

TOP SECRET

April 28, 1960.

TO: The Commissioner

Sir:

Homosexuality Within the Federal  
Government Service

This paper has reference to Security Panel document SP-199 dated May 12, 1959, particularly to the Conclusion wherein it is recognized that homosexuality constitutes a security threat, that certain homosexual characteristics -- instability, willing self-deceit, defiance towards society and a tendency to surround himself with other homosexuals -- do not inspire confidence, and that information obtained on homosexuals is often limited. Its purpose is to provide information on homosexuality obtained through recent investigations, to set out some of the problems encountered and anticipated in our investigations and to make certain recommendations regarding future investigations.

2. The paper is directed at the threat homosexuality constitutes to Canada from a security point of view and is not in any sense concerned with the moral issues involved in this problem.

3. Investigation over the past year has brought certain results and problems which, it is felt, could not have been fully anticipated when the subject of homosexuality was discussed by the members of the Security Panel and Security Panel Directive #199 drawn up. Firstly, our investigation to date which was limited because of its selectivity has revealed the names of over 700 proven, suspected or alleged homosexuals across Canada. More than 300 of these are, or were recently, residing in the Ottawa area where the investigation was concentrated. Of the 700 more than half are, or were recently, employed in federal government service. The investigation of necessity went beyond the government service in order that the most complete picture possible might be obtained. However, it is apparent that only a portion of the total number has come to light thus far.

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4. While we have no concrete evidence upon which to estimate the total number of homosexuals who are employed by the government in relation to the total number in the Ottawa area we have found that each new source of information has revealed additional names. One source, a self-confessed homosexual residing in Ottawa has suggested there are at least 3000 homosexuals in this area alone. We have no way of confirming this figure, or of saying it is not in line with the facts.

5. In order that the meaning of our figures not be misinterpreted it must be explained that because a person has come to attention in this connection it does not mean that he is, in fact, a homosexual. It does mean, however, that further investigation is required if the matter is to be satisfactorily resolved.

6. The second point for consideration concerns our sources of information. Our files reflect fairly conclusively that general security screening enquiries, carried out in accordance with existing policies rarely uncover evidence of homosexuality. The investigation of charges or suspicions of homosexuality usually develops on opinions or knowledge expressed by friends and acquaintances, usually homosexual, of the person concerned.

7. The information is sometimes based on an intimate relationship but more often on mannerisms, appearance, conversation, association and, to a lesser extent from an evidence standpoint, a frequenting of places where these people gather ranging from taverns to resort areas. Because the information is usually not conclusive, corroboration is imperative lest an injustice be done either through an error in judgement or through motivation by spite or jealousy. In nearly all cases on record the information and corroboration was obtained from homosexuals; even when the person's friends and associates, who were not homosexuals, had no knowledge of the weakness.

8. Considered from the investigation viewpoint the characteristics of the problem under investigation are such that we have to rely on the information or evidence of the homosexuals themselves. In fact, their individual co-operation is essential to the success of this investigation. To illustrate, if an allegation is made that a person is a homosexual, in the absence of an admission by the person so alleged corroboration must be obtained from a homosexual who knows the person concerned if any credence is to be placed in the allegation. Only in unusual

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circumstances can satisfactory corroboration be obtained from a person who is not a homosexual. Therefore it is imperative that known and suspected homosexuals be interviewed during the investigation.

9. Such interviews would also aid in overcoming the difficulty presented by the delicacy of the subject itself, which is that during the investigation as few persons as possible become aware in any way that a particular individual is suspect. The care needed to protect the reputation of any such suspected person cannot be stressed too highly because there is always the possibility that an allegation cannot be confirmed or is, in fact, false. In brief, even if an allegation is confirmed we do not wish to cast aspersions on the individual's character any more than is necessary and we wish to maintain, as much as possible, the secrecy of the investigation.

10. One of the problems presented by the need to interview suspected homosexuals stems from the situation that each suspected government employee is at once a potential source of information and the subject of a part of the investigation. While his utilization as a source is imperative it is an accepted government policy that any person on whom a security enquiry is being conducted should not be made aware that such an investigation is underway.

11. This restriction is expressed in RCMP, "C" Department Policy Instructions - "CHA", paragraph 1(c) - wherein it is stated that a person under investigation must not be contacted without prior authority from this Headquarters. Furthermore, the restriction is implied by Security Panel Directive #29, and attachment thereto, which states, in effect, that an employee who is moved or released on security grounds is not to be made aware of the grounds for the action taken. Since there does not appear to be any middle ground which can be taken on this problem we would suggest that a policy be established for this type of investigation to support the interviewing of homosexuals, known and suspected.

12. In addition to the reasons mentioned in the preceding paragraphs there are other grounds which we feel support this recommendation. There is no better way to dispose of an accusation of homosexuality than to interview the person accused. In the absence of an interview, particularly in doubtful cases there is

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no alternative but to keep the information on file and thereby maintain the doubt. If interviewed however, in addition to allowing the person concerned an opportunity to deny the allegation or admit its truth it also makes him aware that the weakness is known to the security authorities which, in itself, serves a useful purpose by reducing the danger of compromise by blackmail, even though it may disclose the reason for departmental action at a later date.

13. Another problem which is related to the need to interview homosexuals is when should the department be advised that we have information suggesting or proving homosexuality on the part of an employee. Should we advise the department as soon as a corroborated allegation is received and/or after the interview has taken place? If after the interview, should we advise immediately or at our discretion? The present terms of Security Panel directive #29 indicate the department should be advised as soon as we have factual information. In respect to advising the department immediately after an interview has taken place we have already experienced some difficulties in our investigation arising from departments discharging homosexuals who have admitted their weakness, rather than complying with those terms in Security Panel Directive #29 which provide for the transfer of such persons to non-sensitive positions. We firmly believe that if it becomes a general practice to discharge homosexuals who co-operate with us these people will refuse to talk, and without their assistance this type of investigation cannot achieve complete success. It therefore becomes imperative that the departments take no action which will interfere in any way with the investigation.

14. It would resolve many difficulties if it could be agreed by all concerned that the normal steps required by Security Panel Directive #29 be suspended in this type of investigation. We feel that the decision as to when a department is to be notified that a homosexual is employed in the department, either in classified or non-classified work, should be left in the hands of the Force which will be guided by the circumstances and their effect upon allied investigations.

15. In the event that agreement cannot be reached on the above proposals there appears to be two other possible courses of action to guarantee that self-admitted homosexuals will not be immediately discharged. One suggestion, which is similar to that in the previous paragraph, is

that the results of our investigation not be disseminated until such time as the success of the over-all investigation is fairly well established. However, this would not only prevent discretion being used to advise on any particular case during the investigation thereby jeopardizing a department's administration but could also result in the development of a considerable back-log of information on our files. The second suggestion is that the departments be advised that no action, even the transfer to non-sensitive positions, is to be taken against self-admitted homosexuals without the prior consent of the Security Panel.

16. Although there are divergent views on the degree of risk involved, it is generally accepted that homosexuality within the government service is a security risk because of the potential for compromise by a foreign intelligence service through threat of exposure. While the risk is most acute when a homosexual is employed on duties requiring access to classified material there is a reduced danger represented by those homosexuals who may not in the course of their present duties have access to classified material but who, through normal advancement, may be expected to require access at some future date. Additionally, since neither the bonds of friendship nor of homosexual liaison are dependent on employment there is a danger present in the normal, friendly relationship between two government employees when one is a homosexual and in a homosexual relationship between a government employee and a non-government employee. An instance of the latter came to light recently where a homosexual government employee, with access to classified material, displayed a considerable lack of security concerning his work during the course of his close association with his homosexual friend who was not a government employee.

17. There is evidence at hand that the Soviet Intelligence Service, through threat of exposure of homosexual practices, compromised a Canadian Government employee stationed in Moscow. Their plan failed only because the person concerned was imbued with a strong sense of loyalty to his country and immediately confessed to his superiors. This was most fortunate, as otherwise the Soviets would have been successful in obtaining a well-placed source of information within a Canadian service at an important level in terms of access to highly classified material. There may have been other similar attempts that have been successful and about which nothing is known.

18. There is no proof that such an attempt has been made in Canada by a foreign intelligence service, but the question always

arises as to the possibility of this having occurred and the compromise proved to be successful from the Russian Intelligence or satellite Intelligence Service point of view. Information has been received which raises a suspicion that an initial seemingly innocuous approach may have been made on at least one occasion. The source of information, another self-admitted homosexual, advised that a friend of his, who is a suspected homosexual and a government employee, had been "courted" by members of a Soviet Bloc Mission in Ottawa some time ago. The approach may not have been the opening stage of an attempt to compromise but it apparently caused the subject some concern and raised a suspicion in the source's mind.

19. In the attached statistical summary, Appendix "A", those persons who have come to attention and who are employed, or were employed within the past two years in a government department or agency are divided numerically into three categories -- confirmed, alleged, suspected. The "confirmed" are those who have been interviewed and admitted being homosexuals or who have been convicted in court on a charge of sexual deviation with another male. The "alleged" are those who have been named as homosexuals by a source or sources whose information is considered to be reliable. The "suspected" are those who are believed to be homosexuals by a source or sources whose information is considered to be reliable. To date, of the total number of persons interviewed by this Force 84% have confessed their weakness, 8% denied the allegation and 8% were non-committal.

20. Since we know that not all of the persons listed in Appendix "A" are, or were, employed in sensitive positions the question arises as to how best to handle information dealing with homosexuals employed in non-sensitive work. Because these people constitute an administrative problem to the department we are finding that under our present procedures when we notify a department that information is available which may have a bearing on the person's security status the department usually asks to be given the information even in those cases where access to classified material is not involved. In keeping with our previously expressed views on the danger involved through this character weakness, we believe that the departments should be provided with the information with the proviso that no action is to be taken without authority from the Security Panel.

21. The Force has received the necessary ministerial authority to proceed with the investigation in both sensitive and non-sensitive departments



and agencies. This is being done as quickly as possible. Unfortunately this and other heavy and unexpected demands on our resources have created an acute manpower problem. As a result we cannot develop this matter as rapidly as the requirements of security make advisable. The scope of the investigation is further expanded by the necessity of developing information on and interviewing homosexuals who are not employed in the government service. These persons are not only potential sources of information to us but they could conceivably be used by a foreign intelligence service to identify and perhaps otherwise assist in the compromising of homosexuals employed in the government on classified work.

22. As a matter of interest our investigation to date has disclosed certain evidence of extreme interest to other friendly security services concerning their nationals, some of whom are employed in such a capacity that they have access to highly classified material. This type of information, we feel, cannot be withheld from the security services because to do so would have an effect on the friendly security community as a whole.

23. Since you may wish to refer this matter to the Security Panel for further consideration by its members we might summarize our views on this matter.

- (a) We feel that the existing policy restrictions, particularly as implied in Security Panel Directive #29 and attachment thereto, which prohibit our interviewing homosexuals should be set aside for this type of investigation and that the necessary provision be made for us to interview at our discretion any person who we may consider to be of assistance to our enquiry.
- (b) We also believe that the decision as to when any department should be provided with assessed information relating to the homosexuality of any one of its employees should be left to our discretion.
- (c) If the proposal in (b) is not acceptable we would suggest that the good offices of the Secretary of the Security Panel be sought to ensure that departments do not take any action against homosexuals, who have assisted us, which might prove detrimental to our general investigation.

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- (d) We would also appreciate clarification on whether or not we should provide the department concerned with information on a homosexual who is not employed on duties having access to classified material.

(J. M. Bella) A/A/Commr.,  
Director of Security and Intelligence.

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APPENDIX "A"

Homosexuality Within the Federal Government Service  
- Statistics -

	<u>Total</u>	<u>No. of cases "Briefed" to Depts. by RCMP</u>	<u>Disposition of "Briefed" cases by Depts.</u>
Department of Agriculture:			
confirmed - 2	2	Nil	-
Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd:			
alleged - 1	1	1	still employed(1)
Bank of Canada:			
suspected - 1	1	Nil	-
Canadian Broadcasting Corp.:			
confirmed - 2		3	resigned (1)
alleged - 4			still employed(2)
suspected - 1	7		
Central Mortgage & Housing Corporation:			
alleged - 2	2	Nil	-
Citizenship and Immigration:			
suspected - 1	1	Nil	-
Civil Service Commission:			
suspected - 1	1	Nil	-
Department of Defence Production:			
confirmed - 2		5	resigned (1)
alleged - 1			still employed(4)
suspected - 2	5		

	<u>Total</u>	<u>No. of cases "Briefed" to Depts. by RCMP</u>	<u>Disposition of "Briefed" cases by Depts.</u>
Defence Construction (1951) Ltd:			
alleged - 1	1	Nil	-
Dominion Bureau of Statistics:			
alleged - 3		Nil	deceased (1)
suspected - 1	4		
Department of External Affairs:			
confirmed - 9		26	released (1)
alleged - 17			resigned (9)
suspected - 33	59		retired (1)
			deceased (2)
			still employed (13)
Department of Finance:			
suspected - 1	1	Nil	-
Department of National Defence:			
(a) Navy:			
confirmed - 123		4	released (90)
suspected - 76	199		
(b) Army:			
confirmed - 2		4	released (2)
alleged - 2			still employed (2)
suspected - 4	8		
(c) Air Force:			
confirmed - 3		7	released (1)
alleged - 9			still employed (6)
suspected - 4	16		
(d) D.R.B.:			
confirmed - 1	1	1	still employed (1)
National Film Board:			
alleged - 3	3	Nil	-
National Harbours Board:			
suspected - 1	1	Nil	-

	<u>Total</u>	<u>No. of cases "Briefed" to Depts. by RCMP</u>	<u>Disposition of "Briefed" cases by Depts.</u>
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Department of National Health  
and Welfare:

confirmed - 1		1	still employed (1)
alleged - 3			
suspected - 1	5		

National Research Council:

alleged - 2	2	1	resigned (1)
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Department of National Revenue:

confirmed - 2		Nil	retired (1)
alleged - 1			
suspected - 1	4		

Northern Affairs & National  
Resources:

alleged - 1		Nil	-
suspected - 2	3		

Post Office Department:

alleged - 3		Nil	-
suspected - 1	4		

Department of Public Works:

confirmed - 1		2	still employed (2)
alleged - 1			
suspected - 1	3		

Royal Canadian Mounted Police:

confirmed - 2			released (3)
alleged - 1	3		

Secretary of State:  
(Patent & Copyright Office)

alleged - 1	1	Nil	-
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Department of Trade &  
Commerce:

confirmed - 2		2	released (1)
alleged - 2	4		transferred (1)

	<u>Total</u>	<u>No. of cases "Briefed" to Depts. by RCMP</u>	<u>Disposition of "Briefed" cases by Depts.</u>
Department of Transport:			
confirmed - 3		3	still employed (3)
alleged - 1			
suspected - 2	6		
Board of Transport Commissioners:			
alleged - 4	4	Nil	-
Unemployment Insurance Commission:			
alleged - 1		Nil	-
suspected - 1	2		
Department of Veterans' Affairs:			
confirmed - 1		Nil	resigned (1)
suspected - 2	3		
Government House:			
suspected - 1	1	Nil	-
House of Commons & Senate:			
alleged - 4		Nil	-
suspected - 1	<u>5</u>		
	363	60	117
TOTAL:			
confirmed - 156			
alleged - 168			
suspected - <u>139</u>	<u>363</u>		
		<u>60</u>	
Total number of "Briefs" to Departments			
		<u>60</u>	
Total number of persons released, resigned, retired, deceased or transferred			<u>117</u>