

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM

TOP SECRET EIDERTO: PERSONNEL DIVISIONSecurity TOP SECRET EIDERFROM: J. K. Starnes, D. L. (2) DivisionDate June 10, 1959REFERENCE: Your Memorandum of April 29, 1959

File No.	<u>A-26</u>

SUBJECT: Annual Establishment Review 1960-61

In putting forward recommendations for changes in our authorized establishment I shall deal first with the Officer establishment of the Division and then with our Clerical and Stenographic staff. For convenience you may find it useful to refer to the attached charts of the Divisional establishment. One of these charts is basically similar to the one giving a breakdown by sections of this Division which was attached to your memorandum of March 31 last for the previous annual establishment review.

2. I advance below arguments in support of the following proposed changes:

- (a) the establishment of a new FSO 3 position in the Security Intelligence Section; OK
- (b) the establishment of a new AO 3 position in the Security Section; OK
- (c) the reclassification of EXT.68/FSO3 to FSO 4 in the Political Intelligence Section; OK
- (d) the reclassification of EXT.87/FSO2 to FSO 3 in the Political Intelligence Section; OK
- ✓ (e) the establishment of a new Clerk 2 position in the Special Registry; OK
- (f) the establishment of a new Steno 2 position for the stenographic pool; No
- (g) the establishment of a new Typist position in the Security Section. OK

3. I am not at present recommending any changes in the Defence Intelligence Section, now consisting of EXT.74/FSO3 and EXT.1510/FSO3. While the work load on this section has increased appreciably since October 1, 1958 as the result of the introduction of new procedures in the preparation of the JIC's Weekly Indications Report, it is still manageable without excessive overtime. It is possible, however, that as a result of changes in JIC staffing arrangements the workload on this section will increase further. I should like to note in this connection that Mr. Cook's departure for Washington will create a vacancy in this section which must be filled as soon as possible. While Mr. Uren on his return from Washington will assist in the work of this section, it is my intention that he devote himself largely to the work of the Political Intelligence Section, where as you know a vacancy has existed since Mr. Moore's transfer to Information

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Division some time ago. This will leave the Defence Section short handed, and past experience has shown that one officer alone can handle the section in stop-gap fashion only with many hours of overtime work every day.

4. I am proposing the establishment of the additional FSO 3 position in the Security Intelligence Section for two principal reasons. First, I am convinced that an additional officer is required to deal adequately with the important work of this section. Secondly, this additional officer will enable the section to take on work which is properly in its field but which has hitherto been handled by the Deputy Head of the Division. This will free the Deputy Head from a number of duties, in turn enabling him to give me greater assistance in my many responsibilities as Head of this Division.

5. As Head of this Division I report to at least four different persons. As Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee I am responsible directly to the Chiefs of Staff Committee and report to the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff on the work of the Committee. As the Director of Communications Security I am responsible to the Communications Security Board which is under the Chairmanship of the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs. I am responsible to the Board for the day-to-day policy direction of Canada's COMINT and ELINT effort and as Secretary of the Board I am responsible to the Chairman for the Board's work. I report to the Under-Secretary directly in connection with certain aspects of our relations with the RCMP. In cases dealing with personnel security I report to the Under-Secretary through the Assistant Under-Secretary charged with responsibility for personnel questions. I report to another Assistant Under-Secretary for the other aspects of the Division's work. As Director of Communications Security I am Chairman of the Communications Operations Policy Committee and Chairman of the Communications Research Committee as well as being a member of the Selection Board for candidates for the Communications Branch, N.R.C. I am also Chairman of the Cypher Policy Committee, a member of the Security Sub-Panel and I attend meetings of the Visits Panel.

6. Apart from these responsibilities which are directly related to the work of the Division, I am appointed in a personal capacity as a member of the Officer Rating Review Board, the Officer Promotion Board and the Examinations Committee. Recently I have been named an "Executive Officer" in connection with the interim programme for Emergency Government.

7. Frankly, I find that I have too much to do. It is quite clear to me that if this Division is to function properly and if I am to be able to do justice to these various jobs I must have additional help and I must be able to delegate more of my responsibilities to those who are helping me.

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A. OFFICERSSecurity Intelligence Section

8. This Section was set up in 1957 to carry out the following tasks:

(a) To do studies on the Russian Intelligence Service (RIS) for two principal purposes. First, in order to assist the overall assessment of Soviet foreign policy by the Department of External Affairs by determining:

- (i) the place of the RIS in the Soviet Government structure and its influence therein;
- (ii) the effects of its operations abroad in individual countries and on the policies of their governments; and
- (iii) the degree to which the actions of and instructions to representatives and agents abroad are at variance with our knowledge of Soviet foreign policy.

A second purpose of these studies is to assist the Security Section of Defence Liaison (2) Division with advice about RIS operations as they might affect the Department's security. The Section carries out similar studies on other intelligence services, notably those of the Satellite countries, which operate against Canada and countries allied with Canada.

(b) To study the International Communist Movement with a view to determining:

- (i) its place and influence in the conduct of the Soviet Government's foreign policy;
- (ii) its influence on the policies of other governments in the Communist bloc;
- (iii) its influence on the line followed by Communist parties elsewhere; and
- (iv) the effectiveness and extent of exploitation by the Sino-Soviet bloc intelligence services of the International Communist Movement.

(c) The Section is the point of contact with the RCMP in all security intelligence matters of concern to the Department of External Affairs such as immigration and consular matters involving security; the Canadian Communist movement and Canadian Communist activity reaching abroad; defectors; security questions affecting diplomatic missions in Canada, especially the activities of Soviet and satellite missions. This Section also handles matters with which the NATO Special Committee is concerned.

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9. As you know, Mr. Peter Johnston was specially recruited to work in the Security Intelligence Section. Although it was envisaged that he would give priority to carrying out the studies and tasks enumerated under (a) and (b) above and would spend most of his time on these duties, in practice the increasing volume of work associated with the problems enumerated under (c) above has tended to occupy the greater part of Mr. Johnston's time. On these duties he has the full time assistance of Miss Greenwood, the other Officer in this Section. As the problems involved are very difficult and complicated and often require consultation on an interdepartmental basis as well as with the RCMP, these consultations and the associated committee work have proved to be very time consuming in nature. Thus the amount of time which Mr. Johnston has been able to devote to the duties described under (a) and (b) above has had to be increasingly restricted and as a result the most important responsibilities of the Section are being neglected in favour of more urgent problems.

10. To resolve this situation I recommend that a new position for an Officer of FSO 3 grade be added to the Security Intelligence Section. The Officer in this new position would under the direction of the Head of Section concern himself largely with the matters described under (c) above and with the committee work associated therewith and he would have the assistance for this purpose of Miss Greenwood, the incumbent of the present Junior Officer position in the Section. As might be appropriate and possible he would also assist the Head of Section on matters described in (a) and (b) above.

Political Intelligence Section

11. As I pointed out when the proposal was put to me by your Division, the transfer of Mr. Moore to Information Division was a difficult decision for me to accept in view of the importance of the responsibilities which Mr. Moore was discharging in his capacity as Head of the Political Intelligence Section of the Division. The transfer has provided the occasion for a review of the responsibilities of this position (EXT.68/FSO3). As a result of such a review it is now clear to me that, in line with the importance and weight of the duties associated with this position, it should be reclassified to the higher grade of FSO 4, and that it should be filled by an Officer of appropriate experience and knowledge of intelligence work.

12. In support of the above recommendation I am setting down as follows a description of the position which is necessarily compressed because of the nature of the duties. The Political Intelligence Section's primary function is to maintain close liaison with other divisions and to ensure that their requirements for current intelligence are promptly met. This includes "raw" intelligence from COMINT and secret agent sources, in great volume, as well as processed and evaluated intelligence from United States, United Kingdom and Canadian agencies. The Section also handles the Department's liaison with the clandestine intelligence services of both the United States and the United Kingdom. Under present arrangements the Head of the Section deals with the Middle Eastern Division and the United Nations Division and his two colleagues handle the European, Economic, Far Eastern, American and Commonwealth Divisions. The Head of Section is also responsible for

serving other divisions which do not normally receive secret intelligence material. Under the direction of the Head of Section, Officers of the Political Intelligence Section must familiarize themselves with the work of the divisions to which intelligence material is supplied and to make the requirements of these divisions known to intelligence sources in Ottawa and abroad.

13. The Political Intelligence Section daily scans all secret agent and intercept intelligence, as well as summarized reports from London and Washington, and selects items of interest to the different divisions. The Section also is expected to summarize and to collate this material, presenting it to the divisions concerned promptly and in a readily digestible form with any explanations required. In the field of current intelligence the Head of Section acts as Chairman of the weekly indications meeting in National Defence at which the draft Weekly Indications Report for consideration by the Joint Intelligence Committee on the following day is prepared. In this capacity the Head of Section also supervises the work of the Department's representative to the Joint Indications Room.

14. In addition to the responsibilities described above the Head of Section has the particular duty of conducting correspondence with the appropriate Canadian UK and US agencies on intercept intelligence material. He is responsible for the distribution of such material to the Under-Secretary's office, the Minister's office and the Prime Minister's office, to certain outside departments and agencies, and to certain missions abroad, e.g. the Canadian Delegation to the United Nations in New York. An important aspect of the Head of Section's responsibilities in the handling of this special intelligence material is to act as the Department's Comint Security Officer and in the same capacity as far as the other civilian departments are concerned.

15. As the No. 2 position in the Political Intelligence Section (Ext.87/FS02), presently filled by Mr. Dery, requires the incumbent to act as the deputy of the Head of the Section in the discharge of all the main responsibilities enumerated above, I believe that this position also should be upgraded and I accordingly recommend that it be made an FSO 3 position.

The Security Section

16. The present organization and responsibilities of this Section are described in the chart attached as Appendix "B".

17. As you are aware, Mr. Agnes, who is an Administrative Officer Grade 3, is now covering position Ext.1429/FS02. Mr. Agnes has filled this position most capably and to our complete satisfaction. However, it seems quite clear to me that if this Section is to function properly and to fulfill its responsibilities adequately, some upward revision of its establishment is essential. In what follows I shall attempt to describe briefly the scope and volume of the Section's work and to give some idea of where and how it is deficient in meeting its responsibilities:

(a) Personnel Security

(i) The work under this Head comprises inter alia the processing of routine security clearance cases concerning applicants for entry to the Department. In 1958 these totalled 384. Another 167

security clearance cases relating to Athlone and NATO Fellowships and Scholarships and non-departmental experts and officials nominated to represent Canada at international and special conferences were dealt with by the Section in the same year. Special clearances, clearances for permission to marry and reviews totalled 261. Many of these clearances entailed careful study and exchanges of views with the RCMP, the Civil Service Commission and Personnel Division.

(ii) In addition there were a considerable number of difficult, complex and delicate personnel security problems to deal with during the year both at home and abroad, each of which demanded many days of work and close attention by the Head of the Section. Responsibility in this important and sensitive field cannot, of course, be delegated to a junior officer.

(iii) A good deal of work and study has also been devoted by the Head of the Section in his capacity as Departmental member of the Security Sub-Panel to the review of personnel security policies and procedures (in particular the study of character weaknesses in relation to security and the establishment of an appeals procedure for persons denied or dismissed from employment on security grounds).

(iv) There is in my opinion an urgent need for a deeper study (involving much research and close consultation with Canadian and other authorities such as the United Kingdom, United States and NATO) to be made with regard to our policy, methods and procedures for dealing with matters of personnel security.

(b) Local Security

(i) The Department now occupies space in seven different buildings in Ottawa. Each of these buildings poses security problems of a physical and internal procedural nature peculiar to itself. This wide dispersion of Departmental activities also, quite obviously, creates problems of a more general but nonetheless vexing security nature. Responsibility in this field has been delegated to the Deputy Departmental Security Officer who has been designated as Local Security Officer. His duties comprise, inter alia, evolving safe procedures for the circulation and distribution of sensitive documents to widely dispersed sections of the Department by safe hand of messenger, the physical security of buildings and the supervision of the five security guards and four commissionaires employed in Ottawa directly under our control and liaison with the Mounted Police on the duties of the 12 commissionaires employed on the East Block, Daly and New Post Office buildings. He is responsible also for ensuring that combination settings throughout the Department in Ottawa are changed regularly, that arrangements for the collection and disposal of classified waste are adequate and satisfactory, that divisions

maintain adequate records and control of keys to sensitive offices and that infractions of the regulations relating to the security of offices, papers, etc., are suitably dealt with. During 1958 over 280 infractions were discovered by security guards and reported to heads of division and the Local Security Officer.

X (ii) I am seriously concerned about the inadequacy of our security arrangements and procedures in Ottawa and consider that, if necessary improvements are to be effected and a high standard of security maintained, there is enough work to justify the appointment of a full time Local Security Officer. An added reason why we should in my opinion have such an officer is that we have not been able to devote sufficient attention to security arrangements for, and the protection of, the increasing number of international conferences and meetings of a sensitive nature taking place in Ottawa and elsewhere in Canada. An example of what I have in mind here is the arrangements which were made for the Commonwealth Trade and Economic Conference held in the Queen Elizabeth Hotel in Montreal last year and which occupied the time of the Local Security Officer for a full six weeks.

(c) NATO and Allied Security

X (i) At the moment we are not fulfilling our obligations to NATO under the NATO Security Regulations to which Canada has subscribed. For example, this Department, since it operates the Senior Civil Cosmic Registry in Canada, is responsible not only for the proper distribution, protection and accounting for documents circulating within the Department but for the despatch of such documents and their proper handling in Cosmic sub-registries established in other Canadian departments of Government. The regulations stipulate that an annual inspection of each main and sub-registry will be done by the Head of the Security Section in his capacity as Cosmic Control Officer. Because of pressure of work it has been impossible to comply with this requirement which would take a full two weeks to complete.

(ii) The number of international treaties and agreements concerning the sharing of national secrets in the field of defence, atomic research, etc., are growing and NATO security standards and procedures are constantly being reviewed and improved. These matters entail considerable study and work by the Security Section, consultation with other government departments and interested divisions, and advice to our Delegation representative on the NATO Security Committee.

(d) Security Training

X (i) It is perfectly apparent that the Security Section should devote a great deal more time than it is at the moment able to give to the education in security matters of both Departmental personnel and

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members of other Departments posted to our missions abroad. As you may be aware, a programme has been worked out for this to be done in connection with the provision of a properly designed and equipped security briefing room. However, unless additional help is given the Section, it will not be possible to exploit these new facilities to the best advantage.

(ii) A major project under this heading is the preparation of a comprehensive Departmental Security Manual. This work is well advanced but has been held up by a lack of time in which to clear a number of difficult points outstanding and to revise and produce the Manual in final form.

(e) Security Abroad

(i) One of the more important tasks of the Security Section is periodically to visit and inspect the security arrangements of our posts abroad. The value of such inspections cannot be overestimated. Responsibility for the inspection of European posts now rests with the Regional Security Officer, with the help of Mr. Barker in London. Pressure of work has precluded the inspection of Middle Eastern, Far Eastern and South American posts by the Departmental Security Officer.

(ii) In addition to the by no means inconsiderable task of catering to the numerous and widely divergent security needs of over 60 posts abroad (which includes among other things trying to evolve and encourage posts conscientiously to observe sound security procedures tailored to local conditions and their individual needs and to raise to acceptable standards the physical security arrangements of posts), the Security Section is required to advise on the layout of offices and the provision of built-in security features in connection with major building projects or the acquisition of new premises. Cases in point are Kuala Lumpur, Tehran, Prague, Paris, Geneva, Rome, New Delhi, Canberra and Moscow. In addition, major structural alterations, with the object of improving the physical security of chancery premises, have been initiated or projected in Warsaw, Belgrade, Brussels, Bonn and Tel Aviv. Having regard to the fact that, in stark contrast to the practice of Communist countries in matters of this kind, most of our posts are now housed in offices in business blocks and other types of physically insecure or vulnerable accommodation, it is clear that a great deal of work remains to be done by the Security Section in this sphere of its responsibility.

(iii) Our security guard programme, now comprising over 80 security guards serving abroad, is likely to expand. To ensure that these guards are employed effectively and to the best advantage by posts entails a good deal of advice and guidance to posts from the Security Section. The administration of the guard programme in collaboration with Personnel Division also imposes a considerable work load.

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(iv) On the technical side also the work of the Security Section is increasing. For example, during the past 12 months we have experienced four lockouts of Taylor safes, one lockout of a Chubb vault and one lockout of a Chubb safe filing cabinet plus a number of minor lockouts abroad, and two lockouts in the Department in Ottawa. Three of the Taylor safe lockouts required the Technical Officer to visit the post to deal with the matter. The others required exchanges of letters and telegrams, long-range diagnosis of the difficulty and advice to the posts which in most cases resulted in the trouble being remedied and access being gained to the defective cabinet without the infliction of permanent damage and with a consequent saving in costs. In addition, the Technical Officer of the Section has been engaged in the testing of new locks and other protective equipment, research on shredding and other machines for the destruction of classified waste, and in devising improved methods for dealing more economically with lockouts. For example, he is now experimenting with a method of opening the locked Taylor safe returned from Prague which, if successful, will effect a saving of approximately \$1,000 in repairs to the safe and enable us to deal with future lockouts far less expensively than in the past. Revised methods of procurement and purchase of S & G security equipment has already saved the Department many hundreds of dollars. There is, however, still much scope for improvement and for savings, providing the necessary time for research and exploration is made available.

18. The importance of the work of the Security Section and the need for better security in the Department at home and abroad can only be appreciated in the light of the ever increasing and highly skilled efforts being made by Soviet and Satellite intelligence organizations to penetrate our security and the damage which would be done to our national interests and our relations with NATO and other allies if we were found to be deficient in matters of security.

19. I strongly recommend, therefore, that to enable the Security Section to meet its present responsibilities adequately, that its establishment be revised by the creation of an Administrative Officer 3 position, to be filled by Mr. Agnes. At the same time the present FSO 3 position, now covered off by Mr. Agnes, should be filled by an FSO of appropriate grade. This FSO would act as Deputy Head of the Section (and as Acting Head during the absence of the Departmental Security Officer on inspections or to deal with specific security problems at posts abroad as they arise), and the AO would deal principally with local security matters. The reorganization which would follow upon approval of these proposals is shown in Appendix B.

20. A separate recommendation will be submitted shortly concerning the Security Guard programme.

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B. CLERICAL AND STENOGRAPHIC STAFFDefence Liaison (2) Special Registry

21. In view of the volume and complexity of the work that has to be carried out the staffing of our Special Registry continues to be a serious problem. As the attached chart (Appendix A) shows, the complement of the Special Registry is only two people, that is, Mrs. Bruce (Clerk Grade 4) as head of the Registry, and her assistant, Mr. Gauthier (Clerk Grade 3).

22. The Clerk 2 position in our Special Registry was created as a result of the recommendation made in last year's review of the annual establishment. It might be useful to recall the situation in the Special Registry at the time that this recommendation was made. In our memorandum of June 18, 1958 we pointed out that there was a weekly inflow of about 975 separate items of intelligence. Of these [redacted] were papers classified up to Top Secret, most of them [redacted] from the U. S. and U. K. clandestine intelligence services. The remaining [redacted] which may be treated as a separate operation because they are handled by our research assistant, Miss Stothers, who analyzes, studies and files them in a special set of files, were COMINT intercepts and reports based on COMINT sources.

23. In the handling of COMINT material particularly stringent security requirements must be satisfied. These requirements derive from COMINT security agreements which Canada has entered into with the United States and which correspond closely to similar agreements between the U. K. and the U. S. The amount of time and effort which must be devoted to the processing of such papers is much greater than that required for the handling of ordinary secret material in the average Department registry. The treatment which the Special Registry must accord to the [redacted] U. S. and U. K. [redacted] which were flowing in weekly a year ago is almost as rigorous and certainly as laborious and results from stringent security measures imposed by both the U. S. and U. K. intelligence authorities as the prerequisite of the release of this material to Canada. This means that our Special Registry is required to process each item as many as eight times in the course of circulating it before it is finally filed away. Records of receipt and return must be made, special security markings must be placed on each page. These and other time consuming requirements must be meticulously fulfilled.

24. It is now clear from our experience over the past year that our present Special Registry establishment is quite inadequate for coping with the volume of work at the level reached about a year ago. In the meantime the volume of work has substantially increased, and the new developments which have led to this result are as follows:

(a) Since the autumn of last year this Division has been charged with responsibility for the distribution of the "B-wire" service. This is a teletype service which originates with the Foreign Broadcast Information Service of the U. S. Central Intelligence Agency. It consists of an edited selection of news available in

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Washington from the BBC monitoring service and the FBIS's own field monitoring stations. The FBIS obtains immediate coverage of the actual texts of radio broadcasts, and items are also sometimes taken from some western commercial services such as Reuters. The B-wire is that part of this immense coverage which is of most interest for intelligence purposes. It is produced on a 24-hour a day basis, 7 days a week. It has proved to be a most valuable service in the Department but because of the volume of material which keeps flowing in it requires on the average about 19 hours of one person's time per week to process and distribute it.

(b) Over the past 12 months there has been a further increase in the volume of papers flowing into our Special Registry, both from COMINT and [REDACTED] sources. The COMINT intake now totals some 490 items weekly, or an increase of 15 percent over last year. The number of new non-COMINT papers handled by the Special Registry now averages between 620 and 650 weekly, which is also an increase of approximately 15 percent over the same date last year. In addition, the Special Registry handles each week several hundred items of ordinary departmental correspondence which must be classified and filed. This increase in the inflow of paper is largely, as we predicted a year ago, the result of the further development of our intelligence liaison arrangements with the U. K. and the U. S. authorities and particularly of the establishment of our Departmental intelligence liaison officers in London and Washington.

25. In order to cope with the increased volume of work described above we have had to resort to a number of makeshifts. Miss Lewis has been diverted part time from her normal typing duties to assist Mr. Gauthier in the processing of the "B-wire". Similarly Miss Mantle has been assisting Mrs. Bruce on a part time basis on the filing and distribution of papers and Mrs. Stewart, [REDACTED] was employed on an almost full time basis in an endeavour to help Mrs. Bruce keep abreast of the backlog of work.

26. These makeshifts cannot, of course, resolve the continuing problem. They are unsatisfactory both from the point of view of morale and efficiency. Morale suffers when the employees concerned have to be diverted from the performance of the skills for which they were trained and hired to the execution of duties involving some tedium and less skill, as for instance in the processing of the B-wire. Moreover, their usual duties involving stenographic and typewritten work for officers of the Division remain to some extent unaccomplished and a backlog of work inevitably accumulates. It is particularly important if the incoming flow of intelligence material is to be adequately exploited that our small typing and stenographic pool concentrate mainly on work appropriate to their skills. It is equally important that the large inflow of intelligence material be kept moving rapidly since much of it is topical and loses a good deal of its value if because of shortages of clerical help processing falls behind.

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27. I think it is clear from what I have said above that a new clerical position should be established in our Special Registry and that this position be filled as a matter of some urgency. I accordingly recommend the establishment of the necessary Clerk Grade 2 position. The duties of this position would be as follows:

Under the direction of the Head of D. L. (2) Special Registry, to process the "B-wire" and to assist in the maintenance of the files and records and in the processing and distribution of incoming intelligence material.

28. With regard to our present stenographic establishment I should like to point out that two of the positions in our stenographic pool, that is, Ext.522/Steno.2 and Ext.546/Steno.2 are now filled by employees who are classified as Typists. We are very satisfied with the work of Miss Lewis and Miss Mantle who are occupying these two positions and in the interests of continuity and permanence, which are highly desirable features in the handling of intelligence material, we would not wish to see these arrangements disturbed. (As you are aware, the staff of this Division all require to be given security clearances to S. A. standards.) It will, however, be appreciated that in consequence the volume of stenographic work on the stenographers classified as such in our Divisional pool is quite heavy. If therefore my recommendations for additional officer positions in our Security Intelligence Section and Security Sections are approved it will be necessary to obtain additional stenographic assistance. I would accordingly recommend that positions for an additional Steno. 2 and Typist be established in the Divisional stenographic pool.



J. K. Starnes
Defence Liaison (2) Division

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Head of Division
EXT 10/FSO 7
(Mr. Starnes/FSO 6)

DCO
EXT 101/Clerk 4 (Secretarial)
(Miss Farmer/Clerk 4 (Secretarial))

Deputy Head
EXT 41/FSO 5
(Mr. Hard/FSO 4)

EXT 176/Steno 3
(Miss Shuchard/Steno 3)

Military Intelligence

Section
EXT 18/FSO 3
(Mr. Smith/FSO 3)
EXT 27/FSO 2
(Mr. Perry/FSO 3)

Defence Intelligence

Section
EXT 24/FSO 3
(Mr. Smith/FSO 3) *Ken*
EXT 1510/FSO 3
(Mr. Dupuis/FSO 3)

Security Intelligence

Section
EXT 54/FSO 4
(Mr. Johnston/FSO 3)
EXT 655/EAC 1
(Miss Greenwood/EXT 227/AC 1)
Mr. Buchanan

Security Section

EXT 70/AC 7
(Mr. Timmerman/AC 7)
EXT 1429/FSO 2
EXT 442/TO 3
(Mr. Kayser/TO 3)

EXT 23/FSO 2
(Mr. Smith/FSO 2)

Research Assistant
EXT 1545/Clerk 4
(Miss Gathers/Clerk 4)

Special Registry
EXT 100/Clerk 4
(Mr. Bruce/Clerk 4)
EXT 1546/Clerk 2
(Mr. Gauthier/Clerk 3)

EXT 151/Clerk 3
(Mr. Reid/Clerk 2)
EXT 1430/Clerk 2
(Mrs. Harwood/Clerk 2)

Steno and Typist Pool

EXT 113/Steno 3
(Miss Kortell/Steno 3)

EXT 121/Steno 2
(Miss *Burford*/Steno 3)

EXT 114/Steno 2
(Miss Mantle/Typist)

EXT 113/Steno 2
(Miss Lewis/Typist)

Miss Burford

EXT 109/Steno 2
(Miss Tilsley/Steno 3)

EXT 754, 756/Security Sec. 2
(Messrs.)

EXT 934, 1431, 1432/Security Sec. 1
(Messrs.)

SECURITY SECTIONDEFENCE LIAISON (2) DIVISIONHEAD OF SECTION

Regional Security Officer (London)

A. O. 3: (Mr. MacNeil)

(Responsible for European Posts under
direction of Head of Section)

Supernumerary (Mr. Barker)

A. O. 7: (Mr. Timmerman)

Departmental Security Officer

Departmental Member, Security Sub-Panel

Departmental security policy (security regulations and instructions)
Personnel Security (policy, clearances and cases - liaison with
Security Intelligence Section)Communications Security (messenger, courier and mail) (with Communi-
cations and Administrative Services Divisions)

International Security Treaties and Agreements

Counter measures against intrusion

Security of European Posts (through R.S.O., London)

F.S.O.3 ~~and~~ (vacant)

Deputy Head of Section

NATO Security Regulations & Procedures

NATO Security Committee

Preparation of Security Panel and Sub-
Panel PapersSecurity of Posts Abroad (other than
European)Departmental Security Training Officer
(excluding Security Guard Training
Courses)Personnel Security Clearances (in absence
of Head of Section)

A.O.3 (Mr. Agnes) (NEW POSITION)

Local Security Officer (inspections
of Ottawa premises, local regula-
tions and procedures, etc.)Control and supervision of local
security guards and commissionaires(9)
Duties and responsibilities of security
guards abroad

Security Guard Training Courses

Security of International and special
conferences in Canada

Security Guards (5)

Commissionaires (4)

T.O. 3 (Mr. Keyes)

Testing, repair maintenance of locks,
keys; alarms, and security containers
Advice and instructions to posts on
above (through appropriate officer)Supply and records of security equip-
ment (tools, locks, keys, containers,
alarms, despatch cases, etc.)Liaison with RCMP Crime Detection
Lab and manufacturers of security
equipmentMaintenance of Chancery plans, security
chronical sheets, etc.Technical training of security guards
(with A.O.3)

Miss 2 (Miss Tilsley)

Correspondence, etc.

for head and deputy
head

Typist (vacant)

Correspondence and reports,
etc. for A.O.3

Clerk 2 (Mrs. Harwood)

Personnel Security Records and
correspondence (including COSMIC
and other special clearances and
indoctrination (departmental and
non departmental))

Clerk 3 (Mr. Reid)

Records of combination changes and set-
tings; maintenance of sectional records
on behalf of A.O.3 and T.O.3; building
pass cards; requisitioning of office
supplies, forms, etc.; keeping of divi-
sional inventories of furniture and
office equipment; general office duties

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SECURITY SECTION

DEFENCE LIAISON (2) DIVISION

HEAD OF SECTION

A. O. 7: (Mr. Timmerman)

Regional Security Officer (London)

A. O. 8: (Mr. MacNeil)

(Responsible for European Posts under direction of Head of Section)

Superintendent (Mr. Parker)

Departmental Security Officer

Departmental Member, Security Sub-Panel

Departmental security policy (security regulations and instructions)

Personnel Security (policy, clearances and cases - liaison with

Security Intelligence Section)

Communications Security (messenger, courier and mail) (with Communi-

cations and Administrative Services Divisions)

International Security Treaties and Agreements

Counter measures against intrusion

Security of European Posts (through R.S.O., London)

P.S.O. 3 (Mr. Agnes)

Deputy Head of Section

NATO Security Regulations & Procedures

NATO Security Committee

Preparation of Security Panel and Sub-

Panel Papers

Security of Posts Abroad (other than

European)

Departmental Security Training Officer

(including Security Guard Training

Courses)

Personnel Security clearances (in absence

of Head of Section)

A.O. 3 (Mr. Agnes) (NEW POSITION)

Local Security Officer (Inspections

of Ottawa premises, local regula-

tions and procedures, etc.)

Control and supervision of local

security guards and commissionaires (9)

Duties and responsibilities of security

guards abroad

Security Guard Training Courses

Security of International and special

conferences in Canada

Security Guards (5)

Commissionaires (4)

T.O. 3 (Mr. Keyes)

Testing, repair maintenance of locks,

keys, alarms, and security containers

Advice and instructions to posts on

above (through appropriate officer)

Supply and records of security equip-

ment (tools, locks, keys, containers,

alarms, despatch cases, etc.)

Liaison with RCMP Crime Detection

Lab and manufacturers of security

equipment

Maintenance of Chancery plans, security

chronical sheets, etc.

Technical training of security guards

(with A.O. 3)

Steno 2 (Miss Silsby)

Correspondence and reports,

A.O. 3 and T.O. 3

Clerk 2 (Mrs. Harwood)

Personnel Security Records and

correspondence including COSMIC

and other special clearances and

endorsements

Clerk 3 (Mr. Reid)

Records of commissionaires and

other personnel records

and other special clearances and

endorsements

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