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APPENDIX "A"

A Summary of the Salient Points in  
"United States Security Procedures"  
A Report by the Secretary of the  
Security Panel.

This is a summary of an eleven and one-half page report submitted by Mr. Wall following discussions he had with a number of U.S. security screening agencies in October 1961 and in June 1962. The purpose of the summary is to set out the more salient points raised in the report under the same headings as those used by Mr. Wall.

(Introduction):

Mr. Wall points out that the purpose of his visits to certain U.S. security screening agencies was to gain a better understanding of the processes by which security policies and procedures are formulated in that country, and in particular to study the methods by which persons are selected to serve in sensitive positions in the U.S. public service.

On his two visits to Washington Mr. Wall had discussions with the Department of Justice, the State Department, Civil Service Commission, [REDACTED]

Mr. Wall comments that despite the complexity of Statutes upon which U.S. security screening procedures are based the thoroughness of their field investigations, the quality of investigators and the completeness of reports to departments, together with personnel and medical interviews combine to make a better security screening procedure than we have.

Interdepartmental Co-ordination:

The U.S. has two committees responsible for this function, the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security, both reporting to the National Security Council.

The I.I.C. is concerned primarily with intelligence work and was not contacted by Mr. Wall. In two discussions with the Secretary of the I.C.I.S. Mr. Wall gained the impression that, in fact, the U.S. has no one body comparable to our Security Panel, and that such co-ordination as did exist was brought about more on a "personal liaison" basis between officials of the various agencies.

# Security Requirements for Government Employment

An executive order issued in 1953 sets out the minimum requirements for employment in the U.S. public service. The minimum check which is mandatory on each incumbent in the public service is:

- (a) a check of the subversive indices of the [REDACTED], the C.S.C., the military services, the House Committee on Un-American Activities, and in some cases the State Department and the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
- (b) a check of [REDACTED] files.
- (c) written enquiries to employers and supervisors, educational institutions of college or university level, law enforcement agencies at places of employment, education and residence, and to three referees listed on an application form.

The Civil Service Commission is responsible for carrying out the minimum check on all federal employees and, with the exception of employees for the [REDACTED], the State Department, the military, and a few other agencies, it is also responsible for conducting any necessary field investigations and providing a full report to the employing department. The excepted departments conduct their own field investigations, with the proviso that whenever an indication of disloyalty (subversion?) is uncovered the investigation is handed over to the [REDACTED].

## The Investigative Process:

The U.S. agencies use two application forms for employment in the public service; one for "sensitive" and one for "non-sensitive" employment. Applicants for "sensitive" positions are interviewed on the basis of the information they provide on the form and are warned against giving false information.

Using the application form as a basis the required records checks and field investigation is commenced, followed by two or more interviews with the applicant. The employing department then decides what additional personnel checks are required. In the State Department, [REDACTED] these include medical, including psychiatric, examination and further oral examination. Only [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] also use the polygraph.

The total of the various forms of investigation are then brought together and are considered jointly by the security and personnel officials of the Department and a decision is reached, with the assistance of medical advice when necessary.

One feature of the U.S. system is its very open and frank discussions with each applicant of the security requirements of public service. The applicant is given every opportunity to withdraw his application at any stage.

#### Field Investigative Resources:

Standards for employment as a personnel investigator by any of the Departments conducting security enquiries were similar, and equal to those of the ~~State~~ Investigators require a University degree, personal suitability in terms of intelligence, range of interests, balanced judgement, flexibility, presentability and objectivity, as well as an interest in and a flair for studying and assessing human beings as individuals. They receive fairly extensive formal and "in-job" training, and salary ranges up to \$12,000 for the head of a field office ensure continuing service by suitable, trained personnel.

Each Department or Agency involved in security screening field investigations maintains a net-work of offices across the country and field investigations normally require about 60 days to complete. Where the investigation is conducted on behalf of another Department by the ~~State~~ or C.S.C. the complete file is forwarded to the employing Department which has complete discretion in the use and handling of the reports, and is also charged with the responsibility for their safekeeping.

#### Security Training and Indoctrination:

All Departments place a good deal of emphasis on continuous training in security, by means of periodic lectures, discussion groups and demonstrations.

The State Department makes use of special advisory services and has expanded its medical section to include two psychologists and two psychiatrists, with clinical staff. In addition to conducting tests and induction interviews they also interview foreign service officers prior to and during overseas postings to "orient" them and discuss any problems.

#### Attitudes Toward Human Frailties:

Among the 20 to 25 security officials visited it was generally agreed that the security threat presented by the homosexual lay in the possibility of blackmail, not in the character defect itself, and that the greatest danger was presented in Iron Curtain countries.

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Both the [redacted] and the State Department expressed the view that no known homosexual would be employed by them. However, the C.S.C. indicated that it would be neither wise nor feasible to attempt to exclude all homosexuals from the public service, [redacted] admitted that a known homosexual was employed in its headquarters. Nevertheless [redacted] spends a great deal of time and effort to substantiate or refute allegations of homosexuality made against an applicant or employee.

The general approach to personnel security problems by all Departments appeared to be a constant endeavour to recognize potential troubles before they developed and to take appropriate remedial action. In addition there was general agreement that employees found to have some character defect should be treated fairly, objectively and privately, and to the greatest extent possible without jeopardy to their future careers elsewhere. Each case has to be considered on its own merit.

#### CONCLUSION:

Differences between Canadian and U.S. security screening policies and procedures warrant some consideration:

#### (A) Public and Public Service Attitudes toward Personnel Security

- (1) the present Cabinet Directive on Security might be redrafted in the light of our experience in personnel security over the past seven years, with a view to making it a public document;
- (11) concurrently, a complete explanatory statement might be made in the House of Commons, clarifying the need for these measures in such a way as to command public acceptance and support;

- (111) departments and agencies of the government and the Civil Service Commission might adopt an attitude of much greater frankness in their relations with present and prospective employees in relation to matters of personnel security, particularly in the recruiting, induction and training stages, in order that better security might be achieved through full understanding of the responsibilities and restrictions which must be placed on certain employees.

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**(B) Investigation and Selection of Personnel**

This contains a brief resume of our present procedure in notifying departments and agencies of the results of a field investigation. Mr. Wall declares that it is unsatisfactory on the grounds that the R.C.M.P. as a fact-finding agency should not be required to judge what is "adverse" information; this is the responsibility of the employing department. \*

Finally, on the strength of his submission Mr. Wall makes the following recommendations:

- (i) A complete review of present procedure with a view to reverting to the previous method of providing employing departments with copies of police investigation reports.
- (ii) Recommendations of Dr. Wake be adopted.
- (iii) Further study of the security screening methods and procedures in the United Kingdom be undertaken.

\* (In reporting to vulnerable government departments, the Force does not exercise any judgment as to what is or is not "adverse." We do not withhold information and departments are favoured with all favourable as well as adverse information developed on these candidates.

It is the practice of briefly reporting the extent of our investigation as well as the favourable information in a letter to which is appended a factual brief of anything that could be considered adverse as to loyalty and character.)

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PAR S.C.R.S.

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