

SECRET

**BRIEF FOR DISCUSSION ON REPORTS OF
MR. DON WALL AND DR. F.R. WAKE ON
PERSONNEL SECURITY MATTERS IN THE U.S.A.**

Mr. Wall's report emphasizes that differences between Canadian and U.S. security screening policies and procedures warrant some consideration, and recommends certain modifications in Canadian policies and procedures. Since these recommendations have a direct bearing on our present commitments, it would seem opportune to briefly outline our views on these proposals.

2. The recommendations, which are to be found on pages ten and twelve of Mr. Wall's report, can perhaps be best dealt with point by point followed by our own views on each issue in juxtaposition.

**(A) Public and Public Service Attitudes Toward
Personnel Security -**

(1) Mr. Wall's Report

The present Cabinet Directive on Security might be redrafted in the light of our experience in personnel security over the past seven years, with a view to making it a public document.

- (ii) Concurrently, a complete explanatory statement might be made in the House of Commons, clarifying the need for these measures in such a way as to command public acceptance and support.

(iii) Departments and agencies of the government and the Civil Service Commission might adopt an attitude of much greater frankness in their relations with present and prospective employees in relation to matters of personnel security, particularly in the recruiting, induction and training stages, in order that better security might be achieved through full understanding of the responsibilities and restrictions which must be placed on certain employees.

R.C.M.P. Views

The Force would welcome a redrafted Cabinet Directive and suggests that Security Panel Document 196 could form the basis of the amended directive, provided, of course, that provision for an appeal procedure and details of screening methods and procedures are eliminated.

It is considered that any explanatory statement made in the House of Commons could conceivably result in public acceptance and support of the Governments' Security Program. Such a development could eliminate much criticism of the investigative action taken by the Force.

The implementation of this proposal would undoubtedly do much to make security screening procedures more acceptable to the applicant and employees subjected to them. It might also be used to emphasize the importance of being security conscious at all times.

(B) Investigation and Selection of Personnel

- (1) A complete review be made of our present standards and methods for the investigation and selection of persons to be employed in sensitive positions, with a view to providing employing departments and agencies with the fullest and most accurate information which will permit them to make reasonable judgements as to the loyalty, reliability and suitability as well as the general suitability of the persons concerned.

We believe we are utilizing all facilities available to us to the fullest degree possible, to determine whether or not anything is known to the detriment of an applicant or employee from a security point of view. However, we believe that the responsibility of the Force should be limited to determining character and loyalty; that is, whether or not an applicant or employee has a serious character defect or is subversively inclined. This could be supplemented by the Departments and Agencies themselves checking the suitability and bona fides of candidates by insisting on documentary proof of school attendance and scholastic accomplishments. Prospective employers could write to references for assessment of character. We would recommend that in those investigations where our records checks and enquiries produce nothing to the detriment of the applicant or employee, a short statement to this effect to the employing department should be sufficient to permit a decision being made on security grounds. We would continue to provide adverse information in the form of evaluated, factual reports. We consider our standards for field investigations are effective.

- (11) In relation to human frailties as they affect security, measures be taken to initiate the program of practical research described in the attached report by Dr. F.R. Wake, with a view to facilitating the selection of the most suitable persons to serve in those positions in the public service in which they might be subjected to blackmail or other pressures for offensive intelligence purposes.

We agree that the clinical testing of each applicant for employment in a sensitive position and each person already so employed would improve our security screening procedures. We would recommend that since these tests are designed to uncover character defects, any suspected deviant behavioural traits which are so detected should be referred to us because they would provide us with valuable investigational leads. Our enquiries could then be directed towards corroborating the results of the tests.

SECRET

(11) A further study be made of personnel investigation and selection methods and standards in the United Kingdom, with a view to sharing the benefits of their lengthy experience in these matters, as well as fostering the close co-operation which has proven necessary and useful in the past, in this field as in others.

We agree that an examination of security screening policies and procedures used in the United Kingdom could be beneficial. However, we would suggest that a more complete understanding of the nuances and intricacies of their system in relation to our own might be obtained if a member of the Force were to accompany Mr. Wall.

3. In any discussion on the problem of personnel security, it should be kept in mind that R.C.M.P. Terms of Reference do not provide for any Force responsibilities beyond providing all known facts to appropriate government departments on the matters of character and loyalty.

4. Another point which has been raised and which may arise at the meeting, concerns the sending of actual police reports to government departments. By the very nature of police reports, which include names of sources who have given confidential information, we cannot pass them to other departments. All investigators must feel that their reports are for the confidential use at Headquarters. It is this Headquarters responsibility to pass to appropriate departments an evaluated factual report combining all known facts, often obtained from several different geographical locations. This matter has been thoroughly explained to the Secretary of the Security Panel.

5. It should be noted that Mr. Wall's report goes much beyond homosexuality as a security problem, sets out a variety of suggestions which could conceivably change the entire structure of our present security screening procedures. Of course, we have certain views on these suggestions, which will have to be considered.

6. I think it is safe to infer, after reading the reports, that both Mr. Wall and Dr. Wake feel that homosexuality is a basis on which employment on classified material should be denied. Whilst the reports indicate clearly, steps that might be taken to avoid homosexuals being employed by the government, there are no suggestions as to what steps can be taken to locate homosexuals now employed in sensitive areas. This is a problem with which we are presently concerned.

7. Attached hereto as Appendix "C" is a copy of R.C.M.P. request in May 1960 for Terms of Reference in this connection, together with a counter proposal made by the Special Committee of the Security Panel on December 19th, 1960.

8. The present policy restricts the steps, that can be taken by investigators, to the immediate cases of those in vulnerable positions that come to our attention. It is a well known fact that homosexuals congregate together, both socially and in places of employment. Homosexuals not employed on classified information in government employment known to us, could, if interviewed, lead to homosexuals who are so employed.

9. In the form of a synopsis is attached hereto appendices concerning the following subjects.

APPENDIX

A Summary of the Salient Points in
"United States Security Procedures"
A Report by the Secretary of the
Security Panel.

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PRIVACY/ACCESS TO INFORMATION ACTS
RÉVISÉ EN VERTU DE LA LOI SUR LA PROTECTION
DES RENSEIGNEMENTS PERSONNELS OU DE
L'ACCÈS À L'INFORMATION

APPENDIX "B"

A Summary of the Salient Points in the
Report on Special Project by Dr. F.R. Wake

APPENDIX "C"

R.C.M.P. Request for Terms of Reference -
May 1960

DECLASSIFIED
BY C.S.I.S.

APPENDIX "D"

A Brief Comparison of the Bases of
Security Screening Procedures in the
U.K., U.S.A. and Canada -

DÉCLASSIFIÉ
PAR S.C.R.S.

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