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HOMOSEXUALITY AND CANADIAN INTERNAL SECURITY

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HOMOSEXUALITY AND CANADIAN INTERNAL SECURITYTABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Pages</u>
I. INTRODUCTION	1-3
II. HOMOSEXUAL RECRUITMENT TECHNIQUES OF THE SOVIET BLOC INTELLIGENCE SERVICES	3-7
A. The Use of Homosexuals to Talent Spot and Recruit Foreign Homosexuals	3-4
B. Methods Employed to Talent Spot Homosexuals	4-5
C. Compromise Techniques	5-7
1. Making the Acquaintance of the Target	5
2. Enticing the Target to a Compromise Location	5-6
3. Blackmail of Compromised Persons	6-7
III. THE DANGERS OF HAVING HOMOSEXUALS IN GOVERNMENT EMPLOY	7-12
A. In Classified Areas of Employment	7
B. In Non-Classified Areas of Employment	8-10
C. In Canadian Missions Within the Soviet Bloc	10-12
IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY ON HOMOSEXUALITY	12-18
A. Principles of Security Screening	12
B. Cabinet Directive No. 4	13
C. Cabinet Directive No. 24	13
D. Cabinet Directive No. 29	13
E. Proposals for a Change in Emphasis in Security Policy Where Character Weaknesses are Concerned	14-15
F. Cabinet Directive No. 35	15-16
G. Current Interdepartmental Procedures and Methods in Cases Involving Homosexuality	16-18
V. PROBLEMS PECULIAR TO INVESTIGATIONS OF HOMOSEXUALITY	18-25
VI. THE APPARENT EXTENT OF HOMOSEXUALITY IN THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT	25-28
VII. CONCLUSIONS	28

RCMP EYES ONLYAPPENDIXESTABLE OF CONTENTS

JOHN BENJAMIN CLARK WATKINS (DECEASED)

APPENDIX 1

WILLIAM JOHN VASSALL

APPENDIX 2

DAVID MOFFAT JOHNSON

APPENDIX 3

JOHN WENDELL HOLMES

APPENDIX 4

PETER GEORGE RAOUL CAMPBELL

APPENDIX 5

JEAN PHILLIPE LUPIEN

APPENDIX 6

JAMES DUNCAN ALBRIGHT

APPENDIX 7

APPENDIX 8

APPENDIX 9

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TOP SECRET

HOMOSEXUALITY AND CANADIAN INTERNAL SECURITYI. INTRODUCTION

Acting on the recommendations of the 1946 Royal Commission (Canadian) on espionage, the Canadian Government introduced a security screening program designed to deny Communists and Communist sympathizers employment involving access to classified information. So successful was this screening program that in Canada, commencing in approximately 1950, the Russian Intelligence Service (RIS), faced with loss of traditional sources of agent recruitment, i.e., the Communist Party of Canada and its auxiliaries, was forced, in its efforts to recruit agents, to place more emphasis on discovering and exploiting character weaknesses, including homosexuality, of persons in Government employ.

The fact that the Communist-bloc intelligence services (CBIS) were placing greater reliance on the exploitation of human weaknesses in order to recruit agents was confirmed by the Australian, British and United States intelligence services, each of whom had observed within their respective countries an upswing in the use of this recruitment technique. For example, the Australian Royal Commission on Espionage, in its report of 22 August 1955, noted that


while Communist conviction and sympathies appeared still to be regarded as the best basis for the development of agents, other persons were marked down for "study" because the MVD¹ believed that for some reason or other they might be susceptible to pressure or blackmail. Hence the interest of the MVD in procuring, in respect of persons thought to have access to information, particulars of their private lives and idiosyncracies, such as their drinking habits, financial positions, and sexual irregularities.

One document, furnished the Australian Commission by the defector Vladimir PETROV, former head of the MVD in Australia, was described as "a farrago of fact, falsity and filth" and contained personality reports on a great number of persons, "politicians of every colour, newspaper proprietors and journalists, businessmen, etc.", all potentially of interest as agents.

In March 1956 the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom presented to Parliament the Statement on the Findings of the Conference of Privy Councillors on Security. The Conference recognized that "today great importance must be paid to character defects as factors

¹The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), under the leadership of Lavrentiy BERIA, absorbed the Ministry of State Security (MGB) for a short period during 1953 and 1954.

tending to make a man unreliable or expose him to blackmail or influence by foreign agents."



In the United States, the problem of character weaknesses, or more particularly homosexuality, as a security risk factor in persons in Government employ, was made the subject of enquiry by two legislative committees of the United States Congress in 1950. The Hill-Wherry Special Subcommittee of the Senate District Appropriations Subcommittee, and the Senate Expenditures Subcommittee, following separate studies of the dangers inherent in allowing homosexuals and perverts to hold positions of trust with the United States Government, arrived at identical conclusions. The Committees reported that "Nazi and Communist agents have attempted to gain information from employees of the U.S. government by threatening to expose their abnormal sex activities."

Testifying before these two Committees, responsible officials of the FBI, CIA and the U.S. Department of State cited numerous examples of how hostile intelligence services exploited character weaknesses of every kind with a view to obtaining classified information. In fact, an assistant to the Director of the FBI testified that

the Communists ... have a program of seeking out the weaknesses of leaders in government and industry. The FBI has in its possession information of unquestionable reliability that orders have been issued by high Russian intelligence officials to their agents to secure details of the private lives of government officials, their weaknesses, their associates ... hoping to find a weakness upon which to capitalize at the appropriate time.

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[REDACTED]

More recently, Laszlo SZABO, who defected to the West in 1965 after serving twenty years in the Hungarian Intelligence Service (HIS), testified before the CIA Subcommittee of the House of Representatives that Soviet training given to HIS officers dealt with the recruitment of foreign diplomats. SZABO stated that


the Soviets gave examples of blackmailing diplomats with photographs of their intimate relations with women and with homosexuals. They [the RIS] use any technique: blackmail, threats against relatives, money, anything that will work.

II. HOMOSEXUAL RECRUITMENT TECHNIQUES OF
THE SOVIET BLOC INTELLIGENCE SERVICES

A. The Use of Homosexuals to Talent Spot
and Recruit Foreign Homosexuals

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
¹See APPENDIX 3



The practice of utilizing homosexuals as agents or co-opted members, rather than employing them as intelligence staff officers, appears to be followed by the other Communist-bloc intelligence services. It is not known if these services have special sections devoted to the recruitment of foreign homosexuals; however, it is known that they conduct widespread activity (see pages 10 to 12) in this area of agent recruitment.

B. Methods Employed to
Talent Spot Homosexuals

The primary and most successful way of talent-spotting foreign homosexuals is, of course, through the use of native or foreign homosexuals already recruited as agents. The innate ability of one homosexual to recognize another, even though they may have never met before, is well documented. Added to this is the tendency, also generally acknowledged, of homosexuals to seek out persons of similar disposition.



In addition to the type of homosexual talent-spotting already outlined, the Communist-bloc intelligence services (CBIS) are known to subject foreign visitors and residents, particularly members of non-Communist missions, to intensive investigation and observation.

¹For details on the methods of investigation and observation see pages 11 to 14.

The purpose of such detailed study is to discover any signs of character weakness which might be successfully exploited.

C. Compromise Techniques

From the experiences of Canadians who have been homosexually compromised while in the Communist bloc, from defectors (some of whom have actually participated in homosexual compromise operations), and from information furnished by friendly intelligence agencies, we have obtained considerable insight into CBIS compromise techniques. While CBIS compromise operations will vary depending upon the circumstances and individuals involved, the techniques employed appear to follow a fairly set pattern which consists of:

1. Making the Acquaintance of the Target

This is most often done by arranging apparently "casual" meetings between the homosexual agent and his target, e.g.,

- (a) arranging for the seat next to the foreign resident or visitor either in a theatre¹ or perhaps on a sightseeing bus to be left vacant and sending the agent to sit next to his target;
- (b) keeping the target under surveillance and, when he was seen to settle in a bar² or cafe, bringing the agent on the scene; and
- (c) keeping the target under surveillance and (providing the agent had already met the target on one occasion) dropping the agent at a suitable spot so that on walking along the street he would meet the target "accidentally".

2. Enticing the Target to a Compromise Location

The acquaintance of the target having been made, the agent's next task is to entice his target to a location already

¹The Canadian, [REDACTED] dealt with in APPENDIX 1, was first approached while seated in a Soviet theatre.

²The Canadian, [REDACTED], dealt with in APPENDIX 2, was approached in a bar.

prepared for clandestine photography and to indulge in homosexual activity under conditions suitable for such photography.

In some cases the agent is an active partner in the compromise operation. In others, however, where he is not suitable as a partner, the agent is used to introduce the target to another partner.

The prepared compromise locations utilized by the CBIS are many and varied. Hotel rooms, apartments, cottages, turkish baths and public baths¹ (with cubicles especially prepared for clandestine photography) are all known to be used for staging compromise operations.

3. Blackmail of Compromised Persons

Once a successful compromise operation has been carried out, usually by obtaining photographic evidence, an approach is made to the victim in order to attempt to recruit him as an agent. The approach is usually styled according to the particular circumstances or individual involved. Some examples of CBIS follow-up methods are as follows:

- (1) The victim is shown the photographic evidence of his homosexual activity² and threatened with exposure to his superiors, friends and family.
- (2) If photographic evidence is not available, possibly due to the fact that the photography was unsuccessful, the victim is told that such photographs are in CBIS possession and could be shown to the victim's superiors.³
- (3) The victim is pressed to sign a confession or acknowledgement of homosexual activity and then threatened with either exposure or, where applicable, prosecution.

¹The Canadian, [REDACTED], was homosexually compromised in the Charles St. Public Baths in Prague and later in a Prague apartment. See APPENDIX 2.

²This happened in the case of [REDACTED] a Canadian homosexually compromised while in Moscow. See APPENDIX 1.

³This is believed to have happened in the [REDACTED] case.

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- (4) The victim is told either by his homosexual partner or by some other person that he (the partner) is being blackmailed. The victim is asked for money to pay the blackmailer. Intelligence officers, posing as criminal police, then inform the victim that they have caught the blackmailer and ask the victim for a statement to assist the prosecution. Once the statement is given, the intelligence officers reveal their true identity and exploit the victim.
- (5) The victim is approached by an intelligence officer posing as a friend who will suppress rumours and destroy the evidence of the victim's homosexuality in return for "friendship" assistance.¹

The use of such compromise techniques followed by blackmail and attempted recruitment is forcefully illustrated in APPENDIXES 1 and 3, which deal with two former Canadian Government employees who were homosexually compromised while serving in the Soviet bloc, and in APPENDIX 4, which outlines the homosexual compromise and successful recruitment by the RIS of William John VASSAL, the British naval clerk who was subsequently sentenced to twenty years imprisonment for espionage.

III. THE DANGERS OF HAVING HOMOSEXUALS IN GOVERNMENT EMPLOY

Although there are divergent views on the degree of risk involved, it is generally accepted that homosexuals within the Government service are a security risk because of their potential for compromise, blackmail and recruitment by a foreign intelligence service.

A. In Classified Areas of Employment

The security risk involved in the employment of a homosexual by the Government is, of course, most acute when the homosexual is working on duties which provide him with direct access to classified information or when the homosexual occupies a position of sufficient importance as to enable him to influence Government policy.²

¹This offer was made to the Canadian J.B.C. WATKINS. See APPENDIX 3.

²See APPENDIX 3 for Canadian example.

B. In Non-Classified Areas of Employment

The homosexual employed in a non-classified area of Government constitutes less of a security threat but still poses a security problem because

- (1) he may in the normal course of advancement be required to have access to classified information;
- (2) he may, through homosexual liaison with a person employed in a classified area, gain indirect access to classified information (this could also apply to homosexuals who are employed outside the Public Service); or
- (3) if recruited by a hostile intelligence service, he can talent spot other potential homosexual agents. (This of course also applies to homosexuals recruited from classified areas of employment and from outside the Public Service).

In addition to the obvious security risks involved in the employing of homosexuals within the Government service, there are certain facets of homosexual behavior which, because they tend to enlarge and intensify the security problem, deserve consideration in any assessment of the homosexual problem as it relates to Government employment. These facets are:

- (1) An established homosexual relationship involves emotions as strong as the normal love relationship between a man and a woman.

For example, a Western official serving in a Satellite country entered into a homosexual relationship with his driver, a native of the Satellite country. So strong were the ties between the two homosexuals that the official used his influence to obtain an exit visa for the driver and brought him back to the official's home country in order to continue their homosexual relationship. The degree of control possibly exercised over the driver and the official by the intelligence service of the Satellite country had not yet been determined when the situation "blew up" and the driver returned to his native country.

- (2) The bonds and loyalties which exist between homosexuals make them seek out, congregate with, and support others of the same type.

Testifying at a Senate Enquiry in 1950, the Director of the CIA stated that because of their propensity to support each other perverts in key positions lead to the concept of a government within a government. That is so noteworthy.

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TOP SECRET

One pervert brings other perverts. They belong to the lodge, the fraternity. One pervert brings other perverts into an agency, they move from position to position and advance them usually in the interest of furthering the romance of the moment.¹

Although there is no evidence of any "government within a government" on the part of homosexuals employed in Canadian Government departments and agencies, there have been a number of cases where known or suspected homosexuals have reportedly assisted in obtaining employment, within their particular department, for other homosexuals.

For example, [REDACTED] a suspected homosexual, employed as a duplicating equipment operator with the Department of Public Works is reported to have arranged for a homosexual acquaintance, [REDACTED] to be employed² with that department. In another case [REDACTED], a self-admitted homosexual, employed with the Department of the Secretary of State, has reported that he assisted another known homosexual in obtaining employment with that department.

- (3) Homosexuals belong to a fraternity which knows no bounds in relation to employment,³ social status, or geographic location.

For example, a security guard⁴ can be the homosexual partner of a Member of Parliament or highly placed civil servant. Again, homosexuals who occupy prestigious positions both economically and socially will, after office hours, often engage in the homosexual practice of "cruising", i.e., looking for a "pick-up", and as a result of this exercise engage in homosexual relations with persons from

¹An official of the U.S. Department of State testified that in 1951 and 1952 his Department "had released one employee on the average of every three days as a social defect."

²On the date [REDACTED] was reportedly going to start work with DPW he was arrested for Violation of Parole.


³Walter JENKINS, a prominent presidential aide in the United States, was arrested on a morals (homosexual) charge at the YMCA in Washington on 7 October 1964. JENKINS had previously been given top security clearance by the CIA, without any field investigation being carried out, because the CIA has no authority to demand an investigation of presidential staff members.

⁴See APPENDIX 9.

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all walks of life and of every circumstance.¹ Finally, the universality of homosexuality enables homosexuals to travel outside their own city, province or even country and yet often have prior knowledge of, and establish contact with, homosexuals in other areas.²


C. In Canadian Missions
Within the Soviet Bloc



¹See APPENDIXES 3 and 5.

²See APPENDIXES 4, 5 and 8.

TOP SECRET



In this context, marked features of recruitment attempts made by CBIS personnel, particularly those directed against diplomats, are their patience over a long period of time in seeking the right method and best opportunity for compromise and also the amount of effort they will expend on what they consider to be a worthwhile target.¹

Local employees of the non-Communist Missions, who are either agents or co-opted workers of their national intelligence service, are used to gain insight into the character and habits of Mission personnel.

Agents, selected according to personal qualifications which give them a natural rapport with the specific target, e.g., sharing the same language, profession, hobby or interest, are specifically detailed to cultivate the person selected for possible recruitment.

Technical operations which can provide essential information on the target's behavior, friends and personality may also be mounted against the specific target, through eavesdropping devices or telephone taps planted on the Mission premises or in his private residence. These technical operations can be, of course, greatly expanded upon when a target is travelling or temporarily residing outside of the Mission premises. When this occurs the techniques employed may include, in especially prepared hotels, such things as closed circuit television, two-way mirrors and visual observation posts.

¹This is clearly demonstrated in the case of the Canadian diplomat, J.B.C. WATKINS. See APPENDIX 3.

Female members of non-Communist Missions, even those employed in minor clerical positions, are also made the target of homosexual compromise by the CBIS. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

This case clearly demonstrates the trouble the CBIS will go to in order to compromise and possibly recruit Western homosexuals.

IV. GOVERNMENT POLICY ON HOMOSEXUALITY

A. Principles of Security Screening

The principles of security screening, or vetting as it was originally called, were set out in a 12 December 1946 memorandum to the Cabinet Defence Committee by the Security Panel. Vetting was described as "the process of enquiring into the antecedents of applicants for Government employment to determine their suitability from a security point of view". Consideration was given to the advisability of drawing up a list of criteria by which "suitability from a security point of view" might be determined, but the opinion was held that any decision affecting an applicant or employee must permit the exercise of judgement based on the circumstances of each individual case. The best criterion devised and generally accepted is that when "after a careful examination of all the available information pertinent to both loyalty and character provided by an approved investigating agency in the form of an evaluated, factual report, a continuing doubt of loyalty or reliability remains in the mind of a reasonable man and when national security is involved, that doubt must be resolved in favour of the state". The principles of security screening, after Cabinet approval on 16 January 1947, were incorporated into Cabinet Directive No. 4 issued on 4 March 1948.

¹It is not known if the female Western official was recruited as a result of her being homosexually compromised.

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B. Cabinet Directive No. 4

Although Cabinet Directive No. 4 provided for the investigation of both the loyalty and the character of Canadian Government employees and prospective employees, it was clear that, at that time (1948) under the direct influence of the Royal Commission (Canadian) on espionage of 1946, the primary objective of the screening program was to bar known or suspected Communists from employment in sensitive areas of Government. Thus, adverse information in relation to an employee's or prospective employee's character appears to have been considered of secondary importance to information reflecting any disloyalty.

C. Cabinet Directive No. 24

As already pointed out,¹ commencing in approximately 1950 the Soviet and Satellite intelligence services began to place more emphasis upon the recruitment of agents through the exploitation of character weaknesses. This change in emphasis from ideological recruitment to recruitment on the basis of character weakness was taken into account by the Canadian Government when, on 19 September 1952, they issued Cabinet Directive No. 24 which specifically stated:

Persons who are unreliable from a security standpoint, not because they are disloyal, but because of defects in their character which may lead to indiscretion or dishonesty, or make them likely subjects of blackmail, must not be employed in any position where they may have access to classified information.

D. Cabinet Directive No. 29

On 21 December 1955 Cabinet Directive No. 29 replaced Cabinet Directive No. 24. In regard to character weaknesses the new Directive stated:

It also remains an essential of Canadian security policy that persons who are unreliable from a security standpoint not because they are disloyal, but because of defects in their character which may lead to indiscretion or dishonesty, or may make them likely subjects of blackmail, must not be employed in any position where they may have access to classified information. Such defects of character may also make them unsuitable for employment on grounds other than security.

¹See pages 1 to 3 inclusive.

E. Proposals for a Change in Emphasis
in Security Policy Where Character
Weaknesses are Concerned

By 1958 the steady increase in the number of security cases involving character weaknesses presented for the consideration of the Security Panel, coupled with the insight gained by the RCMP into CBIS homosexual recruitment operations, led to a growing awareness and concern, on the part of the Government, over the peculiar security problem posed by homosexuals in Government employ. On 2 July 1958 the Secretary of the Security Sub-Panel advised its members that "in dealing with a recent difficult security case which involved a character weakness, the Prime Minister expressed the wish that this aspect of the security problem should be re-examined." The Sub-Panel memorandum continued by stating:

The general practice has been to treat character defects, from a security point of view, in much the same way as subversive tendencies, associations or activities. Although there are valid reasons for arguing that persons with character weaknesses may be indiscreet or dishonest or susceptible to blackmail, it appears that it may now be possible to make some distinction between the kinds of weaknesses which could affect the reliability of an employee, and to modify the existing policy accordingly.

It cannot reasonably be suggested that there is no security risk involved where character weaknesses are concerned; but it does seem that the evidence at hand would warrant the consideration of an alternate way of guarding against it which would be more sympathetic, frank and effective. For example, where there is evidence of character weakness, an employee, or prospective employee, might be taken, at least partially, into the confidence of the employing government department or agency. It might be indicated to him with the greatest possible tact that he might be made the object of blackmail, and emphasize the duty to report any such approach with the assurance that he will receive the full cooperation of his employer and the security authorities.

There is no doubt that a policy such as this would raise many problems, particularly the protection of sources of security information. It is suggested, however, that the nature of the information, and the sources of it, in cases involving character weaknesses, are not of the same degree of sensitivity as is the case where subversive activities or associations are concerned. If this is so, and since any statement made to the employee would be in the most general and tactful terms, then the danger of exposing delicate sources could be minimized. At the same time, the employing department would be in a much better position to assess any possible threat, as well as to withstand the criticisms of evasiveness and deception.

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TOP SECRET

If a policy along these lines could be evolved, it is suggested that the end result - the protection of classified information and the security of the state - could be achieved at least as effectively as at present, and that there would be in addition desirable gains. These would include a reduction of the area in which government security policy is open to uninformed and unfair criticism by the public and, most important, a greater measure of fairness in the treatment of individuals whose loyalty is not in question.

In considering any change in emphasis which may be made in the present security policy where character weaknesses are concerned, the Sub-Panel may also wish to consider a re-wording of the present Cabinet Directive on security which might be recommended to Cabinet after consideration and approval by the Security Panel. The effective research and analysis of our experience in the character aspect of security operations may be initiated, in order that security officials may be better informed in dealing with these complex problems involving freedoms and emotions.

As a result of this request by the Prime Minister, a submission, SP 199 dated 12 May 1959, outlining the problems¹ of security cases involving homosexuality, was presented for the consideration of the Security Panel meeting of 6 October 1959. After studying the problem the Panel directed its Chairman to inform the Cabinet that the Security Panel "could not recommend any change in existing security policy on this matter as set out in Cabinet Directive No. 29".

F. Cabinet Directive No. 35²

On 24 October 1963 the Cabinet approved Cabinet Directive No. 35. The most important modifications in the new Directive involved an attitude of much greater frankness with employees whose reliability or loyalty was in doubt, and provided related procedures for reviewing such cases both within the responsible department or agency and if necessary by a Board of Review composed of members of the Security Panel.

The Directive required that, in addition to ensuring the security of classified information for which each is responsible, departments and agencies had

- (1) to inform applicants and employees of the reasons for security investigations, and of the dangers to themselves and to national security in their attempting to conceal relevant information about themselves;

¹The problems are outlined on pages 18 to 25.

²The Procedures and Methods adopted by CD 35 are dealt with on pages 16 to 18.

- (2) to tell an employee about whom doubt has arisen on security grounds of the reasons for that doubt, insofar as is possible without endangering important sources of security information, and to give him an opportunity to resolve the doubt;
- (3) if the doubt cannot be resolved, to attempt usefully to place the employee in a less sensitive position in the department or elsewhere in the public service;
- (4) if dismissal appears to be the only prudent recourse, to have the case reviewed and the employee interviewed by the deputy minister, to give him a further opportunity to resolve the doubt that has been raised about him; and
- (5) to seek the advice of a Board of Review before a recommendation for dismissal is made to the Minister responsible.

In regard to character weaknesses, although the definition of the types of character weaknesses remained the same as in CD 29, the new Directive provided that the

persons described [those having a character weakness] may not be permitted to have access to classified information, unless after careful consideration of the circumstances, including the value of their services, it is judged that the risk involved appears to be justified.

From this extract it can be seen that the new Directive tends to treat persons with character weaknesses in a different way than persons posing a threat because of their subversive tendencies.

G. Current Interdepartmental Procedures and Methods in Cases Involving Homosexuality

Cabinet Directive No. 35 under the sub-heading of Procedure states:

The functions of an investigative agency (in this case the RCMP) are to conduct promptly and efficiently such investigations as are requested by departments or agencies to assist them in determining the loyalty and reliability of the subject of investigation; and to inform departments and agencies of the results of their investigations in the form of factual reports in which sources have been carefully evaluated as to the reliability of the information they have provided.

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On the basis of these reports and such other pertinent information ... the employing department or agency will arrive at a considered judgement of the person's loyalty and reliability ...

Under the section entitled Methods, the following screening procedures are set out in regard to employment involving access to classified information:

(1) Persons to have access to Top Secret information

Before a person is employed in a position requiring access to Top Secret information he must be the subject of an investigation in the field by an appropriate investigative agency, his name must be checked against the subversive records¹ of the RCM Police, and he must be the subject of a fingerprint check by the RCM Police. These procedures are mandatory.

(2) Persons to have access to Secret information

Before a person is employed in a position requiring access to Secret information his name must be checked against the subversive records of the RCM Police, and he must be the subject of a fingerprint check by the RCM Police. Both these procedures are mandatory. (The deputy head of a department or agency is further authorized to request, if necessary, that a field investigation be also conducted.)

(3) Persons to have access to Confidential information

Before a person is employed in a position requiring access to Confidential information, his name must be checked against the subversive records of the RCM Police, and he must be the subject of a fingerprint check by the RCM Police. Both of these procedures are mandatory.

(4) Responsibility for granting clearances

The deputy head of a department or agency will be responsible for granting or withholding a security clearance

¹The requirement for a check of RCMP subversive records in the case of persons who are to have access to Top Secret, Secret and Confidential information points up the need for the effective maintenance and extension of the RCMP's subversive and character weaknesses indices.

and will assume a continuing responsibility for a person's access to Top Secret, Secret and Confidential information.

Where a person is already employed in the Public Service, and a doubt has been raised as to his suitability to have access to classified information, CD 35 requires that "the security officer of the department or agency must take such action as is necessary to preserve security".

In line with these requirements, when a person makes application or is being considered for a position within a sensitive¹ department which requires that he have access to classified information, the employing department usually forwards a completed Personal History Form (PHF) to the RCMP together with a request for either a records check or a records check supplemented by a field investigation, depending upon the degree of security clearance required. In these cases, if subversive or adverse character information is recorded in the RCMP indices or uncovered through the field investigation a brief of the information is automatically sent to the employing department.

With respect to persons employed in non-sensitive² Government departments, which nevertheless in some cases permits them access to classified information,³ when the RCMP learn that a person on whom they have subversive or adverse character information is employed by one of these departments, the department concerned is asked whether or not the employee occupies a position which permits access to classified information. Should this be the case a brief of the adverse material is sent to the employing department; if not, the information is retained in RCMP subversive records.⁴

V. PROBLEMS PECULIAR TO INVESTIGATIONS
OF HOMOSEXUALITY

As previously mentioned (see page 14), growing Government concern with the security problem posed by homosexuals in Government

¹Sensitive departments are listed on page 27.

²Non-sensitive departments are listed on page 27.

³This applies, for example to some employees of the National Research Council or of the office of the Secretary of State.

⁴The problem of whether or not the RCMP should provide information indicating homosexuality on the part of a person employed in a non-sensitive Government department is fully discussed in the next section.

employ and the increase in RCMP knowledge of CBIS homosexual recruitment operations caused the RCMP, in 1958, to intensify its efforts to identify homosexuals employed on duties which required them to have access to classified information, with a view to reducing the possibilities of the CBIS compromising and recruiting such persons.

As the investigation progressed, over the next two years, it became apparent that

- (1) normal security screening procedures were inadequate for this particular type of investigation. This was evident because a large number of the homosexuals first identified had previously been subjected to a most thorough investigation without any trace of homosexuality being uncovered.
- (2) if the overall investigation was to be successful, it could not be limited only to incumbents of classified positions. This conclusion was reached because it was found that in order to accumulate all the available information on cases which had a direct bearing on the national security it would be necessary to investigate and interview homosexuals in non-classified positions and even outside the Public Service, as well as those whose security status was directly concerned. It was also considered that the investigation had to be expanded because of the necessity of developing information and building up indices on homosexuals employed in non-classified areas of the Public Service, on the grounds that they could at some future date be eligible for transfer or promotion to a classified area. Another possibility which had to be considered was the fact that the CBIS could conceivably use homosexuals in non-classified areas of Government or outside the Public Service to identify and perhaps otherwise assist in the compromising of persons employed on classified work.
- (3) existing security screening policy (at that time contained in Cabinet Directive No. 29 and now in Cabinet Directive No. 35) has not taken into consideration the type of investigation that homosexuality demands and, therefore, is too restrictive in nature to permit successful investigation of homosexuality in the Public Service. This was because, although the development of information relating to a serious character weakness "on the part of a Government employee whose duties provide access to classified information" is authorized by the terms of reference for security screening established by the Security Panel, Cabinet Directive No. 29 and now No. 35

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TOP SECRET

were interpreted to preclude the RCMP from interviewing homosexuals in non-classified Government positions.

- (4) homosexuals themselves are the most productive and in most cases the only sources of information. The investigation of homosexuality usually develops out of the opinions or knowledge expressed by the homosexual friends or acquaintances of the person concerned. Persons who are not homosexuals but who are close to the subject of the enquiry invariably have no knowledge of the subject's character weakness. It follows, therefore, that the co-operation of homosexuals and their protection as sources of information are essential to the success of the investigation.

With problem (2) particularly in mind and, in order for the investigations to proceed more satisfactorily, Ministerial authority was obtained, in March 1960, for the RCMP to proceed with investigations in both sensitive and non-sensitive departments and agencies. However, with the expansion of the homosexual investigative program two other questions arose; these were:

- (1) Should the RCMP provide the department concerned with information on a homosexual who is not employed on duties providing access to classified information? (The RCMP felt that it could not, without a specific Government directive, withhold this type of information.)
- (2) When should the particular department concerned be provided with assessed information relating to the homosexuality of any one of its employees? (The main difficulty here was the conflict between the RCMP's desire not to withhold pertinent security information from departments, and a department's desire to take action concerning the employee, which could jeopardize RCMP sources and hinder future RCMP investigations.)

On 19 May 1960 the RCMP submitted a paper to the Secretary of the Cabinet on "Homosexuality Within the Government Service". This paper outlined the problems involved in the investigation of homosexuality within the Public Service and suggested that these problems be discussed with a small Committee made up of members of the Security Panel "for the purpose of developing a separate policy for this kind of case than that now in effect for the usual security matter with which we have been faced in the past". The RCMP views, as expressed in the paper, were as follows:

- (1) We feel that the existing policy restrictions, particularly as implied in Cabinet Directive No. 29

.. /21

and attachment thereto, which prohibit our interviewing homosexuals [i.e., employed in non-sensitive position] should be set aside for this type of investigation and that the necessary provision be made for us to interview at our discretion any person who we may consider to be of assistance to our enquiry.

- (2) We also believe that the decision as to when any department should be provided with assessed information relating to the homosexuality of any one of its employees should be left to our discretion.
- (3) If the proposal in (2) is not acceptable we would suggest that the good offices of the Secretary of the Security Panel be sought to ensure that departments do not take any action against homosexuals who have assisted us which might prove detrimental to our general investigation.
- (4) We would also appreciate clarification on whether or not we should provide the department concerned with information on a homosexual who is not employed on duties having access to classified material.

As a result of the RCMP's request a meeting of a special group of the Security Panel was held on 20 and 29 September 1960. At this meeting the RCMP Commissioner, C.W. HARVISON, stated that

- (1) it would not be possible to limit RCMP investigations and interviews to persons in vulnerable positions within the Public Service, since, in order to accumulate all the available information on cases which had a direct bearing on the national security, it would be necessary to investigate and occasionally interview persons outside the Public Service; and
- (2) the RCMP, without a specific directive from the Government, could not be asked to withhold information indicating homosexuality on the part of employees in non-vulnerable positions.

Commissioner HARVISON also suggested the setting up of a body of experts to consider the feasibility of devising tests which would assist in the selection of persons to be appointed to vulnerable positions.¹

¹This suggestion has been implemented and the necessary research is now underway. See pages 23 to 25.

TOP SECRET

After discussions the Committee concluded¹

- (a) that our investigations of homosexuality should not be indiscriminate, but should be limited to those persons who were vulnerable to effective exploitation by foreign intelligence services, except in cases where further investigation was necessary to establish the validity of information concerning employees in vulnerable positions;
- (b) that there did not appear to be a security objection to informing persons whose security status was being questioned on grounds of homosexuality that the enquiry was related to security;
- (c) that most careful consideration should be given in each case to the nature and timing of informing departments whose employees were involved, and to assessing the validity and significance of the information, in view of the possible effect on the employee and on the service;
- (d) that the government be asked to give the RCM Police a clear directive to the effect that, where security was not a factor, the RCM Police were not required to report allegations of homosexuality to the employing department; and
- (e) that, in cases where continued investigation was essential to establish the validity of allegations, but where it was also necessary to inform the department concerned, the Secretary of the Security Panel might ask the department to withhold action until the investigation was completed.

In a follow-up comment on these conclusions, the RCMP Commissioner, on 27 October 1960, advised the Secretary to the Cabinet as follows:

I feel that it should be made quite clear that our present policy of sending to the appropriate Department information relating to character weaknesses on persons employed in sensitive positions, whether it is conclusive or inconclusive, be maintained.

¹Pending the possible issuance of further Government directives in this regard, the Committee's conclusions form the basis of the present policy followed by the RCMP with respect to investigations of homosexuality.

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With reference to conclusion (d) the Commissioner warned that should it be approved

... problems are likely to arise at a later date. The Department concerned may be embarrassed when a person with the character weakness referred to is promoted to a more substantial position in the Department, whether security is involved or not; but more particularly if security is a factor, and the weakness does not become known until there is a security check through the RCMP.

On 20 December 1960, in reply to an enquiry as to what progress had been made in following up the suggestions made by the Special Committee of the Security Panel, the RCMP was advised that initial steps had been taken to set up an effective research program into the homosexual problem, that

a report has been prepared as a basis for discussion with the Prime Minister and the Minister of Justice [and that] arrangements will shortly be made for our committee to meet with the Prime Minister and Mr. FULTON with a view to making necessary modifications in existing policy and procedures.

The report referred to (outlining the problem encountered in security cases involving homosexuality and the recommendation made by the Special Committee) was presented to the Prime Minister and the Minister of Justice on 2 February 1961. However, no meeting was held and no new terms of reference for RCMP investigations into homosexuality in the Public Service were drawn up.

In October 1962, the RCMP reiterated its homosexual investigative problems to the Minister of Justice pointing out that the RCMP was still awaiting Cabinet approval of adequate terms of reference for this type of investigation. Again, on 10 April 1963, the Secretary of the Security Panel was informed by the RCMP that

to continue our investigation to identify homosexuals employed on classified work, with any measure of success, we require authority to interview homosexuals employed in non-sensitive positions. It is requested that the Security Panel give further consideration to this submission at the earliest possible date.

In conclusion, RCMP efforts, first started in May 1960, to obtain Cabinet approval of adequate terms of reference under which successful investigation of homosexuality in the Public Service could be conducted have so far met with no success.

On the positive side, however, a medical research program under Government sponsorship has been initiated with a view to assisting in the detection of homosexuals. Although the first formal

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TOP SECRET

proposal for an effective medical research program into the problem of the homosexual and national security was made by Commissioner C.W. HARVISON at the Security Panel meeting of 20 September 1960, a preliminary study in this connection was made, at the request of the Privy Council Office, by Dr. F.R. WAKE, a psychologist at Carleton University.

Dr. WAKE's interim report, which was tabled at the Security Panel Meeting on 24 June 1960, recommended

- (a) that a fully considered research program be instituted in order to develop suitable methods of selecting personnel for sensitive positions; and
- (b) that the departments concerned institute a program of training aimed at developing the fullest awareness, on the part of the employees concerned, of all aspects of this threat.

Following Dr. WAKE's interim report and Commissioner C.W. HARVISON's proposal, four doctors were considered for appointment to an "advisory Cabinet committee" on homosexuality and security.¹ The doctors were F.R. WAKE, J.P.S. CATHCART, R. CHALKE and R.G. RATZ¹.

Subsequently Dr. WAKE and Mr. Don WALL of the Privy Council Office visited the United States in order to learn from the experience of the FBI, CIA and the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) in dealing with the homosexual problem. In addition, Dr. WAKE took a one-year sabbatical leave from Carleton University in order to study problems of sex deviates in the United States.

After Dr. WAKE's and Mr. WALL's return from the United States they obtained RCMP co-operation in order to continue their research in Ottawa. The RCMP agreed to provide Dr. WAKE with access to selected homosexual files, tapes of interviews with homosexuals and the general background knowledge on homosexuals which had been gained by RCMP investigators.

On 19 December 1962 the RCMP received a copy of Dr. WAKE's first report to the Privy Council. This report, although providing valuable insight into the probable scope of the homosexual problem in Canada, dealt primarily with methods of detecting homosexuality and suggested the need for more research "until a measure or measures of some efficiency had been designed".

¹It is not known if all four were in fact appointed; however, Doctors WAKE and CHALKE are active in the current research program.

TOP SECRET

As a first step toward additional research, Dr. WAKE wished to conduct an experiment involving fifteen normal males; fifteen normal females; fifteen homosexual males and fifteen homosexual females, with all of the subjects to be supplied by the RCMP. The RCMP, although anxious to assist Dr. WAKE, could not meet his request in its entirety because the Force lacked sufficient contacts among female homosexuals and because it was felt that, in the matter of the normal males and females, the Security Panel should obtain co-operation from all Government departments. However, in 1963, the RCMP did solicit the co-operation of a number of known male homosexuals for Dr. WAKE's experiment and also provided technicians from its Identification Branch to construct a testing apparatus.

The research program is continuing but it would appear that it is still too early for Dr. WAKE to be able to draw firm conclusions or make specific recommendations.

VI. THE APPARENT EXTENT OF HOMOSEXUALITY
IN THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT

It was not until 1960, approximately two years after the commencement of RCMP investigations of homosexuality within the Federal Government, that statistical information giving some idea as to the number of homosexuals in Federal Government employ and the number of homosexuals involved in the overall investigation became available.

Early investigations, which were largely concentrated in the Ottawa area and further limited because of selectivity, provided the RCMP with a figure, in May 1960, of approximately 700 known¹ or suspected² homosexuals who had come to notice in the overall investigation. Of this number, 300 resided in the Ottawa area and 363 were or had been employed with the Federal Government.

From the manner in which the early investigations were proceeding, with each new source revealing additional suspects, it was clear that only a portion of the total number of homosexuals in the Public Service and of those homosexuals likely to be involved in the overall investigation had been uncovered. One source, a self-confessed homosexual residing in Ottawa, reported that there

¹A known homosexual is one who has been interviewed and has admitted his character weakness or has been convicted in court of a homosexual offence.

²A suspected homosexual is one who has been named by a reliable source or sources (usually another homosexual) as a homosexual or who is believed (usually because of his associates, mannerisms, dress or habits) to be a homosexual.

were at least 3,000¹ homosexuals in the Ottawa area alone. Although we had no way of confirming this estimate, in the light of the rapid growth of our investigation it appeared entirely possible that this figure was a reasonable estimate at that time.

Five months after the original figure of 700 homosexuals had been calculated, the overall total of persons who had come to RCMP notice in connection with this investigation increased to 870 and those who had been or were in the Government from 363 to 446.

As of 1 May 1967 the RCMP's indices of homosexuals contained approximately 8,500 adverse traces on known or suspected homosexuals, largely concentrated in the metropolitan areas of Canada, who had come to notice in connection with the investigation into homosexuality within the Canadian Government. Of this 8,500, approximately 1,585 had been employed, at one time or another during the period from 1959 to 1967,² by the Federal Government. Of the 1,585, approximately 1,140 had been working in sensitive departments and 445 in non-sensitive departments.³

During this same period of time, i.e., from 1959 to 1967, the RCMP forwarded, to the particular departments concerned, 339 briefs⁴ on known or suspected homosexuals employed in sensitive departments.

¹In an article published in the Ottawa Citizen of 2 June 1965, Garfield D. NICHOL, Secretary of Canadian Council on Religion and the Homosexual, estimated Ottawa's homosexual population at 4,500.

²We have no way of providing exact figures on the number of known or suspected homosexuals employed in Government at any specific point in time, because sensitive departments and agencies are not required to inform the RCMP of action taken in security screening cases which only involve character weakness. Again, we have no way of keeping track of homosexuals employed in non-sensitive departments.

³The obvious numerical superiority, i.e., 1,140 as opposed to 445, of homosexuals in sensitive departments over those in non-sensitive departments is a reflection of the fact that RCMP investigations were concentrated in the sensitive areas. The figures in respect to non-sensitive areas would undoubtedly rise much higher were the full force of the investigation to be directed toward that area.

⁴This figure is based on one person - one brief. It should be appreciated, however, that more than one brief is often sent either because the person has changed departments or because more information has become available.

.. /27

The breakdown of this 339 is as follows:

<u>Sensitive Departments & Agencies</u>	<u>No. of Briefs</u>
Department of National Defence	145
Department of External Affairs	85
Department of Defence Production	41
Royal Canadian Mounted Police	20
Department of Transport	18
National Research Council (Communications)	13
Defence Research Board	8
Privy Council Office	6
Atomic Energy of Canada	3
	<u>339</u>

In addition to these 339 briefs, the Department of National Defence provided the RCMP with the identities and particulars of approximately 300¹ other known or suspected homosexuals who were or had been employed by that Department.

Of the remaining approximately 500 persons who had come to RCMP attention as having been employed in sensitive departments, many left their positions voluntarily during the period of investigation while others were only identified as homosexuals after they had already left their jobs and, therefore, in neither case was a brief to the particular department necessary.

With respect to the approximate 445 known or suspected homosexuals who had been employed during the period from 1959 to 1967 in non-sensitive departments, the RCMP forwarded sixty-five briefs to the departments concerned. The breakdown of this sixty-five is as follows:

<u>Non-Sensitive Departments & Agencies</u>	<u>No. of Briefs</u>
Civil Service Commission	22
Energy, Mines and Resources	8
Trade and Commerce	8
Secretary of State	5
National Research Council	3
National Health and Welfare	3
National Film Board	2
Department of Finance	2
Department of Justice	2
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation	2
Air Transport Board	1
National Revenue	1

¹Of this 300 some had been or were included in the 145 RCMP briefs forwarded to DND.

TOP SECRET

External Aid	1
Public Works	1
Immigration	1
Post Office	1
Canadian Corps of Commissionnaires	1
Public Printing and Stationery	1
	<u>65</u>

The discrepancy between the numbers who had been employed and the number of briefs sent to the departments is because, like their confreres in the sensitive departments, many of the homosexuals left their jobs during the investigation, others were not identified until after they had quit the department and, in the case of the non-sensitive departments, briefs were only sent when the RCMP had information indicating that the particular homosexual, although in a non-sensitive department, nevertheless might have access to classified information, e.g., a translator in the Department of the Secretary of State.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

The RCMP is in possession of irrefutable evidence that the Communist-bloc intelligence services (CBIS) are engaged in the talent-spotting, compromising and recruiting of foreign homosexuals who preferably, but not necessarily, occupy sensitive or influential positions within their respective governments.

Canadian homosexuals, serving in Bloc countries, have been talent-spotted and compromised by the CBIS, leading in at least one case (reference APPENDIX 3) to what was undoubtedly successful manipulation by the intelligence service in question.

Although the degree of security risk involved in the employment of homosexuals in sensitive and non-sensitive departments of the Canadian Government is open to question, it cannot reasonably be suggested that there is no such security risk.

As the national security service of Canada the RCMP has a dual responsibility in relation to CBIS operations against Canadian homosexuals. First, under the Government's security screening program it is responsible for providing to the Government, upon request, information relating to the loyalty and reliability of present or prospective Government employees. Second, it is responsible for the countering of espionage operations directed against Canada.

In the problem field of homosexuality and Canadian internal security, the RCMP, in order to discharge its responsibilities, requires adequate terms of reference which will permit it to expand its investigations into homosexuality among persons employed in non-sensitive government positions. Such an expansion will enable the Force to gain better insight into the extent of the threat and help neutralize CBIS operations in this field.