

Annex to the Minutes of the 28th Meeting of the
Security Sub-Panel Held on July 8th, 1958,
Item III, paragraph 9.

(a) "A" met and became involved with a homosexual group in an iron curtain country. The Russian Intelligence Service became aware of this and lured "A" to a hotel room where he was surreptitiously photographed with his male companion in flagrante delicto. He was later threatened with exposure if he did not cooperate. Two days later he reported the facts to his Ambassador.

It is significant that, although "A" was sensible enough to acquaint his Ambassador with what had happened and subsequently to inform the Departmental Security Officer without reservation on this RIS operation, he still lives in perpetual fear that his parents will become aware that he is a homosexual. He is, therefore, still open to blackmail and in our opinion must be regarded as unreliable from a security point of view.

(b) "B" whilst serving abroad became involved with a number of non-Canadian homosexuals stationed in the same city in the foreign service of their country.

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On being questioned "B" admitted being aware that the people concerned were homosexuals, that he had become very friendly with them, that various of them both singly and in groups had stayed at his house overnight and had lived there for days at a time on various occasions, and that he had sometimes shared his bed with one or other of them. He refused, however, to admit that he had indulged in homosexual practices or was homosexually inclined.

"B" had ambitions eventually to engage in business for himself and to become active in politics in Canada. He was greatly concerned about the damaging effect this case might have on his career in the Department, his reputation and his plans for the future. He was therefore unwilling to resign and stoutly maintained that despite the very strong evidence against him, he was innocent of wrongdoing.

"B" was not, so far as we are aware, ever approached by the RIS. He is convinced, however, that his telephone line was tapped. Someone also attempted surreptitiously to break into his house very late one night while he and a male friend were in it asleep. The intruder fled when discovery threatened.

It is possible that if "B"'s telephone line was tapped that this and the attempt to gain access to his house was part of an intelligence operation with the object of securing evidence which might be used to bring pressure to bear on "B". On the other hand the intruder may have been another homosexual who was upset at the thought of his "friend" staying with "B" for the night. Emotional and unbalanced as these people often are, we should perhaps consider ourselves fortunate that this incident did not culminate in an assault or even murder with all its attendant unpleasant publicity.

(c) This case involved, not homosexual but, extra-marital relations. Photographs (infra red) were taken surreptitiously. When a threat of exposure failed to compel cooperation, what is known as a "spoiling operation" was carried out. This consisted of sending prints to relatives, colleagues and others so that it might be known in future that a threat to expose upon failure to cooperate is not an idle one.

It is thus evident that the RIS and the satellite intelligence organizations which understudy it have every intention of continuing to exploit character weaknesses in this and other ways whenever possible.

(d)



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