
(DND 450 ENGLISH, DND 453 FRENCH)

The duties to be assigned to you will bring you in contact with classified information. Before such information is made available to you, you will be subject to security clearance procedures.

The official Personal History Form, which you are now being asked to complete, seeks, in strict confidence, certain details pertaining to yourself and your immediate relatives.

Personnel security clearance is part of the security measures adopted by the Government of Canada to ensure that its defence and other secrets are entrusted only to persons who can be determined as loyal and reliable.

It is of utmost importance, to your advantage, and mandatory that you answer all questions appearing on the Personal History Form, completely and truthfully.

Any additional information which you consider desirable to disclose should also be included. This can be done on a separate sheet of paper, duly signed and attached to the Personal History Form.

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SECRET
CDN EYES ONLY

ANNEX M
TO DND BRIEF FOR ROYAL
COMMISSION ON SECURITY
DATED: 26 DEC 67

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

C22-00-00(CO)

Ottawa 7, Ont
7 Jul 67

SPECIAL INVESTIGATION UNIT INSTRUCTION 2/67

RE-ISSUED INSTRUCTION

1. SIUI #2/66 and Annexes B and C are cancelled and re-issued. Annex A dated 16 May 66 is to be retained.

SECTION 1 - Security Field Investigations

AUTHORITY

2. Cabinet Directive #35 was promulgated on 18 Dec 63 and is entitled "Security in the Public Service of Canada". It constitutes our authority to conduct investigations into the general employment and relevant background areas of civilian and military members of the Canadian Forces who will require access to classified information in the course of their duties. In some instances, this authority extends to include such persons as meteorological officers, DM auditors, commissionaires, etc, who, although not attached to the Forces, are employed on behalf of DND. CD #35 is reproduced at Annex A.

PURPOSE

3. On the basis of the investigative reports and such other pertinent information as has been obtained, the employing department or agency (DND and CFHQ D Security) will arrive at a considered judgement of the person's loyalty, reliability, and the degree of confidence that can be reposed in him to carry out, safely and efficiently, the duties to be performed.

PROHIBITIONS

4. Security field investigations shall not be conducted by the SIU organization, except at the request of CFHQ D Security. However, there is no objection to SIU, SIDs, and SISs conducting local police records checks at the request of a local Base Commander when such a request is made for other than clearance purposes.

DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION

5. CFAO 22-3 para 10 precludes disclosing information respecting security field investigations to anyone outside of the SIU organization without specific authority from D Security.

6. Notwithstanding para 4 above and para 10 of SIUSOs, if at any time an investigator:

- a. becomes aware of a matter which might immediately endanger the security of a DND establishment, or
- b. is the recipient of information and/or rumours which, if true, may require further investigation from a criminal point of view,

he shall advise the commander of the base/station concerned as soon as possible. This course of action should, in cases envisaged in a. above, rarely be necessary, and where in doubt, the Detachment Commander shall be contacted direct by the investigator. In respect of b. above, the

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information should be passed to the Base Security Officer or NCO i/c of MP. At this point, the obligations of the investigator are fulfilled. He may of course offer the services of the SIS to the unit commander but the decision to employ them must remain the latter's prerogative in accordance with CFAO.22-3 para 5.

SECTION 2 - Requests for Field Investigations

TABLE OF CATEGORIES

7. a. Category one cases covers special investigative requirements which are coded as follows:
- (1) 1(a) Personnel who require Special Activities (SA) clearances;
 - 1(b) Personnel on whom there is adverse political information;
 - 1(c) Personnel on whom there is adverse criminal information;
 - 1(d) Personnel who are aliens or former aliens or personnel who have relatives behind the Iron Curtain, have visited or are suspected of visiting Iron Curtain countries, etc;
 - 1(e) Personnel on whom there is known adverse information, other than of a criminal or political nature;
 - 1(f) Personnel on whom there is no known adverse information, but on whom investigation is urgently required;
 - 1(g) Personnel whose parents or parents-in-law have been identified as members of questionable political groups where there is a possibility that ties are ethnic or linguistic as opposed to ideological; and
 - 1(h) Personnel on whom additional investigation is necessary in support of the Human Reliability Program (HRP).
- b. Category two cases covers normal requirements for Secret and Top Secret clearances.
- c. Category three cases covers cases other than those described above.

DIARY DATES

8. A diary date shown on the letter of request for investigation is the latest date on which the completed investigation is to be received at D Security. Consequently, SIDs shall ensure that SIU receives the report(s) at least five working days prior to the date shown.

DISTRIBUTION OF FIELD INVESTIGATION REQUESTS

9. D Security forwards field investigation requests to SIU after having considered the following:
- a. areas to be investigated;

- b. sufficient copies of the letter of request and Forms DND 450 are supplied to ensure that each SID involved in the investigation has the information required to conduct enquiries within their geographical area; and
- c. notwithstanding that the designated places of investigation are precise geographical areas, nothing in a. or b. above precludes an investigator from conducting additional enquiries in an area immediately adjacent to the designated point of investigation if it appears clear to him that a valuable source of information is available there.

CFHQ DISCLOSURE OF ADVERSE INFORMATION

10. Adverse information of a subversive nature which is known to D Security will not be included in requests to SIU for security field investigations. However, these requests will be allocated a category 1(b) and be annotated as to whether the information relates to the subject, his relatives, or to his associates.

UPDATING

11. D Security requests for updating field investigations frequently stipulate that particular attention is to be paid to specific factors which could have a direct bearing on a person's suitability for a security clearance.

SPECIFIC FACTORS

12. The factors requiring particular investigative attention are clearly indicated and are usually one or more of those listed in paras 1 to 9 of the Security Clearance Report Form CF 246. Therefore, all requests will identify the points(s) requiring special attention through the use of the para number(s) under which they appear on the Form CF 246. As an example, required detailed knowledge of the subject's financial status would be indicated by quoting "para 3".

SPECIFIC FACTORS ON INITIAL INVESTIGATIONS

13. Occasionally the procedure set out in 10 and 11 above is also used in initial requests for field investigations.

OFFICERS

14. Investigations on officers of the rank of Lt Colonel equivalent and above shall be conducted by an officer of the SIU organization. In cases of urgency or the unavailability of an officer, the Detachment Commander shall assign a suitable investigator.

15. Investigations on other personnel may be conducted by any investigator of the SIU organization.

CONTACTS

16. Contacts are to be carefully selected. They must not be related to the subject being investigated. The necessity for a clear and sincere approach to contacts cannot be over-emphasized.

IDENTIFICATION

17. It is a requirement for investigators to produce their credentials when introducing themselves to contacts. It is important that the investigator clearly identify himself as a "Department of National Defence Investigator" at the time of introduction.

PURPOSE OF VISIT

18. The next step by the investigator should be an explanation covering the reason for the enquiry. In normal circumstances, it should only be necessary to advise the contact that the person under investigation is the subject of routine enquiries to verify his integrity, reliability and suitability to have access to information which is vital to Canada's defences. It should be amply pointed out that the subject is not in any trouble, he is not being singled out for any specific purpose, and that exactly the same type of enquiry is carried out on all persons, both civilian and military, who are required to work in positions of trust.

DISCRETION

19. Contacts shall be advised that enquiries are confidential and the information they give will be treated in the strictest confidence.

DISCLOSURES

20. Contacts shall not be apprised of information previously obtained, nor of the identity of other contacts. While conducting interviews there is no objection in requesting the names of other persons who might be utilized as reliable contacts. At the conclusion of an interview, it should be impressed on the contact the desirability that he not mention an investigator has called.

SCOPE OF FIELD INVESTIGATIONS

21. Investigators occasionally question the necessity for carrying out certain phases of investigations. The following sub-paras are provided to explain the need for such investigations:

- a. remote area investigations will not normally be requested unless;
 - (1) adverse information has been received through other sources which makes the enquiries necessary; and
 - (2) sufficient information cannot be obtained elsewhere.
- b. training phases will not normally be covered, unless the circumstances are similar to those outlined in a. above; and
- c. with reference to family background and environment, where a field investigation has been requested to cover that period of an individual's life during which his character traits were being developed - "the formative or juvenile period", - it is mandatory that the investigator conduct sufficient enquiries to establish the family environment in which he was raised. The results of these enquiries are to be clearly stated in the ensuing report.

SPECIAL COVERAGE

22. D Security does not normally request investigations covering periods in the background of an individual which have already been satisfactorily investigated. However, should additional enquiries be necessary, D Security will indicate the specific coverage required.

QUESTIONABLE REQUESTS

23. Notwithstanding that D Security issues the terms of reference for field investigations, Detachment Commanders should question any request for an investigation, which, from local knowledge, would prove fruitless or

would not warrant the expense involved. SIU, if in agreement, will request reconsideration by D Security.

FIELD INVESTIGATIONS - REQUIREMENTS

24. Information concerning the character and habits of the subject prior to his enrolment, re-enrolment or appointment shall be obtained from sources located in each of the areas designated for investigation.

CIVIL POLICE CHECKS

25. Arrangements shall be made by Detachment and Section Commanders with their applicable police agencies ensuring that:

- a. only the subject is checked against their records (except in category 1(a) cases - see para 31);
- b. when a conviction is either revealed or confirmed, particulars of the offence(s) will be reported;
- c. should police records fail to confirm an admitted conviction, as declared in para 15 of Form DND 450, an explanation is necessary.

LAST MAIN SCHOOL ATTENDED

26. A primary and secondary school enquiry and records check shall be conducted if the subject was at least 15 years of age when he left school and attended that school within the past five years, except

- a. in the case of a subject with previous attendance as a student in a Canadian college or university, when only a record's check is permitted, and can usually be obtained through the School Registrar, whereas;
- b. DND staff personnel who are located at colleges and universities are subject to standard enquiries through amicable contacts.

PREVIOUS EMPLOYERS

27. Dates of employment, when available are to be shown in the report. Particulars of the employment should also be given with the reason for departure or termination of employment. While it is not always possible to conduct interviews with persons who associated with the subject while he was employed by any one employer, attempts should be made to obtain such interviews.

NEIGHBOURHOOD CHECKS

28. Normally, all residential addresses shown on the Personal History Form that are within the assigned SIS area should be verified and a sufficient number of contacts obtained to allow accuracy and objectivity in reporting. If, for any reason, an adequate number of contacts cannot be obtained, an explanation shall be given in the "remarks" portion of the report. Normally, neighbourhood enquiries shall not be conducted in subsidized or controlled PMQ/LDH areas in which DND personnel reside. In these cases, the investigator shall ascertain the identity of neighbouring male tenants in order to contact and interview them, when practical, at their place of employment

BASE OR UNIT CHECKS

29. D Security will not normally request this type of check unless the subject has been employed at the base or unit for at least six months

and has reason to believe that suitable contacts are available. The investigator, before conducting these enquiries shall advise the Base or Unit Commander of his presence and of the purpose of his visit.

ENQUIRIES GENERALLY

30. Investigations concerning:
- a. officers shall include, when practical, interviews with the subject's superiors and such other officers of equal or higher rank with whom he works or associates;
 - b. other ranks shall include, where possible, interviews with the subject's supervising officer(s), warrant officer(s) and NCOs to whom he is directly responsible, and such other men of equal or higher rank with whom he works or associates;
 - d. civilians shall include, when practical, interviews with both superior military and civilian supervisors to whom the subject is directly responsible, and those with whom he works or associates; and
 - d. each case shall include:
 - (1) a local military police check;
 - (2) in Canada, a local civilian police check; and
 - (3) a local service records check (in the case of civilian personnel, records held by the CPC : and
 - e. notwithstanding the foregoing, when it is necessary to interview personnel subordinate in rank to the subject, the reason shall be included in the report.

FIELD INVESTIGATIONS TO SA STANDARDS (Category 1(a) Cases)

31. Field investigation reports under category 1(a) shall be prepared in narrative form, as shown at Annex C, to provide sufficient information on individuals being considered for Top Secret clearances to SA standards. The investigation shall cover the last 20 years of the subject's life except for very young persons on whom a minimum of ten years complete coverage shall be obtained. Interviews concerning the subject will be conducted at schools, places of employment, residences and any other place where useful information may be obtained, except as prohibited by para 26 a. or as specified in the letter of request. Particular attention shall be given to the following:

- a. Records Checks
 - (1) law enforcement agencies,
 - (2) credit,
 - (3) employment (to verify),
 - (4) military (if specifically requested), and
 - (5) birth(if necessary to identify).
- b. Character Traits
 - (1) social behaviour,
 - (2) morals,

- (3) adverse habits,
- (4) integrity,
- (5) sense of responsibility,
- (6) maturity, and
- (7) consumption of alcoholic beverages and the resultant effect.

c. Other

Travel to communist-dominated countries, except in the service of the Canadian Government.

d. Family and Relatives

- (1) the subject's wife/husband (common law included), parents and parents-in-law shall be the subject of police checks, whereas "other relatives" and "close associates" are checked only when it is apparent they possess some degree of influence over the subject,
- (2) relatives requiring police checks as above must also be the subject of enquiries in the manner outlined in para e,
- (3) when applicable, family environment in accordance with para 21 c.

For clarification, "other relatives" is defined as brothers, sisters, children and/or step-children over 16 years of age, and step-brothers and sisters who were raised with the subject during his formative years. "Close associates" is defined as fiancée, co-worker room-mate, very close personal friends, etc.

e. Contacts

Normally, the investigator should only interview contacts pertaining to the subject, but during these interviews, he will note any information that may be supplied on the members of the family. This information shall be embodied in the report in the manner shown in Annex C. Should adverse information be learned about the subject's family or associates, additional and very discreet inquiries may be made by the investigator on that member of the family or associate.

f. Additional Data

The foregoing paragraphs do not preclude investigators from reporting any other information which may be useful in the granting of a security clearance.

VERIFICATION

32. When any adverse information is received during the course of an investigation, the investigator shall make every effort to verify it by interviewing as many reputable contacts as necessary.

MEMBERS OF FAMILY

33. Except for category 1(a) cases (see para 31) information concerning other member(s) of the subject's family which might be volunteered by a contact shall only be reported if:

- a. it is of a subversive nature; or
- b. it is believed that the subject's reliability or loyalty might be adversely affected by such member(s) conduct or actions; or
- c. it is specifically requested.

INFORMATION UNAVAILABLE

34. When information is unavailable or cannot be obtained, the reasons shall be fully outlined in the report.

REPORT WRITING

35. Reports shall be typed neatly, contain only the best of information available and be presented in a chronological order; i.e.:

- a. neighbourhood checks grouped together, commencing with the earliest address first and progressing through to the latest address;
- b. employment checks grouped together, commencing with the first place of employment and progressing through to the last place of employment;
- c. in each case the relationship between the subject of the investigation and the person used as a contact must be clearly indicated as i.e.: neighbour, former employer, immediate supervisor, etc.;
- d. all SURNAMES appearing in the report will be in upper case; and
- e. the contact's age shall not be shown.

INVESTIGATOR'S NOTES

36. Section Commanders shall ensure that the investigator's notes are kept with the file copy of the report. The notes should be sufficiently comprehensive to allow the preparation of a narrative report should one be subsequently requested following the submission of a Form CF 246.

SOURCES OF INFORMATION

37. It is the function of the investigator to gather facts without bias or prejudice, and to report these facts in a clear concise manner. Investigators must always bear in mind that their reports are carefully evaluated at CFHQ D Security. It is on the basis of these reports that a security clearance is either granted or denied.

CORROBORATION

38. Any adverse information contained in a report is to be corroborated.

CREDIBILITY OF INFORMATION

39. To ensure a report contains the most reliable information available from an area, the investigator shall select only the most suitable contacts. Information is of no value unless credibility is established to the satisfaction of the persons who must assess it and to those who must make the final decision.

IDENTITY

40. In certain cases where the RCM Police are used as a source of information, for other than a police check, they shall be referred to as a "very confidential source" and this reference shall not be used to identify any other source. When a member of the RCM Police is interviewed as a neighbour, an acquaintance, or in any other case when he is not being contacted in his specific official function as a member of the RCMP, his name should be indicated, and his relationship to the subject shown. All other sources of information shall be fully identified.

ANONYMITY

41. Investigators may assure their informants that their identities will be protected, and that their information will be treated with the utmost discretion. On those rare occasions when a contact refuses to give information unless anonymity is guaranteed, the investigator should understand that when information is gained under these circumstances, it is only useful as the basis on which to search for usable information.

REPORTS - COMPILATION

42. The form CF 246 was designed to handle the majority of field investigation reports where the information gathered is favourable; and

- a. unless otherwise directed it shall be used to report on the following cases:
 - (1) category 1(c) cases where nothing adverse, controversial or questionable is brought to light by the investigator,
 - (2) categories 1(d), 1(e), 1(f), 1(g) and L() cases where the report is favourable, and
 - (3) categories 2 and 3 cases where the report is favourable.

CONDUCT OF REPORTING

43. To assist personnel in the compilation of the Form CF 246, the investigator shall be guided by the following:

- a. only the CFHQ case file reference shall be entered in the applicable space;
- b. "subject and trade" blocks are self explanatory;
- c. the SIS and SID block is self explanatory;
- d. "location of the enquiries" is self explanatory;
- e. "date of enquiry" is the date(s) on which enquiries are actually conducted;
- f. "name of contact" is self explanatory;
- g. "address and occupation" requires the complete address and occupation of the contact, and the specific type of association the contact has had with the subject, e.g. employer, fellow worker, supervisor, neighbour, social or service acquaintance, etc, or a combination of two or more when applicable. When the contact is one of the subject's character references, the reason for interviewing that contact must be provided in the "remarks" section;

- h. "I, M and C" block relates to the degree of knowledge of the subject by the contact which must be established by the investigator. It is an important ingredient of the report because, in conjunction with the type and period of association reflected in the "address and occupation" and "period" blocks respectively, it assists readers in assessing the credibility of each contact's assessment and/or information regarding the subject. This portion is often difficult to complete because there is no clear definition of the categories "Intimate" and "Moderate" that would assist to differentiate between the two and accurately record the degree of knowledge. To simplify the problem, the category "Intimate" (I) is not to be used, and the degree of knowledge shall be graded as either "Moderate" (M) or "Casual" (C). Frequently a contact may indicate he has a good knowledge of the subject and yet does not know the details of one or more phases of the subject's affairs, e.g. financial, family responsibilities, drinking habits etc. If the investigator doubts the contact's knowledge of the subject, he shall grade it (C) for casual. However, if he believes that the contact does know the subject moderately, minus one or two phases, he shall grade the knowledge as (M), but an explanation must appear in the "remarks" section of the form as to the reason for lack of knowledge of the phase(s) concerned;
- j. "Period" block relates to the period during which the contact has known the subject. Periods of knowledge shall be shown from month and year to month and year when possible, e.g. May 55 to Jun 66. Annotations such as "6 mos" or "2 yrs" are not acceptable as the evaluator must assume that the time period coincides with that on the PHF. When two degrees of knowledge are recorded in the "I M and C" block, the applicable period of time to be shown for each degree;
- k. "personal character" covers all aspects of an individual's personal behaviour. A satisfactory rating in this section would be based on a good report in other sections. A person who has been released from his employment for, as an example, the misappropriation of funds, but avoids persecution by making restitution; or person who, although never convicted of criminal charges, frequently associates with known criminals, should not be described as "of satisfactory character";
- l. "loyalty" covers loyalty to Canada, the Forces, and his employers. Service personnel whose behaviour is not compatible with good service discipline cannot normally be said to be basically loyal. A lack of respect for the Forces, a general disregard for regulations or any association with persons known to have subversive tendencies would raise doubt as to the loyalty of the individual;
- m. "financial" outlines the financial stability of persons being reported on. There are those who are good managers but are heavily indebted for reasons beyond their control. Conversely, there are others who are careless managers due to immaturity and lack of good sense in handling the personal financial affairs. Indebtedness raises a doubt as to the suitability of an individual to have access to classified information and detailed knowledge regarding indebtedness is essential to a security clearance evaluator;
- n. "family responsibilities" refers to married personnel only. When evidence is revealed that an individual neglects his family, information should be sought to ascertain the particulars of neglect. It is to be understood that where

information concerning martial infidelity is revealed, enquiries should be continued with discretion. Special care should be taken to report any change in the subject's marital status that may have occurred since he submitted his last Personal History Form. In this event, the investigator shall report any change concerning demise, divorce, or re-marriage;

- o. "alcoholic drinking habits" is used in reporting the person's degree of indulgence in alcohol and requires the most searching attention. The most important aspect of any drinking habit is the resultant reaction created by alcohol. An individual may be a heavy and frequent drinker but always maintains control of his faculties. There are others who drink on occasion and lose control after consuming only a small quantity. Because excessive drinking is relative and could vary according to a contact's opinion as to what constitutes excessive drinking, the investigator is to ascertain the degree of the subject's drinking, the frequency of his drinking, the effect his drinking has on his work and family, and charges, if any, as the result of drinking;
- p. "discretion" applies to an individual's general conduct, social verbiage, and self discipline to protect classified information from disclosure. Evidence of instability, mental disturbances lack of a sense of responsibility, or a previous disregard for security regulations would raise a serious doubt as to an individual's ability to protect classified information. In this event, such knowledge is to be followed up and reported in narrative on Form CF 245.
- q. "moral conduct" refers to the general conduct and social relations of the individual as viewed from a point of view of ethics and propriety. The individual who opposes and disregards the rights of others cannot be said to be of good moral conduct. The moral conduct of persons requiring access to classified information is an important aspect of security enquiries. Where adverse information is revealed, full details must be provided on Form CF 245. Investigators must always be on the alert for any indication of abnormal sexual tendencies possessed by the subject;
- r. "service records" is self explanatory. Should unfavourable data be found the information shall be recorded in the "remarks" section, provided other information uncovered during the investigation is favourable and does not warrant a narrative report;
- s. "civil police check" is used in conjunction with para 15 of the Personal History Form DND 450 which shall be checked to ascertain if the subject has declared a conviction that occurred within the area of your investigation. If a conviction is declared, it must be verified and the particulars obtained, i.e. ; type of offence, Act charged under, disposition, etc., if available. Local civil police checks are to be conducted in the area where the subject resided or was employed. When the results are positive, the relevant information shall be included in the "remarks" section of Form CF 246, or in the text of the narrative report CF 245 as applicable;

- t. "military police check" is utilized when the investigation includes a unit check and is in addition to the requirements of sub-para s. above;
- u. "attendance at last school" (see para 26 above) should unfavourable information be found concerning the subject at the last school he attended it shall be included in the "remarks" section of Form CF 246 or in the narrative on Form CF 245, as applicable;
- v. "remarks" will include, in addition to the requirements of previous sub-paragraphs, a brief explanation if suitable contacts cannot be found with any one employer, and also if a sufficient number of contacts cannot be found in the neighbourhood of each previous residential address:
 - (1) an explanation is also necessary for failure to cover any phase of an investigation which has not been included in the preceeding paragraph,
 - (2) and where family background and environment is required, specific comments on this phase shall be included,
 - (3) and when the investigator feels that he may clarify certain points in his report,
 - (4) and while completing the "remarks" portion of the form, investigators shall not report the subject or a member of his family as being "an ardent supporter of", "a follower of", "a believer in", etc, any particular non-subversive Canadian political party; and
- w. the remainder of Form CF 246 is self-explanatory.

PREPARATION AND SUBMISSION

44. a. Form CF 246 shall be prepared:
- (1) at SIS, in duplicate, which shall be signed by the investigator concerned. The SIS Commander shall in turn peruse and sign the report, if satisfactory, in the next block and forward the original copy to his Detachment Commander with Form DND 450 and the letter of request attached; and
 - (2) at SID, the Detachment Commander shall peruse the report and ensure that the investigation was completed satisfactorily and in accordance with the request. He shall sign the lower portion of the report and forward it together with the attached DND 450 and original letter of request to SIU. If more than one of his SISs are involved in conducting enquiries in any one case, the Detachment Commander will hold the report(s) until all of his SIS phases have been completed. Completed reports on Forms CF 246 will be held on file only at an SIS and CFHQ D Security.

NARRATIVE REPORTS - COMPILATION

45. The form CF 245 shall be used to report on the following investigations:
- a. category 1(a) cases;

- b. category 1(b) cases;
- c. category 1(c) cases when adverse, controversial or questionable information is gained by the investigator;
- d. category 1(d) to 1(h) inclusive when such cases are unfavourable;
- e. in circumstances where the investigator or his superior decide that because of certain facts uncovered during the source of enquiries, Form CF 245 is preferable for more adequate reporting; and
- f. when requested.

PREPARATION AND SUBMISSION

46. a. The Form CF 245 shall be prepared as shown in Annexes B and C:
- (1) at SIS in two copies; and
 - (a) the file heading shall be prepared in accordance with the Military Police File Key, which requires the following "three line" identification:
 - line 1 - name of subject in accordance with MP File Key,
 - line 2 - description of investigation in accordance with MP File Key,
 - line 3 - geographical area where enquiries are conducted;
 - (b) the investigator will sign both copies of his report and submit it to his SIS Commander who shall peruse it for neatness and clarity, etc. If the SIS Commander finds the report satisfactory, he shall sign it and forward the original copy to his controlling SID together with the Personal History Form and letter of request attached;
 - (c) upon receipt at SID, the Detachment vetting officer will ensure the investigation was properly actioned, that the report provides the information sought, or a satisfactory explanation appears where the information is not available. If satisfied, he shall sign and date the report and forward it, together with the personal history form(s) and letter(s) of request attached, to SIU, who shall forward the report to CFHQ D Security. If a phase contains adverse information which in the opinion of the vetting officer could preclude the retention or granting of a security clearance, the phase shall be flagged "Adverse Phase" and forwarded immediately to SIU notwithstanding there may be other phases outstanding at the SID.
47. Reports will normally be assigned the same security classification as the letter of request, but may be assigned a higher classification when the content justifies a change. However, any report containing information of a subversive nature affecting either the subject, his relatives or associates, shall not be classified lower than SECRET.

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CONFIDENTIAL

December 18th, 1963.

CABINET DIRECTIVE NO. 35

Security in the Public Service of Canada

POLICY

1. Security in the public service of Canada is essentially a part of good personnel administration, and therefore it is the responsibility of each department and agency. The security of classified information in the possession of a department or agency may be placed in jeopardy either by persons who may be disloyal to Canada and her system of government or by persons who are unreliable because of defects in their character.
2. Employees in the public service of Canada, including members of the Armed Services and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, who are required to have access to classified information in the performance of their duties, must be persons in whose reliability and loyalty to his country the Government of Canada can repose full confidence. It has been clearly demonstrated that such confidence cannot be placed in persons whose loyalty to Canada and our system of government is diluted by loyalty to any Communist, Fascist, or other legal or illegal political organization whose purposes are inimical to the processes of parliamentary democracy. It is therefore an essential of Canadian security policy that persons described in paragraph 3 below must not, when known, be permitted to enter the public service, and must not if discovered within the public service be permitted to have access to classified information. If such a person is in a position where he has access to classified information, he must at least be transferred to a less sensitive position in the public service. It may also be necessary, where it appears to the Minister concerned to be in the public interest, to dismiss him from the public service, subject to the conditions set out at paragraph 17 below.
3. The persons referred to in paragraph 2 above are:
 - (a) a person who is a member of a communist or fascist party or an organization affiliated with a communist or fascist party and having a similar nature and purpose;
 - (b) a person who by his words or his actions shows himself to support a communist or fascist party or an organization affiliated with a communist or fascist party and having a similar nature and purpose;
 - (c) a person who, having reasonable grounds to understand its true nature and purpose, is a member of or supports by his words or his actions an organization which has as its real objective the furtherance of communist or fascist aims and policies (commonly known as a front group);
 - (d) a person who is a secret agent of or an informer for a foreign power, or who deliberately assists any such agent or informer;
 - (e) a person who by his words or his actions shows himself to support any organization which publicly or privately advocates or practices the use of force to alter the form of government.

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4. It must be borne in mind that there may be reason to doubt the loyalty of a person who at some previous time was a person as described in paragraph 3 above, even though this doubt may not be confirmed by recent information about him.

5. In addition to loyalty, reliability is essential in any person who is to be given access to classified information. A person may be unreliable for a number of reasons that do not relate to loyalty. To provide as much assurance of reliability as possible persons described in paragraph 6 below may not be permitted to have access to classified information, unless after careful consideration of the circumstances, including the value of their services, it is judged that the risk involved appears to be justified.

6. The persons referred to in paragraph 5 above are:

- (a) a person who is unreliable, not because he is disloyal, but because of features of his character which may lead to indiscretion or dishonesty, or make him vulnerable to blackmail or coercion. Such features may be greed, debt, illicit sexual behaviour, drunkenness, drug addiction, mental imbalance, or such other aspect of character as might seriously affect his reliability;
- (b) a person who, through family or other close continuing relationship with persons who are persons as described in paragraphs 3(a) to (e) above, is likely to be induced, either knowingly or unknowingly, to act in a manner prejudicial to the safety and interest of Canada. It is not the kind of relationship, whether by blood, marriage or friendship, which is of primary concern. It is the degree of and circumstances surrounding such relationship, and most particularly the degree of influence that might be exerted, which should dictate a judgement as to reliability, a judgement which must be taken with the utmost care; and
- (c) a person who, though in no sense disloyal or unreliable, is bound by close ties of blood or affection to persons living within the borders of such foreign nations as may cause him to be subjected to intolerable pressures.

7. In addition it must be recognized that there may be a serious risk to security in employing or permitting to be employed persons such as those described in paragraphs 3 or 6 above:

- (a) in certain positions in industrial firms and related establishments involved in or engaged upon the production or study of classified defence equipment which requires security protection; or
- (b) in positions in government organizations engaged in work of a nature vital to the national security which, although they do not normally involve access to classified information, may afford their incumbents opportunities to gain unauthorized access to such information.

8. To carry out their responsibility for the safekeeping of the secrets of the Government of Canada and her allies, departments and agencies must first obtain sufficient information about a person to be given access to these secrets in order that a reasonable judgement might be made as to his or her loyalty and reliability. In making this administrative judgement, it must always be borne in mind that, while the interests of the national security must take precedence where there is a reasonable doubt, the safeguarding of

the interests of the individual is also essential to the preservation of the society we seek to protect. Information bearing on the security status of an employee will be treated as confidential.

PROCEDURES

9. The following procedures by which this policy is to be implemented are designed to provide that the most careful screening possible be given, particularly to persons who will have access to highly classified information. It is the continuing responsibility of each government department and agency to ensure that its security remains unimpaired.

10. Information about persons who are being considered for access to classified information must be obtained at least from the persons themselves, from referees named by the persons, and from investigations conducted by authorized investigative agencies. Departments and agencies will inform persons who are being considered for access to classified information of the reasons for seeking background information about them, and to explain to them the dangers to themselves as well as to the national security in their attempting to conceal any information which may have a bearing on the degree of confidence that can be reposed in them.

11. The functions of an investigative agency are to conduct promptly and efficiently such investigations as are requested by departments or agencies to assist them in determining the loyalty and reliability of the subject of investigation; and to inform departments and agencies of the results of their investigations in the form of factual reports in which the sources have been carefully evaluated as to the reliability of the information they have provided.

12. On the basis of these reports and such other pertinent information as has been obtained from the person concerned, from the character references which he has given, and from such other sources of information as may have been utilized, the employing department or agency will arrive at a considered judgement of the person's loyalty and reliability, and of the degree of confidence that can be reposed in him to carry out safely and efficiently the duties to be performed.

13. If a favourable determination is made, the department or agency may grant a security clearance to the level required for the efficient performance of the duties of the position concerned. If, on the other hand, there is in the judgement of the deputy minister of the department or the head of agency concerned a reasonable doubt as to the degree of confidence which can be reposed in the subject, the granting of a security clearance will be delayed until the doubt has been resolved to the satisfaction of the deputy minister or the head of agency.

14. Where an applicant for employment in the public service, as opposed to a person already employed, is being considered for appointment to a position requiring access to classified information and doubt has arisen as to his suitability for such access, the following courses of action may be taken with a view to resolving that doubt:

- (a) further specific investigation may be requested of an authorized investigative agency; or
- (b) the department or agency may at any time seek the advice of the interdepartmental Security Panel.

15. Where a person is already employed in the public service, and a doubt has been raised as to his suitability to have access to classified information, the security officer of the department or agency must take such action as is necessary to preserve security and may take the courses

of action referred to in paragraph 14 with a view to resolving that doubt. Should these actions fail to resolve the doubt, or appear to the department or agency to be inexpedient under the circumstances, the assistance of the employee himself shall be sought in an attempt to resolve the doubt. A senior officer appointed by the deputy minister or head of agency shall, after appropriate consultation with the investigative agency or other source of the information which raised the doubt, interview the subject and inform him, to the fullest extent that is possible without jeopardizing important and sensitive sources of security information, of the reasons for doubt, and shall give the employee an opportunity to resolve it to the satisfaction of the responsible department or agency.

16. Should none of the courses set out in paragraph 15 above result in a satisfactory resolution of doubt concerning a government employee, the responsible department or agency shall withhold a security clearance, shall take such action as is necessary to preserve security and shall consult the Secretariat of the Security Panel with a view to their assisting the department or agency in determining tentatively:

- (a) whether the subject might safely and usefully be appointed to a less sensitive position in the department or agency or elsewhere in the public service, with his knowledge and consent to the fullest degree possible under the circumstances;
- (b) if appointment elsewhere is not possible, whether he should be asked to resign his position in the department or agency; or
- (c) if he refuses to resign, whether it should be recommended to the Minister responsible that the person be dismissed from the public service.

17. Should the department decide that a recommendation for dismissal should be made, no action shall be taken on such recommendation until:

- (a) the deputy minister or head of agency has personally made a complete review of the case, and has himself interviewed the employee in question, in a further attempt to resolve any reasonable doubt as to his trustworthiness;
- (b) the employee has been advised to the fullest extent possible without jeopardizing important and sensitive sources of security information, why doubt continues to be felt concerning his loyalty or reliability, and has been given a further opportunity to submit any information or considerations that he thinks ought to be taken into account on his behalf by the deputy minister or head of agency, and failing a satisfactory resolution,
- (c) the advice of a board of review drawn from the members of the Security Panel has been sought on the basis of all the information available. (The board of review shall consist of the Chairman and at least two members of the Security Panel, with the proviso that no member who is directly concerned with the case shall sit as a member of the board).

18. In arriving at a final decision as to whether to recommend to the Governor in Council that an employee be dismissed on grounds of security, the Minister responsible will take into account all of the relevant information and advice that has been provided, but the Minister is not bound to act on such advice.

19. The numbers of all persons who for security reasons are removed from eligible lists by the Civil Service Commission, or are in one way or another refused access to classified information by departments or agencies for security reasons, will be sent quarterly to the Secretary of the Security Panel in order that the Panel may from time to time review the number of persons or the type of cases involved, and assess the extent of the security problem in the public service. The figures provided should be broken down in the following general categories: persons dismissed, persons permitted to resign, persons transferred to non-sensitive posts, persons denied access to classified information, persons denied employment. In addition the figures should indicate whether the action was taken on grounds of disloyalty or unreliability. Figures should not include persons who are no longer given access to classified information because of a change in duties or other similar administrative reasons.

20. It is the responsibility of each deputy head, or head of an agency, to nominate a competent senior official, preferably the Senior Personnel Officer, to act as security officer, and to notify the Secretary of the Security Panel of the appointment and of any subsequent change. The official so nominated shall be cleared for security in accordance with the procedures set out in paragraph 25(i) below. The person so named will be responsible to the deputy head or head of an agency for ensuring that all regulations relative to security are carried out within the department or agency. It will also be the responsibility of the Departmental security officer to maintain close liaison with the government agencies responsible for security policy and procedures. It is important that wherever possible security officers should be persons who may be expected to continue their work over a longer period of time, since effective security is difficult to maintain without considerable experience in a specialized field.

METHODS

21. Security screening of applicants to the public service will be initiated by the Civil Service Commission, or by departments and agencies in the case of persons not employed under the Civil Service Act. Where persons already employed in a department or agency are to be given access to classified information, security screening will be initiated by the department or agency concerned.

22. When it appears necessary on security grounds for the Civil Service Commission to reject an applicant, or a candidate for a position involving access to classified information who is already in the public employ, the Commission will when appropriate consult with the interested department in order to reach a joint agreement as to what action may finally be taken, bearing in mind the fact that the ultimate responsibility for security rests with the Department.

23. When it appoints to a department a new employee who has been the subject of a security screening, the Civil Service Commission will send forward to the department all the pertinent information and documentation relating to the security screening.

24. A person to be appointed to a permanent position in the public service will not normally be made the subject of security screening for this reason alone. But whenever a person to be appointed to such a position is, in the opinion of the deputy minister or head of agency concerned, likely to be required eventually to have access to classified information, that person shall before being given a permanent appointment, be made the subject of a fingerprint and file check if this has not already been done.

25. Within the policies and procedures set out above, a security assessment and clearance will be made by the following means. These represent security criteria and methods which are consistent with present

investigative services available inter-departmentally; they are minimum standards and do not limit in any way the right of the armed forces to conduct field checks, through their own resources, of personnel employed with or on behalf of the Department of National Defence.

(i) Persons to have access to Top Secret information

Before a person is employed in a position requiring access to Top Secret information he must be the subject of an investigation in the field by an appropriate investigative agency, his name must be checked against the subversive records of the R.C.M. Police, and he must be the subject of a fingerprint check by the R.C.M. Police. These procedures are mandatory.

(ii) Persons to have access to Secret information

(a) Before a person is employed in a position requiring access to Secret information his name must be checked against the subversive records of the R.C.M. Police, and he must be the subject of a fingerprint check by the R.C.M. Police. Both these procedures are mandatory.

(b) When the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission or the deputy head of a department or agency, or a security officer appointed by them, considers that information provided by the means set out in paragraph 25(ii)(a) may be clarified by an investigation in the field, or that such an investigation is necessary to satisfy him as to an applicant's or employee's loyalty and reliability, he may request that an inquiry be made of a person's background by a field investigation to be carried out by an appropriate investigative agency. Where it appears that requests from a department or agency dealing with the R.C.M. Police as the investigative agency exceed what seems to be a normal requirement, the R.C.M. Police may ask the Security Panel to allot priorities.

(iii) Persons to have access to Confidential information

Before a person is employed in a position requiring access to Confidential information, his name must be checked against the subversive records of the R.C.M. Police, and he must be the subject of a fingerprint check by the R.C.M. Police. Both of these procedures are mandatory.

(iv) Responsibility for granting clearances

The deputy head of a department or agency will be responsible for granting or withholding a security clearance and will assume a continuing responsibility for person's access to Top Secret, Secret and Confidential information.

26. In addition, departments and agencies are reminded that personal consultation with the references listed by the employee in his Personal History Form may provide useful supplementary information about his character. References should therefore be consulted personally when it appears that a useful purpose would be served by so doing.

SECRET
CDN EYES ONLY

PAGE 20 OF ANNEX "M"
TO DND BRIEF FOR ROYAL
COMMISSION ON SECURITY
DATED: 26 DEC 67

27. Comparable procedures set forth in paragraph 25, except those relating to fingerprinting, apply equally to persons employed in defence industry (and certain services related to defence) who may be required to have access to classified information which is the property of the Government of Canada or for the security of which the government is responsible. In defence industry (and certain services related to defence) the procedures will be administered by the Department of Defence Production in accordance with a separate directive relating to security in defence industry.

SECRET
CDN EYES ONLY

...../21

A0053408_99-004627

ANNEX B
to SIUI 2/67 7 Jul 67

SECRET
CDN EYES ONLY

PAGE 21 OF ANNEX "M" TO DND
BRIEF FOR ROYAL COMMISSION ON
SECURITY DATED: 26 DEC 67

CANADIAN FORCES
MILITARY POLICE INVESTIGATION REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Comd/SIU	OTTAWA
CFE/Unit/SID	OTTAWA
Det/Sec/SIS	TORONTO

Incident	Report	Last Report	Next Report
	15 JUN 67		

For	Public	Non-Public	Private
Loss			
Damage			
Recovered			

File Reference	
CFHQ	DS625-1400-67
Comd	
SIU	
SID	
SIS	
UNIT/DET/SEC	

CAPTION

12345 (SIN 111 222 333) CAPT ABLE BAKER CHARLIE
SECURITY - FIELD INVESTIGATION - OFFICER
TORONTO ONT

IDENTIFICATION

1. Born 3 Dec 24, London, Ont. Identity confirmed by service, employment, school records and/or personal acquaintances. _____

POLICE CHECK

2. Ottawa City Police, Eastview City Police - Negative 10 Jun 67.

OR

Eastview City Police - Negative 10 Jun 67. Ottawa City Police - Positive 10 Jun 67. Particulars as follows:

- a. On 24 Apr 66, Capt CHARLIE was charged with impaired driving under section 223(c) CC of C. He was apprehended by _____
(Provide details of incident) _____
- b. On 22 May 66, Capt CHARLIE appeared before Magistrate DE FOX, in and for the County of Russell and was found guilty _____
(Provide details of disposition) _____

.../2

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

SECRET
CDN EYES ONLY

.../22

A0053408_100-004628

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

CANADIAN FORCES
MILITARY POLICE INVESTIGATION REPORT -- CONTINUATION SHEET
PAGE No. 2

CASE FILE No.
DS625-1400-67

DATE
15 Jun 67

EDUCATION

3. Rideau High School, Ottawa Ont. (Sep 63 - Jun 65) (Indicate actual dates). Records revealed that _____

EMPLOYMENT

4. T Eaton Co Ltd, Ottawa Ont. (Jun 65 - Sep 65) Mr RH JIG, Personnel Manager, revealed from records that _____

5. Simpson Sears Ltd, Ottawa, Ont. (Sep 65 - May 66) Records here indicate that _____

RESIDENCE

6. 271 Metcalfe St, Ottawa, Ont. (Mar 63 - Jun 66) Mr KL MIKE, Lawyer, 269 Metcalfe St, acquaintance and neighbour, has been moderately acquainted with _____

7. 321 Smith St, Ottawa, Ont. (Jul 64 - May 66) Mrs NO PEEKS, housewife, 324 Smith St, has been casually acquainted with Capt CHARLIE as a neighbour _____

(If the request for investigation indicates the subject's family background and environment is to be ascertained, the investigator should cover this during the interview and establish the family environment in which he or she was raised.)

ADDITIONAL RELEVANT INFORMATION (If applicable)

8. Information received from Mr QR SUGAR, Manager, Security Credit Bureau _____

9. CASE CONCLUDED.

T.U. Victor
Sergeant
Investigator

.../3

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

CANADIAN FORCES
MILITARY POLICE INVESTIGATION REPORT -- CONTINUATION SHEET

PAGE No. 3

CASE FILE No. DS625-1400-67
DATE 15 Jun 67

Detachment Commander
CSID Rockcliffe

1. Forwarded in three copies (date forwarded).

W.X. Yoke
Flight Sergeant
Section Commander

Commanding Officer
SIU Rockcliffe

1. Forwarded in two copies (date forwarded).

I.M. Boss
Captain
Detachment Commander

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ANNEX C
to SIUI 2/67 7 Jul 67

SECRET
CDN EYES ONLY

PAGE 24 OF ANNEX "M" TO DND
BRIEF FOR ROYAL COMMISSION ON
SECURITY DATED: 26 DEC 67

CANADIAN FORCES
MILITARY POLICE INVESTIGATION REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Comd/SIU	OTTAWA
SB/Unit/SID	OTTAWA
Det/Sec/SIS	OTTAWA

FILE REFERENCE	
CFHQ	DS625-4567-67
Comd	
SIU	
SID	
SIS	
UNIT/DET/SEC	

Date of			
Incident	Report	Last Report	Next Report
	15 Sep 67		

Value			
For	Public	Non-Public	Private
Loss			
Damage			
Recovered			

CAPTION

A-98765 (SIN 123-456-789) LS JOHN GEORGE BROWN
SECURITY - FIELD INVESTIGATION - MAN
OTTAWA AND CFS GLOUCESTER

EXAMPLE

IDENTIFICATION

1. a. John George BROWN, subject, was born at Edmonton Alta on 10 Sep 40. Not confirmed but agrees with service records. Subject was positively identified by the contacts.
b. Subject's wife, mother and father-in-law, were identified by the applicable contacts of this report.

POLICE CHECK

2. a. OTTAWA CITY POLICE - negative - 14 Jul 67 - on the subject and negative - 19 Jul 67 - on his wife.
b. HULL CITY POLICE - negative - 17 Aug 67 - on the subject, his wife and his mother and father-in-law.
c. GLOUCESTER TOWNSHIP POLICE - negative - 19 Jul 67 - on the subject.
d. MILITARY POLICE, CFHQ/AUSecO and NDHQ/Security Guard - both negative - 17 Jul 67 - on the subject.

EDUCATION

3. Not applicable due to lapse in time.

EMPLOYMENT

4. CFS GLOUCESTER (Mar 1962 - Sep 1962, Jun 1964 - Jan 1965 and 13 Dec - Present). Unit records reviewed and nothing of an adverse nature was noted.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

SECRET
CDN EYES ONLY

.../25

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A0053408_103-004631

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

CANADIAN FORCES
MILITARY POLICE INVESTIGATION REPORT -- CONTINUATION SHEET

PAGE No. 2

CASE FILE NO.
DS625-4567-67
DATE
15 Sep 67

- a. Cl L BLACK, Coxswain, moderately acquainted with the subject through station duties as his superior since Dec 1965. He stated that the subject was a casual controlled drinker with good morals, good personal character and had no apparent family or financial problems. In addition, he considered him to be loyal, discreet and suitable for employment in a position of trust.
- b. LS A WHITE, Com Rsch, moderately acquainted with the subject as a fellow student, neighbour, and co-worker through station duties during periods Apr - May 1962 and Jan 1966 to present. He reiterated the comments made by Cl BLACK and in addition would recommend the subject for employment in a position of trust.
- c. C2 NA GREY, Chief Clerk, Training and Administration, casually acquainted with the subject through station duties and as his former instructor during the periods Mar 1962 - Sep 1962 and Dec 1965 to present. He stated that the subject has no adverse drinking habits and that his morals, personal character, family and financial affairs all appeared to be favourable. He considered the subject to be reliable and trustworthy.

RESIDENCE

5. CFS Gloucester, Barracks (Mar 1962 - Sep 1962), 95 Mary Street, Hull PQ (Jun 1964 - Jan 1965) and 2423 Jacques St, Ottawa Ont (Feb 1965 - Present).

- a. 95 Mary St, Hull PQ. (Apr - May 1962 and Jan 1966 to present) LS A WHITE, former barrack mate, contact of para 4 b.
- b. 95 Mary St, Hull PQ. (Jun 1964 - Present) Mr G GREEN, retired, moderately acquainted with the subject, his wife and in-laws as an immediate neighbour with casual social contact and return visits from Jun 1964 to present. This contact would recommend the subject for a position of trust.
- c. 2423 Jacques St, Ottawa, Ont. (Dec 1965 to present) Mrs F YELLOW, employed with Bell Telephone, moderately acquainted with subject and his family as an immediate neighbour since Dec 1965. She stated subject enjoyed a good neighbourhood reputation.

FAMILY AND ASSOCIATES

6.
 - a. Subject's wife, Mary Jane, enjoys a favourable reputation and provides a good environment for their one child.
 - b. Subject's mother and father-in-law work and reside as indicated on the DND 450. They enjoy a favourable neighbourhood reputation.
 - c. Subject's associates appear to be of reputable character.

.../3

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

SECRET
CDN EYES ONLY

A0053408_104-004632

EXAMPLE

CANADIAN FORCES
MILITARY POLICE

SECURITY CLEARANCE REPORT

SECRET
CDN EYES ONLY

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX M
TO DND BRIEF FOR ROYAL
COMMISSION ON SECURITY
DATED: 26 DEC 67

FILE REFERENCES:
CFHQ DS630-0000-67
SIU
SID
SIS

NUMBER, RANK AND FULL NAME		TRADE	
00001 AG2 Able Charlie BAKER		MP 811	
SID or SIS	LOCATION OF INQUIRY	DATE(S) OF INQUIRY	
QSID/SIS St Hubert	Sherbrooke Quebec	18 Oct 67	
NAME OF CONTACT	ADDRESS AND OCCUPATION	I, M or O	PERIOD
A Mrs G. Smith	Housewife, neighbour and family friend 001 St Jean Baptiste, Sherbrooke	M	May 56 - Aug 67
B Mrs A. Jones	Housewife, neighbour 002 St Jean Baptiste, Sherbrooke	M	May 63 - Aug 67
C Mrs F. Lavoie	Housewife - neighbour 008 St Jean Baptiste, Sherbrooke	M	May 64 - Aug 67
D Mrs P. Beaudry	Housewife, nurse - neighbour	M	Brith - Aug 67
E Mr R. Labelle	Manager, Royal Bank, Queen St., Sherbrooke - Former Supervisor	M	Jun 64 - Apr 67
F			
G			

1 PERSONAL CHARACTER	SATISFACTORY UNKNOWN	A B C D E F G X X X X X
2 LOYALTY (SENSE OF DUTY)	HIGH SENSE OF LOYALTY LOYAL UNKNOWN	A B C D E F G X X X X X
3 FINANCIAL	MEETS OBLIGATIONS UNKNOWN	A B C D E F G X X X X X
4 FAMILY RESPONSIBILITIES	GOOD FAMILY MAN NOT APPLICABLE UNKNOWN	A B C D E F G X X X X X
5 ALCOHOLIC DRINKING HABITS	(X) HEAVY/CONTROLLED MODERATE/CONTROLLED CASUAL/CONTROLLED NON-DRINKER UNKNOWN	A B C D E F G X X X X X
6 DISCRETION	(SA) TALKATIVE, NOT INDISCREET DISCREET UNKNOWN	A B C D E F G X X X X X
7 MORAL CONDUCT	GOOD UNKNOWN	A B C D E F G X X X X X
8 SERVICE RECORDS	NOT AVAILABLE <input type="checkbox"/> POSITIVE <input type="checkbox"/> NEGATIVE <input type="checkbox"/>	
9 CIVIL POLICE CHECK	MILITARY POLICE CHECK	ATTENDANCE AT LAST SCHOOL
NEGATIVE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	NEGATIVE <input type="checkbox"/>	NOT REQUIRED <input type="checkbox"/>
(X) POSITIVE <input type="checkbox"/>	(X) POSITIVE <input type="checkbox"/>	FAVOURABLE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		(X) UNFAVOURABLE <input type="checkbox"/>

SECRET
CDN EYES ONLY

*I or M or C - Intimate or Moderate or Casual

.... /2

A0053408_105-004633

REMARKS

IDENTIFICATION

1. Born 19 Feb 1947 at Sherbrooke Quebec. Information congruent with that shown on school and employment records. Subject positively identified by contacts.

POLICE CHECK

2. Sherbrooke Municipal Police - negative 18 Oct 67.

EDUCATION

3. Ecole Secondaire St Francois, Bowen St, South, Sherbrooke (Sep 60 - Jun 64) Records show that the subject attended for the period shown and completed grade 12 of a special Commercial course with an average of 66.9%. No contacts are available.

EMPLOYMENT

4. Royal Bank, Queen St., Sherbrooke, Quebec (Jun 64 - Apr 67) Contact E refers. Subject had been employed as a teller for the period shown and had been an excellent employee with no adverse habits. He left of his own accord.

RESIDENCE

5. Old Labelle St, Sherbrooke, Quebec (Feb 47 - Aug 67) Contacts A to D refer.

FAMILY ENVIRONMENT AND BACKGROUND

All contacts state that the subject comes from a very good, honest family, was well brought up and well cared for. The parents are highly regarded as neighbours and are good providers.

ADDITIONAL RELEVANT INFORMATION

St. Jean Baptiste Street, on which contacts A to D reside, intersects with Labelle Street.

INVESTIGATOR'S SIGNATURE

DATE 23 Oct 67

REPORT CHECKED BY

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER/NO I/C SIS

DATE 24 Oct 67

REPORT ACCEPTED BY

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER I/C SID

DATE 25 OCT 67

SIU STAMP

SECRET
CDN EYES ONLY

A0053408_106-004634

CANADIAN FORCES
MILITARY POLICE INVESTIGATION REPORT

CONFIDENTIAL

Comd/SIU
CPB/Unit/SID
Det/Sec/SIS

Date of			
Incident	Report	Last Report	Next Report
	27 Oct 67		

Value			
For	Public	Non-Public	Private
Loss			
Damage			
Recovered			

FILE REFERENCE
CPHQ DS 630-0000-67
Comd
SIU
SID
SIS
UNIT/DET/SEC

CAPTION

10000-E OS ABLE CHARLE BAKER
SECURITY - FIELD INVESTIGATION - MAN
VICTORIA, BC

EXAMPLE

IDENTIFICATION

1. Born 26 Feb 47, Wawota, Sask. Identity confirmed from school records, police records, records held at the recruiting unit, Victoria and contacts.

POLICE CHECK

2. RCMP S&I, Victoria, and city police, Victoria, 25 Aug 67 - Negative. RCMP E Div CIS, Vancouver, 31 Aug 67 - Positive and Saanich police Dept. 5 Oct 67 - Positive. Particulars as follows:

- 20 Mar 65, Victoria, BC, charged under section 221(2) CC, Fail to remain at the scene of an accident. Fined \$100.00.
- 20 Mar 65, Victoria, BC, charged under section 18(1) MVA, no current driver's licence. Fined \$25.00.
- 9 Apr 65, Ladysmith, BC, charged under section 120(b) CC, Public mischief. Fined \$100.00.
- 9 Apr 65, Ladysmith, BC charged under section 68 liquor act, consuming liquor in a public place. Fined \$50.00 and costs of \$3.00.
- 9 Aug 65, Saanich, BC, charged under section 231(2) CC. Assault causing bodily harm. Sentenced to three months in jail.
- 9 Aug 65, Saanich, BC, charged under section 68 liquor act, drunkenness. Fined \$15.00.
- 3 Sep 66, Sidney, BC, charged under section 280(b) CC, theft under \$50.00. Fined \$100.00.

CANADIAN FORCES
MILITARY POLICE INVESTIGATION REPORT -- CONTINUATION SHEET

PAGE No. 2

CASE FILE No.
DS 630-0000-67
DATE
27 Oct 67

EDUCATION

3. Student, Victoria High School, Victoria, BC (Sep 61 - Jun 64) A check of records indicated the subject attended this school during this period. BAKER completed grade 10, but only has a partial grade 11. I.M. JONES, boys counsellor, was interviewed. He stated he had known the subject all of this period. The subject's character was considered to be poor and assessments on record from his various teachers all indicated this. Sense of duty, co-operation and reliability were also considered poor by Mr. JONES. Mr. JONES indicated that on 28 Feb 64, the subject had assaulted another student without any justification. He was dismissed from school for this offence, however, his parents and the subject promised good behaviour in the future and he was re-admitted. Nothing was known regarding drinking habits, finances, discretion or moral conduct away from school. The subject's morals in school appeared satisfactory, while he appeared lacking in discretion.

EMPLOYMENT

4. Plasterer-Helper, EDWIN YOKE, 001 Hillside St. Victoria, BC (Casual part-time, Mar - Aug 66) This company is now called B.SMITH plastering. Mr. E. YOKE is however, still employed here. A check of records indicated the subject was employed for two weeks in Mar 66, two weeks in Apr 66, and again for a period of approximately three weeks in Jul 66. The subject indicated on the DND 450, that he had been employed from Oct 65 - Sep 66.

5. Mr. EDWIN YOKE, 0006 Cedar Ave, Victoria, employer Mar - Aug 66, para 4 refers, casual knowledge, was interviewed. He stated that during the short period he had known the subject he was a satisfactory employee. Mr. YOKE could offer no information of a personal nature.

6. Plasterer-Helper, FRED SUN 010, Topaz Ave, Victoria (24 Sep - 5 Oct 66), (one day Mar one day Apr 67) Miss C. CANDY, book-keeper, checked records and indicated the subject had been employed for the period stated above and not for the period Sep 66 - Mar 67 inclusive as indicated on the DND 450.

7. Mr. P. C. SUN, PC Gypsum Ltd 005 Topaz Ave, employer and supervisor for the period indicated in para 6, was interviewed. He stated the subject was unreliable, moody and unco-operative. The subject would work reasonably well for one day and the next day he wouldn't come to work. Mr. SUN was of the opinion the subject's family environment had been poor and he had received little if any guidance from his father. Mr. SUN was not too familiar with the family environment. The parting remark from this contact was that BAKER would not be an asset to the Navy.

8. Inquiries were made at Canada Manpower Centre, in an effort to learn if the subject held other jobs in the area. Their records indicated he had attempted to obtain employment several times but there was no records of him being employed other than as listed in paras 4 and 6.

RESIDENCE

9. 2453 Government St. Victoria, BC (Oct 56 - May 59) This address was located in a commercial area, the house has been torn down, there are no other residences in the area. Mr. A. WEBBER, who operates a business at 0009 Government St, advised that a Mr. J. VICTOR, had operated a shoe repair shop in the block and might possibly know the subject.

CANADIAN FORCES
MILITARY POLICE INVESTIGATION REPORT -- CONTINUATION SHEET

PAGE No. 3

CASE FILE No.
DS 630-0000-67

DATE
27 Oct 67

10. Mr. J. VICTOR, 909 Cook St, owner of Charlie's Shoe Repair, was interviewed. He stated he had known the BAKER family moderately, as a neighbour and acquaintance from 1950-64. He confirmed their residence on both Government and Douglas streets. This contact advised that he considered the subject to be of good character, loyal and a non-drinker. Due to the subject's age he could offer no information regarding finances. He left the area and moved to Cook St, he had no contact with the subject. However, he had heard that BAKER had changed and was drinking and associating with persons of poor character. The contact advised that the subject's parents didn't live together. Mr. BAKER is employed in Duncan, BC as a contractor. The subject's father was said to be a heavy drinker, who took little interest in the family. Mrs. BAKER according to this contact tried to provide a good home, however, as she was employed full time she was unable to provide proper supervision. As a result the subject and his brothers were able to do pretty much as they wished.

11. 0002 Douglas St. Victoria, BC (May 59 - Jun 67) This address is situated in a commercial area and is one of three suites above a store. Mrs. B. KEEP who occupies one of the suites, an employee of DAYLIGHT Laundry, neighbour, confirmed the subject's satisfactory residence with his mother at this address for the stated time. Mrs. KEEP stated she had no contact with the BAKER family and could offer no information. The residents in the other suite at this address do not speak English and an interview could not be carried out. Mrs. KEEP advised that this family had little if any contact with the BAKERS.

ADDITIONAL RELEVANT INFORMATION

12. As few contacts could be obtained it was felt the DND 450 references could possibly provide information as to other suitable contacts. Since the subject seemed to associate with persons of questionable reputation, references James WHITE and Michael BLACK, were checked with Saanich Police. Both WHITE and BLACK have extensive criminal records and are said to be of very poor character. In view of this they were not interviewed. The other reference listed, Jim SNOW, is the subject's brother-in-law.

13. Case concluded.

Flight Sergeant
Investigator

Detachment Commander
WSID Edmonton

1. Forwarded in three copies 27 Oct 67.

Flight Sergeant
Section Commander

SECRET
CDN EYES ONLY

PAGE 4

APPENDIX 2
TO ANNEX M
TO DND BRIEF FOR ROYAL
COMMISSION ON SECURITY
DATED: 26 DEC 67

CANADIAN FORCES
MILITARY POLICE INVESTIGATION REPORT -- CONTINUATION SHEET
PAGE No.

CASE FILE No.
DS 630-0000-67

DATE
27 Oct 67

Commanding Officer
SIU Rockcliffe


Forwarded in duplicate, 27 Oct 67.

Flight Lieutenant
Detachment Commander

SECRET
CDN EYES ONLY

A0053408_110-004638


SECRET



AGC-3482

SECURITY CLEARANCE FLOW CHART FOR SPECIAL CASES

APPENDIX 1 - Procedural Steps for Granting or Denying a Security Clearance to DND Personnel



APPENDIX
TO ANNEX
TO DND BRIEF
FOR THE ROYAL
COMMISSION
ON SECURITY
DATED: 26 DEC
67.
A0053408_112-004640

SECRET
CDN EYES ONLY

APPENDIX 2
TO ANNEX "N"
TO DND BRIEF
FOR THE ROYAL
COMMISSION ON
SECURITY
DATED: 26 DEC 67

PROCEDURAL STEPS FOR GRANTING OR DENYING
A SECURITY CLEARANCE TO DND PERSONNEL

STEP 1

Director of Security (DSECUR)

1. Makes decision as to acceptable clearance level (Military and Civilian).
2. Refers to Director General Senior Appointments (DGSA), Director General Personnel Careers (DGPC) or Director Civilian Personnel Services (DGPS), as appropriate:
 - a. those cases where investigation has disclosed character weaknesses or defects of such a nature and extent that make the individual unworthy of retention in the service and;
 - b. those cases where unreliability precludes the granting of a clearance to the requested level yet might not be such as to require release action.
3. Refers to Deputy Chief of Personnel (through Director General Administration) those cases where loyalty is in question for military personnel, and to DGCP for civilian personnel (i.e. no Step II for loyalty cases).

STEP II

MILITARY

DGSA or DGPC as appropriate

1. Determines whether the subject can be employed in a restricted capacity and should be given the opportunity to improve his shortcomings, or
2. Recommends to Deputy Chief of Personnel (DCP) that the subject should be considered for release.

CIVILIAN

DGPS

1. Determines whether the subject can be employed in a restricted capacity and should be given the opportunity to improve his shortcomings, or
2. Recommends to Director General Civilian Personnel (DGCP) that the subject should be considered for release.

STEP III

MILITARY

DCP

1. Reviews case with DSECUR and arranges for interview of subject.

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CDN EYES ONLY

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SECRET

CND EYES ONLY

(DSECUR will prepare interview guide and preferably be in attendance at interview). Exceptional cases may be referred to higher authority (Step IV) before proceeding with interview action.

2. If the interview produces information that resolves the doubt the security clearance will be granted.
3. If the interview does not resolve the doubt in favour of the subject and depending on whether the subject is employable in another capacity, determine whether the subject will accept remuster or transfer, desires release, or insists on compulsory release.
4. Where there is no alternative to compulsory release action, the case is to be referred to the Security Panel Secretariat for their review and recommendation (CD 35 para 16).
5. If after receiving the recommendations of the Panel Secretariat it is still desired to pursue release action, arrange for review of case and interview of subject by Chief of Defence Staff (CDS).

CIVILIAN

DGCP

1. Reviews case with DSECUR and arranges for interview of subject. (DSECUR will prepare interview guide and preferably be in attendance at interview). Exceptional cases may be referred to higher authority (Step IV) before proceeding with interview action.
2. If the interview produces information that resolves the doubt the security clearance will be granted.
3. If the interview does not resolve the doubt in favour of the subject and depending on whether the subject is employable in another capacity, determine whether the subject will accept transfer, desires release, or insists on compulsory release.
4. Where there is no alternative to compulsory release action, the case is to be referred to the Security Panel Secretariat for their review and recommendation (CD 35 para 16).
5. If after receiving the recommendations of the Panel Secretariat it is still desired to pursue release action, arrange for review of case and interview of subject by Deputy Minister (DM).

STEP IV

MILITARY

CDS

1. Reviews case and if not satisfied to grant clearance an interview with subject is mandatory.
2. If doubt is not resolved, ask the subject to reconsider, remuster or transfer (if such is acceptable to the service) or alternatively again offer the opportunity to resign.

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CND EYES ONLY

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SECRET

CDN EYES ONLY

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3. If compulsory release is to be pursued, the CDS shall refer all pertinent details to the Security Panel Board or Review as prescribed by CD 35 para 17 (e).

CIVILIAN

DM

1. Reviews case and if not satisfied to grant clearance an interview with the subject is mandatory.
2. If doubt is not resolved, ask the subject to reconsider transfer (if such is acceptable to the service) or alternatively again offer the opportunity to resign.
3. If compulsory release is to be pursued, the DM shall refer all pertinent details to the Security Panel Board of Review as prescribed by CD 35 para 17 (e).

STEP V

Board of Review - Security Panel

1. Reviews case and passes it on to the Minister along with their comments and recommendations.

STEP VI

Minister

1. Reviews case history and recommendations of Security Panel.
2. Disposes of the case administratively or,
3. Recommends dismissal to the Governor in Council.

STEP VII

Governor in Council

1. Reviews case history and the Minister's recommendations.
2. Resolves problem administratively or,
3. Sanction dismissal action.

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CDN EYES ONLY

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SECURITY OF PERSONNEL STATISTICS
1 JANUARY 1956 TO 31 DECEMBER 1966
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

TYPE OF CASE		1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	TOTAL FOR 10 YEAR PERIOD
1. Number of Persons Dismissed	Disloyalty	8	12	18	3	11	4	16	-	-	-	-	72
	Unreliability	4	10	11	6	20	7	3	-	-	-	1	62
2. Number of Persons Permitted to Resign	Disloyalty	8	5	2	1	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	18
	Unreliability	20	8	7	1	-	10	3	1	4	1	-	55
3. Number of Persons Transferred to Non-Sensitive Posts	Disloyalty	52	12	15	23	-	2	6	-	-	-	-	110
	Unreliability	217	99	123	62	13	5	31	-	1	1	-	552
4. Number of Persons Denied Access to Classified Information	Disloyalty	35	39	19	19	22	21	28	22	2	5	-	212
	Unreliability	86	72	63	66	67	45	81	59	25	16	20	580
5. Number of Persons Denied Employment	Disloyalty	11	9	8	10	4	11	6	10	8	7	-	84
	Unreliability	11	5	3	10	13	18	24	9	7	5	12	117
6. Number of Persons Transferred to Less-Sensitive Posts	Disloyalty	-	-	2	-	1	2	1	-	-	-	-	6
	Unreliability	-	-	6	3	6	3	-	-	-	1	2	21
7. Clearance Granted to Lower Standard than Requested	Disloyalty	33	4	25	21	8	6	22	6	6	-	-	131
	Unreliability	149	88	69	71	30	39	45	22	41	20	6	580
TOTAL NO. OF CASES PER YEAR		634	363	371	296	197	173	266	129	94	56	41	2620

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ANNEX "O"
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FOR THE ROYAL
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SECRET
CDN EYES ONLY

CHAPTER 50

PHYSICAL SECURITY OF CANADIAN FORCES ESTABLISHMENTS

5001. INTRODUCTION

This chapter prescribes the physical security required by establishments of the Canadian Forces to safeguard personnel, facilities, equipment, materiel and documents against injury, damage, theft, sabotage and espionage.

5002. DEFINITIONS

1. In this chapter:

- a. "Canadian Forces establishment" means any defence establishment as defined in QR & O acquired or set apart for the use of elements of the Canadian Forces;
- b. "open area" means the area within or adjacent to a Canadian Forces establishment in which restrictions and controls are not normally imposed except as provided by the Defence Establishment Trespass Regulations and the Government Property Traffic Regulations;
- c. "physical security" means that part of security concerned with physical measures designed to safeguard personnel, to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, facilities, materiel, and documents, and to safeguard them against espionage, damage and theft;
- d. "resident" means a person who is authorized to carry out his normal duties in a given room, building or area of a Canadian Forces establishment;
- e. "restricted area" means an area within a Canadian Forces establishment which contains sensitive, valuable, or operationally vital matter requiring special protection, and to which access is linked to specified personnel;
- f. "security guard" or "guard" means any person, service or civilian, employed or designated to guard any property and the personnel and matter therein from theft, wilful damage, unauthorized entry, sabotage, compromise, espionage, and any other hazard that could contribute thereto; and
- g. "separated establishment" means a Canadian Forces establishment which is geographically removed from the normal military environment, has few or

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no residents, and relies primarily on community police protection when unoccupied.

5003. GENERAL

1. Pursuant to QR & O 4.20 and 29.01, officers commanding Canadian Forces establishments shall implement the minimum measures outlined in this Chapter and shall apply to their parent CFB or functional commander, as appropriate, for requirements which are beyond their resources.
2. A Base Commander shall normally be responsible for providing the physical security measures required by integral/lodger units, and this responsibility, when applicable, will be reflected in organization orders promulgated by CFHQ.
3. The Commanding Officer of a unit or element which is integral or lodger to a Canadian Forces Base shall, when physical security support is indicated in organization orders, apply to the Base Commander for the physical security measures required to protect his establishment, presenting when necessary the written support of his functional commander.
4. Commanding officers of ships, commanders of ground forces on field operations or manoeuvres, and captains of aircraft away from home base, shall employ those measures which are feasible, and additional or alternative measures as required, in maintaining the security of their commands.
5. In the event of emergencies or war, commanding officers shall take additional security measures commensurate with the situation, or as may be directed by higher authority.

5004. STANDARDS OF PHYSICAL SECURITY

1. The standards of physical security required at Canadian Forces establishments will vary according to operational role, sensitivity, content, location and vulnerability. The standard for a given establishment shall be determined by:
 - a. application of one of the categories of physical security set out hereunder, in accordance with the assignment by type which has been made by Canadian Forces Headquarters at Annex A; and
 - b. local designation of the components of the establishment which, because of their operational importance or sensitivity, are restricted areas requiring additional protection.

5005. CATEGORIES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY

1. The categories for physical security to be applied to Canadian Forces establishments and the minimum measures for each category are:

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a. Category 1 - Special Security. -

Category 1 is applicable to establishments, such as nuclear weapons bases, which are subject to special physical security standards, usually as a result of international agreements.

b. Category 2 - Maximum Security. -

Category 2 applies to establishments and restricted areas requiring complete control of movement and immediate detection of, and response to, unauthorized entry, i.e. essential operational centres and their associated elements. The following measures, which are outlined in art. 5006, shall be employed on a 24-hour day basis;

- (1) security force;
- (2) armed security patrols;
- (3) controlled access; and
- (4) full use of physical safeguards, as required.

c. Category 3 - Intermediate Security. -

Category 3 applies to establishments and restricted areas which are required for immediate support of operations and must have precise access control on a 24-hour day basis. The following measures, which are outlined in art. 5006, shall be employed;

- (1) security force;
- (2) controlled access;
- (3) silent hour patrols; and
- (4) essential physical safeguards.

d. Category 4 - Moderate Security. -

Category 4 applies to standard Canadian Forces establishments, such as bases, camps and stations, which have a large number of residents, and contain principally open areas, with only minor restricted areas. The physical security measures employed shall be those required to effect the provisions of the Defence Establishment Trespass Regulations, the Government Property Trespass Regulations and the Code of Service Discipline, and will normally include a security force and silent hour patrols.

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e. Category 5 - Basic Security. -

Category 5 applies to separated establishments, which may in some cases be located on other than DND-owned property. Buildings and offices shall be locked at all times except when an authorized person is immediately available to attend to the entrances and exits. Separated establishments shall be checked periodically by civilian or company police, building superintendents, commissionaires or watchmen. This category will apply to unmanned communications sites in peacetime.

2. When DND accommodation on other than DND-owned property is arranged through lease or other contractual agreement, the responsibility for security shall be designated in such agreement in the light of the provisions of para 1(e) above.

3. The application of these categories to Canadian Forces establishments by type in Annex A is based on peacetime requirements. In the event of war or other extreme emergency a higher category of physical security will be required at most establishments, depending on the operational role.

4. Canadian Forces establishments outside Canada shall be categorized in accordance with this order. Any additional security arrangements directed by non-Canadian commanders under whom Canadian Forces serve, eg, NATO and UN, are to be considered supplementary to the minimum standards prescribed in this order. CFHQ/DSECUR shall be advised of the nature of such supplementary arrangements.

5006. PHYSICAL SECURITY MEASURES

1. The measures employed to effect physical security at a Canadian Forces establishment are outlined below. Those which are mandatory shall be applied to the degree necessary to meet the precise requirements of an individual establishment. Those which serve as alternative measures, such as physical safeguards in lieu of security force personnel, shall be employed with full consideration of effectiveness and cost:

- a. Security Surveys. The commanding officer of a Canadian Forces establishment shall cause a physical security survey to be conducted by specialist security personnel. The purpose of such surveys is to determine the security measures necessary for safeguarding the establishment concerned, to identify restricted areas, and to determine the personnel and material required under peacetime and emergency conditions. Annex B outlines the basic information required by such survey. As long as there is no major change in the establishment, its role or threats to its security, the survey will remain valid. A review shall be made at least

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once annually, using security personnel where practicable, to confirm the effectiveness of measures employed.

- b. Security Areas. Most Canadian Forces establishments consist of an open area containing one or more restricted areas. These restricted areas shall be designated in the physical security survey, along with the category of physical security protection required for each. At some establishments only one category of protection will be required by the entire establishment.
- c. Physical Security Orders and Plans. Based on the results of the physical security survey, each Canadian Forces establishment shall include comprehensive security instructions in its standing orders. These instructions shall include a listing of the open and restricted areas of the establishment and the security responsibilities and procedures applicable to each. In addition, the physical security requirements of the establishment in times of emergency or war shall be developed in conjunction with, and incorporated into, appropriate emergency defence plans. As a guide for the development of an emergency security plan, factors to be considered include:
 - (1) progressive increases as required in the level of security commensurate with a local situation or with increases in the states of national alert,
 - (2) co-ordination with existing applicable plans,
 - (3) liaison with other civil and military agencies as appropriate,
 - (4) an augmentation security force to assist regular security personnel in protecting the establishment,
 - (5) organizing, equipping, and training of security forces,
 - (6) designation of security areas in accordance with para 1.b,
 - (7) administration and logistic support requirements such as transport, additional fencing, and pass systems,
 - (8) adequate communications systems for security forces,
 - (9) procedures for reporting of security incidents, disposal of sabotage devices and handling of prisoners.

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- (10) locations for security headquarters and any sub-headquarters, and
 - (11) periodic testing of the security plan.
- d. Access Control System. Security is achieved basically by denying access to unauthorized persons. Basic methods which shall be considered for any access control system and applied according to need are:
- (1) the delimitation of the area to be controlled, by providing adequate obstruction through a combination of signs, fences, barriers, gates, window screens or bars, doors and locks;
 - (2) the establishment of the minimum number of authorized access control points consistent with operational requirements;
 - (3) the limiting of access to persons who are appropriately security cleared and who require access in the performance of their duties;
 - (4) the controlling of access by either the residents or designated members of the security force through techniques ranging from cursory surveillance to close inspection of authorization and identity particulars;
 - (5) the implementation of pass systems and authentication procedures, as required;
 - (6) the escorting of visitors; and
 - (7) the searching, as required, of persons, vehicles and materiel entering and leaving.
- e. Security Force. Personnel whose duties, either wholly or in part, fall within the definition of "security guard" are members of the security force: this force is the best measure for providing physical security, but only in cases of emergency is it practicable to maintain a cadre large enough to meet all contingencies. For day-to-day protection, the security force is limited to the number of personnel who, aided by the maximum use of physical safeguards, can maintain the security of the establishment and its components at an acceptable level of risk. This includes the capability of supporting the physical safeguards when required. Generally this force is composed of:

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- (1) the Regular Security Force - military policemen, Commissionaires, watchmen and others whose regular duties include maintaining the security of an establishment or one of its components; and
 - (2) the Augmentation Security Force - personnel who do not have the security of the establishment or a component as a prime duty, but may be called upon to serve as regimental police, duty watch, fire piquet or an emergency security force which has the maintenance of security, or certain aspects of it, as one of its missions.
- f. Silent Hour Patrols. During the hours when most residents of an establishment are not at their normal places of duty, there is a requirement for a silent hour patrol in addition to the physical safeguards used to maintain security. The mission of this patrol is prevention and detection; it is normally unarmed and requires the support of "on call" personnel in the event of an incident. It is usually carried out by the security force, either regular or augmentation, but may partially rely on maintenance personnel and others who are moving about the establishment during silent hours. Small, compact establishments with 24-hour manning and separated establishments will require this measure only in exceptional circumstances.
- g. Security Patrols. Security force personnel, exclusive of access controllers, whose primary duty is to maintain the security of a given restricted area, or a portion of it, constitute security patrols. Operating individually or in teams, these personnel are armed, may be on foot or in vehicles, and usually fulfill a 24-hour manning requirement.
- h. Security Alert Team. The security alert team is a useful measure when a surveillance-type of security posture, e.g., - employing silent hour patrols or intrusion alarm systems, is adequate for routine day-to-day activities, but the importance of a restricted area or areas requires an immediate response in force to any hint of hostile intrusion. The team, not normally exceeding five members, is armed and equipped with a vehicle and adequate communications. It is trained in deployment, investigative and apprehension techniques and is available at all times to instantly support security force personnel or alarm systems in the area.
- j. Physical Safeguards. The type and extent of physical security safeguards shall be determined by the importance, vulnerability, and sensitivity of the installation or area to be protected. A

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physical safeguard in itself will not normally prevent unauthorized access and, to be fully effective, should be supported by a properly organized security force. This factor shall be considered in every physical security survey. Details of physical safeguards designed to deter, delay, or detect unauthorized entry are contained in Annex C. These safeguards include security fencing and lighting systems, intrusion alarms, structural safeguards, perimeter markings, security cabinets and locks.

- k. Passes. Passes used shall be as prescribed in CFP 102, Canadian Armed Forces Identification Bureau Handbook on Identification and Annex D of this Chapter. However, this shall not preclude the devising of additional pass systems to satisfy access control criteria imposed by international agreements or required to meet temporary local situations.
- m. Arming of Guards. When armed guards are employed, they shall perform their duties in accordance with the provisions of Annex E respecting use of force, use of firearms and method of challenging.

5007. SECURITY INCIDENT REPORT AND ALERTING

1. Actual or suspected acts of sabotage or other covert action against a Canadian Forces establishment shall be reported immediately to:

- a. Command headquarters - through normal intermediate command channels;
- b. Canadian Forces Headquarters - (Information copy, for attention of Director of Operations); and
- c. the nearest Special Investigation Section or Detachment (refer CFAO 22-2).

2. The reports to a and b above shall be by classified message with a precedence of Immediate, and the text shall be prefixed by the word "SABAT". The text shall state time, objective, locations, method used, number of persons involved, how entry gained, and the resultant operational status of the unit or installation.

3. Upon receipt of such report:

- a. the Command headquarters shall ensure that all security and support actions deemed necessary to counter further attack are taken;
- b. Canadian Forces Headquarters will assess the reports and disseminate appropriate information to Commands as required, along with direction to

all or part of the Canadian Forces to implement additional security measures when such action is deemed necessary; and

- c. the Special Investigation Section shall immediately commence investigation and advise the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and/or other agencies as required.

4. In the event that it is desirable to implement maximum security measures prior to a National Alert having been declared, CFHQ will despatch a classified message bearing precedence Flash, and containing the nickname "SAFE WIND" and the designation of the formations, establishments or units which are affected. This procedure may also be used by the Commander of a Command when it is deemed essential. In such case, CFHQ shall be provided with an information copy.

5008. NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNITS

1. The security of nuclear weapons is prescribed by international agreement and special orders respecting it are contained in CFP 128, Volume 3.

5009. CANADIAN FORCES COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS

1. The security of communication facilities and units is provided for in CIS/01/1, Canadian Forces Cryptographic Operating Instructions, Chapter 3, based on international regulations for communication and crypto security.

(Arts. 5010 to 5099 inclusive: not allocated)

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ANNEX F
TO DND BRIEF FOR ROYAL
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DATED: 26 Dec 67ANNEX A to
CHAPTER 50CATEGORIZATION OF CANADIAN FORCES ESTABLISHMENTS

<u>ESTABLISHMENT</u>	<u>PEACETIME CATEGORY</u>
Air Transport Units	4
Ammunition Depots and Magazines	3
Army Survey Establishments	4
Camps and Stations not specified	4
Canadian Defence Liaison Staffs (CDLS)	3
Canadian Forces Communications System (CFCS)	
Headquarters	4
Command and Area Headquarters not specified	4
Command Headquarters - (Air Defence, Maritime, and Mobile)	3
Communications Squadrons (Major Relays)	4
Dental Equipment Depots	4
Depots (Armament, Medical, Ordnance, Repair, and Supply)	3
Design, Development, and Experimental Units	4
DEW Line Units	4
Dockyards	3
Electrical and Mechanical Engineer (EME)	
Workshops	3
Engineer Works Units	4
Experimental Army Signals Establishment	2
Field Units (located outside a camp or station)	4
Formation Headquarters	4
Hospitals	5
Nuclear Control and Direction Centres	1
Nuclear Weapon Units	1
Oceanographic Stations	3
Operational Flying Units	2
Radar Stations	3
Radio Stations	3
Recruiting Units	5
Regional Government Emergency Headquarters and Federal Departmental Relocation Centres	4
Remote Transmitter, Receiver and Relay Stations (Unattended)	5
Remote Transmitter, Receiver and Relay Stations (Attended)	4
Remote Commercial/Service Transfer Points	5
Reserve Forces (Navy, Army, Air Force)	5
Stations and Camps not specified	4
Supplementary Radio Stations	3
Target Area Headquarters	4
Technical Service Units and Detachments	5
Training Colleges, Schools, Personnel Establishments	4

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ANNEX F
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ANNEX B to
CHAPTER 50

PHYSICAL SECURITY SURVEYS

1. The essential information required in completing a physical security survey of an establishment is:

a. Description of Establishment

- (1) Location and lay-out, including site plan;
- (2) Role and functions of the establishment, and lodger units if applicable;
- (3) Numbers of personnel on strength and estimate of additional personnel requiring access daily;

b. Description of Environment

- (1) Description of surrounding community;
- (2) Threats, actual or assessed, to the security of the establishment;
- (3) Friendly forces, (civilian police and Forces personnel) their proximity and strengths in support of the establishment;

c. Description of Internal Security

- (1) Category of physical security protection for establishment as whole;
- (2) Physical security measures employed for establishment as whole including:
 - (a) Security Standing Orders;
 - (b) Security Indoctrination of establishment personnel;
 - (c) Security force composition, strength, operating procedures, equipment and communications;
 - (d) Access control system, including movement within the establishment;
 - (e) Physical safeguards employed, including perimeter signs, fencing, barriers and lighting and common internal locking arrangements;

d. Description of Each Restricted Area, including the following as applicable:

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- (1) Physical description, including plan drawing if required;
- (2) Role, importance, and personnel responsible;
- (3) Nature and extent of classified or valuable material held;
- (4) Threats to security beyond those shown for establishment as a whole;
- (5) Category of physical security protection required;
- (6) Security Standing Orders specifically applying to the area;
- (7) Access Control system beyond that employed on establishment as a whole;
- (8) Additional physical safeguards employed;
- (9) Procedures of the establishment security force respecting the area, and security force personnel assigned specifically to protect the area;

e. Security Requirements in Time of Emergency or War

- (1) Role of establishment in time of emergency or war;
- (2) Assessment of increased threat to security at such times and category of physical security protection requirement;
- (3) Emergency defence plans, orders and testing;
- (4) Augmentation Security Force - manpower, equipment and training requirements;
- (5) Additional physical safeguards required;
- (6) Outside resources beyond those available in peacetime;

f. Assessment and Recommendations

- (1) Strengths and weaknesses in physical security posture of the establishment as a whole;
- (2) Adequacy of physical security measures employed for each restricted area;

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- (3) Adequacy of security standing orders and emergency defence plans;
- (4) Recommended improvements in physical security measures employed, with alternatives to each whenever possible;

2. The amount of detail provided under each heading shall be that required to provide a complete picture. It must be remembered that the survey, or extracts from it, is required by higher authority in considering applications for additional physical security measures.

3. A completed physical security survey shall be classified Secret; extracts shall be classified according to their content.

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ANNEX C to
CHAPTER 50

PHYSICAL SAFEGUARDS

SECURITY FENCING

1. Security fencing shall normally be used only for the perimeters of operationally important Canadian Forces establishments, restricted areas, and bulk storage areas. Approved types of fencing include the following:

- a. Security Fence (Type A). This is a chain link fence with an overall height of seven feet which shall include a three-strand barbed wire overhang set outward at a 45 degree angle, supported on tubular steel posts set in concrete. Type A security fences shall be used to provide rigid control over egress from and access to restricted or bulk storage areas and to prevent damage or destruction to the installation.
- b. Security Fence (Type B). This is a chain link fence with an overall height of ten feet, one foot below ground and nine feet above ground, which shall include a three-strand barbed wire overhang set inward at a 45 degree angle, supported on tubular steel posts set in concrete. This type shall be used for the fencing of detention barracks.
- c. Security Fence (Type C). This is a chain link fence with an overall full fabric height of six feet, supported on tubular steel posts set in concrete. There is no barbed wire overhang. When the perimeter of an establishment is to be fenced under special circumstances, such as the establishment being flanked by a busy thoroughfare, sections of such a perimeter shall be fenced with a Type C fence.
- d. Personnel Safety Fence (Type D). This is a chain link fence of four feet overall height with fabric full height, supported on tubular steel posts set in concrete. This type shall be used to deter entry to hazardous areas on or adjoining DND property. In special circumstances, such as the fencing of extremely hazardous areas, consideration may be given to the installation of a Type C fence.
- e. Trespass Control Fence (Type E). This is a farm type fence, 48 inches high, topped by two strands (one foot) of barbed wire supported on steel T-rail posts. Type E fences shall be installed where it is necessary to deter large animals or unauthorized personnel from trespassing and shall be restricted to property boundaries.

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- f. Concertina Wire. Barbed concertina wire may be used as a temporary method of enclosing restricted and bulk storage areas. When used for this purpose, two rolls of concertina wire are placed on the ground with a third roll in the centre of the base thus formed. An alternative arrangement consists of placing one roll of concertina wire on top of another to produce a total height of six feet.
2. Fences shall be as straight as local topography permits, and shall, wherever possible, be sited at least 20 feet away from any natural or manmade feature or outside the area which could afford concealment or assistance to hostile intruders.
3. Where practicable, a fence around a restricted or bulk storage area shall be sited at a sufficient distance from elements being protected within the area to:
- a. permit the movement of guards between the fence and the elements; and
 - b. preclude the possibility of sabotage devices being thrown over the fence at the element being protected.
4. In addition to the types of fencing outlined above, there will be instances in which a fence of another type will be required. No attempt has been made to list them because of the wide variety involved, eg, snow fences, temporary fences, and barricades.

PERIMETER MARKING

5. Perimeter marking consists of prominently displayed signs which inform unauthorized persons that they are not permitted to proceed beyond a certain point. While signs cannot in themselves be regarded as physical obstacles, they support the physical security operation in that non-hostile persons will usually obey them and withdraw, thus separating them from hostile persons, who, by disobeying the signs, make themselves the object of security forces interest. Signs shall be used in the following locations:
- a. Perimeters. Perimeters shall be marked by signs at reasonable intervals to give warning to trespassers. Such signs shall bear the inscription "NO TRESPASSING" in letters at least three inches high, and "BY ORDER OF THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE" in smaller letters in the lower right-hand corner.
 - b. Restricted Area Perimeters. The perimeters of restricted areas and bulk storage areas shall

be marked at intervals, permitting reasonable warning to trespassers and other unauthorized persons, by signs similar to those described in subpara a.

- c. Within Restricted Areas. Some restricted areas may embrace smaller areas containing elements of critical importance, and to which access must be rigidly controlled. To assist guards in controlling access to such areas, it may be necessary to define the boundaries very clearly. This may be done with ropes, painted lines, or portable fencing, supplemented by signs placed in conspicuous positions. Signs at points of entry shall bear the inscription "RESTRICTED AREA - UNAUTHORIZED ENTRY PROHIBITED" in letters at least 2½ inches high and "BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER" in smaller letters in the lower right-hand corner.
- d. Points of Entry. Points of entry shall be marked by signs measuring at least 24 inches by 16 inches, bearing the inscription "UNAUTHORIZED ENTRY PROHIBITED" in letters at least 2½ inches high, and "BY ORDER OF THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE" in smaller letters in the lower right-hand corner.

6. Where necessary, all signs shall be printed in both French and English with the language predominant in the area appearing at the top. The appropriate language will also be used in areas where languages other than French and English are spoken.

SECURITY LIGHTING

7. Where considered necessary, or prescribed by international agreements, security lighting shall be installed in addition to normal domestic lighting systems. Three primary areas should be considered in planning a security lighting system:

- a. Access Control Points. Authorized entrances to Canadian Forces establishments, and to restricted or bulk storage areas, shall be effectively lighted to assist guards in checking vehicles and pedestrian traffic. Entrance lights shall be so placed that the faces of pedestrians, vehicle occupants, and the interiors of vehicles can be clearly seen.
- b. Along Fences. Lighting of fences and their approaches shall be determined primarily by the importance of the fenced area and should be considered in conjunction with other protection

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afforded the area. Where required, fence lighting shall be provided by the use of luminaires located inside the fence line. Distance from the fence, mounting height of luminaires, and spacing will vary according to the topography and the level of illumination desired. The luminaire shall consist of a weatherproof unit equipped with a Fresnel lens having a 180 degree beam spread. All wiring shall be underground. As a general guide, the lights should be mounted 15 feet inside the fence, at 75 foot intervals, and 25 feet above the ground. Fence approaches should be illuminated for approximately 100 feet yet not reveal guard patrol paths.

- d. Interior Areas and Structures. In areas where important night operations are conducted, security lighting should be designed to illuminate the whole area. Specific buildings or structures which are deemed vital, together with their approaches, should be illuminated to prevent persons from approaching unobserved. In many cases this can best be accomplished by good street lighting supplemented by floodlights.

8. Factors which shall be considered in the planning and installation of a security lighting system include:

- a. provisions for systems, or section of systems, to be controlled by guards;

NOTE: Some restricted areas, for example, may contain particularly attractive targets for hostile intruders, and should, in consequence, be located and operated in such a manner as to attract minimum attention. In such areas, security lighting should only be switched on when a search or close surveillance of the area is required.

- b. confirmation from appropriate authorities that proposed lighting systems shall not conflict with safety or blackout regulations;
- c. provision for "lamp overlap", ie, circuits should be so designed that in the event of one lamp burning out, the remaining lamps will continue burning, and the affected area will be illuminated by the lamps on either side;
- d. provision for an alternate power supply for use in the event that the primary source of power is disabled or interrupted; auxiliary power units shall be located in a restricted area;

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- e. provision for supplementing fixed lighting with portable lights; and
- f. provision for the regular inspection of lighting systems and the periodic replacement of lamps.

STRUCTURAL SAFEGUARDS

9. Buildings and other structures shall be protected in a manner commensurate with the importance of their contents, and may be located in restricted areas or may in themselves be designated as restricted areas.

10. The most vulnerable parts of a building are normally its apertures, such as doors, windows, and skylights. These shall be secured through the use of locks, screens and bars. The installation of these safeguards shall be co-ordinated with the establishment fire chief and safety officer, where applicable.

11. All external and internal doors of buildings shall be equipped with approved locking devices, and only a minimum number of external doors shall be used for essential traffic. External doors designed as emergency fire exits shall be secured with approved panic hardware, and a breakable seal conspicuously displayed.

12. Internal doors of accommodation used to house attractive or classified matter shall be locked when not occupied by authorized personnel.

13. The normal military office or area is adequately protected through the use of a good quality mortice or rim latch door lock with a five-pin cylinder, providing classified matter and valuable items therein are locked in approved cabinets. However, doors to rooms or areas containing Secret or Confidential matter or attractive stores on open display shall be fitted with a mortice lock without push buttons with a dead bolt or auxiliary dead latch, with a 5 or 6-pin tumbler having pick resistant drivers and not master keyed or keyed alike. The hinge pins of such doors shall be either concealed or protected against removal.

14. Keys to all internal and external doors or gates of buildings or areas containing classified or attractive matter shall be kept on registry charge by a designated officer.

15. Windows and other apertures which could be used as a means of gaining unauthorized access to buildings containing attractive or classified matter shall be fitted with secure fastenings operable only from inside, and shall, where applicable, be reinforced with steel grills, screens or bars.

ELECTRONIC ALARM SYSTEMS

16. An electronic alarm system is a device which electronically detects and indicates that an area or element under protection has been penetrated or improperly secured. As such systems may deter but will not prevent unauthorized entry, it is necessary when considering their installation to ensure that adequate security forces, either service or civilian, will be available to respond promptly to alarms. Electronic alarm systems shall be tested frequently to ensure that they are functioning properly, and to exercise security personnel in prescribed response procedures.

17. Installation costs and maintenance difficulties dictate that the degree of technical sophistication built into any particular system be commensurate with the importance of the area or element to be protected.

18. Accordingly, electronic alarm systems shall be categorized as follows:

- a. Type A. This type shall normally be used only in the protection of concentrations of highly classified matter or operationally essential elements where the need for prompt detection and investigation of unauthorized entry is vital to national security, and where this need cannot be adequately met by other approved security arrangements. Design, development, installation and maintenance to Type A systems shall be the responsibility of CFHQ/DCEFS. Circuitry details and information respecting special features of system operation shall be classified Secret. The responsibility for certain first line maintenance and minor repairs may be delegated to appropriately cleared unit technicians who have been suitably trained by CFHQ/DCEFS personnel.
- b. Type B. This type shall normally be used in the protection of concentrations of valuable stores, including small arms and ammunition, and bulk narcotic drugs held in Medical Equipment Depots, where the need for prompt detection and investigation of unauthorized entry is important and where this need cannot be adequately met by other approved security arrangements. Type B systems may be designed and installed by CFHQ/DCEFS or by an approved commercial contractor under CFHQ/DCEFS supervision and may consist of unclassified components. However, complete diagrams and blueprints of the entire alarm system shall be classified Confidential. The responsibility of maintenance and minor repairs may be delegated to appropriately cleared unit

technicians who have been suitably trained by CFHQ/DCEFS personnel, or to similarly cleared company representatives in accordance with the terms of a particular contract.

- c. Type C. This type comprises the various unclassified systems used to monitor security patrols, e.g. punch clock systems. Type C systems may be designed and installed either by CFHQ/DCEFS or by an approved commercial contractor under CFHQ/DCEFS supervision. CFHQ may delegate this responsibility to a RCEO or a BASE CEO. The responsibility for maintenance may be delegated to suitably trained unit technicians, or to company representatives in accordance with the terms of a particular contract.

19. Requests for electronic alarm systems shall be directed to CFHQ/DSECUR and shall include the following information:

- a. The sensitivity, importance, value, or quantity, as appropriate, of the elements or materials to be protected.
- b. Details of the existing or planned security posture into which the electronic system, if approved, will be incorporated. It is important to include details of the availability of prompt and adequate manpower response to alarms.
- c. The anticipated degree to which local resources can contribute to system maintenance.

NOTE: Only in the most exceptional cases will the installation of a point alarm system within an area alarm system be approved.

20. CFHQ/DSECUR shall screen each request to confirm correct categorization and compliance with security criteria. Screened submissions will then be passed to CFHQ/DCEFS for programming and implementation. Upon approval by higher authority of the expenditure of the funds involved, electronic alarm systems or components shall be purchased, rented, leased, installed, and maintained only by or on the authority of CFHQ/DCEFS. As a general rule, CFHQ/DCEFS shall install any alarm system which incorporates classified components. In those cases where it is considered expedient to permit a commercial company to install and maintain alarm systems, DSECUR shall arrange with DDP/DIS for the prior and appropriate security clearance of concerned company representatives.

PADLOCKS AND LOCKING BARS

21. The following types of padlocks are authorized for security use as indicated:

- a. NATO Stock No. 5340-21-660-2100 - combination padlock (Security rating FIS3) - for Secret matter only;
- b. NATO Stock No. 5340-21-660-2101 - key padlock (Security rating FIS2C) - Case width 1½", approx. Shackle diameter ½", approx. - for Confidential matter and small quantities of attractive items;
- c. NATO Stock No. 5340-21-660-2102 - key padlock (Security rating F2S2C) Case width 1½" X 2", approx. Shackle diameter 1/3", approx. - for Confidential matter and attractive items;
- d. NATO Stock No. 5340-21-660-2103 - key padlock (Security rating F3S2C) Case width 2" X 2½", approx. Shackle diameter 3/8", approx. - for Confidential matter or large quantities of attractive items.

22. The security rating is the ability of the padlock to resist force (F1 to F3 - Poor to Good) and surreptitious attack (S0 to S3 - Nil to Good). The (C) refers to a padlock which has passed corrosion and rust resistance tests. The letter (C) has no security significance and may be ignored when selecting a padlock to meet a particular security requirement.

23. Padlocks shall be procured through normal supply channels to ensure that they have been properly manufactured under RCMP inspection.

24. An approved locking bar assembly is listed under NATO Stock No. 5340-21-800-7933, which provides plans for local manufacture.

CONTAINERS

25. The following containers are authorized for the storage of the matter indicated. Stock numbers, dimensions and remarks are shown in Table 50C-1:

- a. Enclosure Cabinet - Steel.
Use: Top Secret, ZED List and COSMIC matter, and for bulk narcotics.

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- b. Filing Cabinet - Steel (with Bar).
Use: when fitted with the approved locking bar assembly (para 24) and combination padlock (para 21a) - Secret matter; when fitted with the bar and key padlock (para 21b) - Confidential matter.
- c. Storage Cabinet - Steel (with Bar).
Use: when fitted with the approved locking bar assembly (para 24) and combination padlock (para 21a) - Secret matter; with the bar and key padlock (para 21b or 21c) - Confidential matter.
- d. Chest - Steel, or Aluminum, Type.
Use: Top Secret, ZED List and COSMIC matter.
- e. Chest - Steel, Type 2.
Use: with combination padlock (para 21a) - Secret matter; with key padlock (paras 21b or 21c) - Confidential matter.
- f. Chest - Steel, Type 3.
Use: with built-in key lock - Restricted matter; with key padlock (paras 21b or 21c) - Confidential matter; with combination padlock (para 21a) - Secret matter; with built-in, three number, combination padlock - Top Secret, ZED List or COSMIC matter.
- g. Chest - Steel, Type 4.
Use: with built-in key lock - Restricted matter; with hasps (fitted locally) and key padlock (paras 21b or 21c) - Confidential matter; and with hasps and combination padlock (para 21c) - Secret matter.
- h. Narcotic Chest.
Use: with key padlock (paras 21b or 21 c) - ready use narcotics.
- j. Cash Stowage, Type 1.
Use: Cash and equivalent up to \$1,000.
- k. Cash Stowage, Type 2.
Use: without inner steel chest - cash and equivalent up to \$1,000; with inner steel chest - cash and equivalent over \$1,000.
- m. Cash Stowage, Type 3.
Use: without inner steel chest - cash and equivalent up to \$1,000; with inner steel chest - cash and equivalent over \$1,000.
- n. Chart and Drawing Stowage.
Use: with locking bar assembly (para 24) and key padlock (paras 21b and 21c) - Confidential matter; and with bar and combination padlock (para 21a) - Secret matter.

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TABLE 50C-1

DATA ON AUTHORISED CONTAINERSNOTES

1. Dimensions are in inches. Width (W) means the distance across the front of the container; depth (D) means the distance from the front to the back of the container; and height (H) is the distance from the base to the top of the container.

2. Containers marked "Obsolescent: See Note 2" will continue in use until existing stocks are worn out. No additional stock will be procured.

SERIAL	DESCRIPTION	DIMENSIONS			STOCK NO.	REMARKS
		W	D	H		
a.	Enclosure Cabinet - Steel					1. Use with file cabinet: 7110-21-536-4029 7110-21-536-4003
	Two drawer	24	32	34	7110-21-536-9551	
	Four drawer	24	32	54	7110-21-536-9550	
b.	Filing Cabinet - Steel					-
	One drawer	18	28	12 7/8	7110-21-536-4050	
	Two drawer	18	28	30 1/2	7110-21-536-4047	
	Three drawer	18	28	42	7110-21-536-4048	
	Four drawer	18	28	51	7110-21-536-4049	
c.	Storage Cabinet - Steel					1. Not suitable for use in ships. 2. Back to be welded to sides.
	-	36	20	42	7125-21-536-0133	
	-	36	24	78	7125-21-536-4098	
	-	36	18	78	7125-21-536-4099	
d.	Chest - Steel, or Aluminum, Type 1					1. Aluminum type (for ships) when reduction of magnetic signature is vital. 2. To be secured to structure to prevent removal. 3. Intended for use in ships only.
	Steel	12	20	10	7110-21-536-9567	
	Aluminum	12	20	10		

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TABLE 50C-1 (cont'd)

SERIAL	DESCRIPTION	DIMENSIONS			STOCK NO.	REMARKS
		W	D	H		
e.	Chest - Steel, Type 2 -	21 $\frac{3}{4}$	18 $\frac{1}{2}$	11 $\frac{1}{2}$	7110-21-536-9515	1. Obsolescent: See Note 2. 2. To be secured to structure to prevent removal. 3. Intended for use in ships only.
f.	Chest - Steel, Type 3					1. Obsolescent: See Note 2.
	Restricted Confidential	26	24	33	7110-21-536-9535	2. Not suitable for use in ships.
	or Secret	26	24	33	7110-21-536-9536	
	Top Secret	26	24	33	7110-21-536-9537	
g.	Chest - Steel, Type 4 -	17	14	23	7110-21-536-9560	1. Obsolescent: See Note 2. 2. To be secured to structure to prevent removal. 3. Intended for use in ships only.
h.	Narcotic Chest -	8	12	10	7110-21-536-9513	1. Obsolescent: See Note 2. 2. To be secured to structure to prevent removal. 3. Intended for use in ships only.
j.	Cash Stowage - Type 1 -	20	22	29	7110-21-536-9589	-
k.	Cash Stowage - Type 2					
	No inner chest	26	33	58	7110-21-536-9592	-
	With inner chest	26	33	58	7110-21-536-9590	-

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TABLE 50C-1 (cont'd)

SERIAL	DESCRIPTION	DIMENSIONS			STOCK NO.	REMARKS
		W	D	H		
m.	Cash Stowage - Type 3					
	No inner chest	43	33	70	7110-21-536-9593	-
	With inner chest	43	33	70	7110-21-536-9591	-
n.	Chart and Drawing Stowage					
	Cover	47	36	20	7110-21-536-0985	1. Cover, sections (as many as required) and base to be secured together.
	5 drawer section	47	36	all	7110-21-536-0986	
	Base	47	36		7110-21-536-0987	

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PASSESUSE OF PASSES

1. The Commanding Officer shall determine whether, and to what extent, passes shall be used for controlling movement into, out of and within a Canadian Forces' establishment, except when direction has been issued by CFHQ.
2. The following passes are authorized for general use at Canadian Forces' establishments:
 - a. General Pass - Form CAFIB 31;
 - b. Temporary Pass - Form CAFIB 32; and
 - c. Daily Pass - Form DND 426.

GENERAL PASS

3. Form CAFIB 31 - General Pass - shall be issued only by:
 - a. the Chief of the Defence Staff, or the Director of Security acting on his behalf; or
 - b. an officer commanding a command or formation, or an officer delegated by him.
4. The General Pass may be issued to service and civilian personnel of the DND or to any other person. It may be validated for a period up to one year and will, within the authority of the issuer, authorize the holder to enter the Canadian Forces' establishments named on it.
5. The General Pass shall contain a photograph of the holder or a cross reference to an identification document which does include a photograph of the holder. It shall be the responsibility of the issuing authority to decide what constitutes an acceptable identification document.
6. Applicants for a General Pass may, at the direction of the issuing authority, be required to provide fingerprints.

TEMPORARY PASS

7. Form CAFIB 32 - Temporary Pass - shall be issued only by a Commanding Officer, or by a person delegated by him in writing.
8. The Temporary Pass may be issued to service and civilian personnel of the DND or to any other person. It may be validated for a period of up to one year and will, within

the authority of the issuer, authorize the holder to enter a particular Canadian Forces' establishment or a specified area thereof.

9. The instructions in paras 5 and 6 apply to the issue of a Temporary Pass.

DAILY PASS

10. Form DND 426 - Daily Pass - shall be issued only by a Commanding Officer, or by a person delegated by him in writing.

11. The Daily Pass may be issued to service and civilian personnel of the DND or to any other person. It may be validated for a period up to 24-hours and will authorize the holder to enter a particular Canadian Forces' establishment or a specified area thereof.

12. The Daily Pass will normally be processed through a counter style dispenser machine; the duplicate copy may be used to record the fingerprints of the holder, at the discretion of the issuing authority.

CONDITIONS OF ISSUE

13. A pass issuing authority shall not issue a pass until he has determined the right and need of the applicant to enter a Canadian Forces' establishment or specified area thereof. The pass issuing authority shall check the applicant's identity and, if access to classified matter is sought, his security clearance and "need to know".

14. Persons not subject to the Code of Service Discipline shall be issued passes subject to the conditions of the Defence Establishment Trespass Regulations.

SECURITY

15. Pass forms and completed passes, prior to issue or not in use, shall be protected in the manner prescribed for Confidential documents.

16. Issued passes shall be safeguarded by the holder and returned to the issuing authority on departure from the unit.

17. Pass forms and completed passes for transmission by mail shall be sent by registered mail only.

18. Loss of pass forms and completed passes by any means, and subsequent recovery action, shall be reported without delay to the pass issuing authority.

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SUPPLY

19. CAFIB and DND pass forms, and associated equipment, may be obtained from the Canadian Forces Identification Unit in accordance with supply instructions.

20. CAFIB and DND pass forms are basically self explanatory, however the Canadian Armed Forces Identification Unit Handbook on Identification, CFP 102, provides information on the completion and control of authorized pass forms.

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ARMING OF GUARDS, USE OF FORCE
AND METHOD OF CHALLENGINGGENERAL

1. Personnel employed as armed guards shall be properly trained in the use of weapons and challenging procedures. Before being employed as armed guards they shall be briefed in accordance with the principles contained in this annex.

FORCE

2. Force ranges from a mere threat, through various forms of physical restraint and activity, to the use of firearms.

USE OF FORCE

3. A guard may use as much force as is reasonably necessary to:
- prevent the commission of an offence against the property which he is guarding; or
 - prevent any person trespassing or to remove a trespasser; or
 - defend himself or anyone under his protection from assault.

4. A guard may be held criminally responsible for the excessive use of force.

USE OF FIREARMS

5. A guard armed with a firearm will open fire only when he believes on reasonable and probable grounds that such fire is necessary to:
- prevent death or serious injury to himself or to a person under his protection; or
 - prevent a serious offence such as murder, sabotage, or robbery.

METHOD OF CHALLENGING

6. The following procedure for challenging and replying, which has been adopted as the standard for NATO Nations, shall be used by armed guards and personnel challenged by them:

ANNEX E to
CHAPTER 50ACTION BY GUARDS

- a. "HALT" WHO IS (or GOES) THERE?"
- b. "ADVANCE (ONE) AND BE RECOGNIZED".
- c. "HALT" (When unknown has approached sufficiently for guard to recognize him or to give challenge).
- d. Challenge (if any) is given in a low tone.
- e. "ADVANCE ANOTHER ONE (or REMAINDER) AND BE RECOGNIZED". (Guard calls forward remainder one by one or as a group, as the situation or his orders demand).

ACTION BY PERSON OR GROUP CHALLENGED

- a. Halts and gives any reply which indicated the person or group is authorized to pass, e.g. "FRIEND", "ALLY", "CORPORAL OF THE GUARD", etc.
- b. Person (or group leader) advances without replying.
- c. Person halts until recognized by guard.
- d. Reply or password is given in low tone.
- e. Second unknown (or remainder of group) advances at order of guard to be recognized. Group leader, or person designated by leader must remain with guard to assist in identifying remainder of group.

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