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SECRET

SECURITY SERVICE
'A' OPERATIONS

IT IS INTENDED THAT THE ATTACHMENTS,
TOGETHER WITH THE CLASS EXERCISES WILL
GIVE YOU A GREATER INSIGHT INTO THE
GOALS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF 'A'
OPERATIONS - THE LARGEST PUBLIC
RELATIONS ARM OF THE SECURITY SERVICE.

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SECRET

**SERVICE DE SÉCURITÉ
OPÉRATION "A"**

**CES ANNEXES ET LES EXERCICES
PRÉVUS AU COURS SONT TRANSMIS DANS
LE BUT DE DONNER UN MEILLEUR APERÇU
DE LA RAISON D'ÊTRE ET DES RES-
PONSABILITÉS DE L'OPÉRATION "A" -
L'INTERMÉDIAIRE PRINCIPAL DES
RELATIONS EXTÉRIEURES DU SERVICE DE
SÉCURITÉ.**

**(NOUS N'AVONS PAS ACTUELLEMENT LE PERSONNEL
POUR TRADUIRE CE DOCUMENT. UNE VERSION
FRANÇAISE SERA PUBLIÉE À UNE DATE ULTÉRIEURE)**

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SECURITY SERVICE
"A" OPS

The contents are designed to serve as a record of basic data which should be known to personnel employed not only in "A" Ops duties, but all Security Service personnel.

Appendix "A" outlines the main portions of the 1974/75 - 1978/79 Objectives and Goals for Personnel Security and should be mandatory reading for members employed on this activity, so that field and "HQ" personnel can tailor their responsibilities to meet the specific goals and overall objective.

Appendix "B" is a catch-all paper outlining some of those areas where lack of "A" Ops requirements has resulted in unnecessary correspondence and wasted manhours. Also included are some of the basic criteria to refresh your memory.

On occasion, questions arise as to the legality of our conducting enquiries and interviews in the personnel security field, and to this end the attachments may assist you.

NB: We should always remember that there is no legal responsibility for anyone to answer our enquiries and a tactful retreat is usually more beneficial than a confrontation on this issue.

The authorities quoted for Citizenship interviews with the applicant are not specifically covered under the Act, and the information provided for your benefit is only supporting evidence for ENQUIRY about the individual and does not specifically cover an INTERVIEW. (Appendixes C & D).

Interviews of the applicant himself or his relatives in Government screening cases is covered in Operational Manual - CPA - para. 3.

Appendix "F" should be read with interest as it portrays the new re-alignment and changes of committees on Security and on Intelligence.

OBJECTIVE:

In compliance with Government Directives, to enable the Canadian Government to be in a position at all times to know those employees and applicants who pose an existing or potential security risk in order to take preventative or protective action.

GOALS

- to stimulate and provide input into a more viable, workable Cabinet Directive dealing with personnel security.
- in conjunction with Training Branch, to assist other departments in their Internal Security programs by providing input and lecture assistance.
- Develop the capability for handling a more sophisticated product in the Separatist/Terrorist milieu.
- Create a more relevant capability through statistical review to measure our effectiveness vis-a-vis customer departments.

In line with our current goals, it is necessary that investigators remain alert to social changes and values as they might affect the opinions of persons being interviewed.

It is imperative that opinions expressed should be qualified by some facts in order that a qualified assessment can be made of that information. We must be on the alert to ensure that a bias does not exist between the source and the subject, which would allow the former to falsely defame our applicant.

Investigators should not accept generalizations when adverse information is supplied. It is realized that the source will try to generalize by using phrases 'he drinks to excess', 'he is in debt', 'he runs around', and therefore it is incumbent on the investigator to press for details. 'He drinks to excess' when supplied by a 60 year old member of the Women's Christian Temperance Union, could mean the subject consumes a six-pack once a month. Further facts are an essential requirement when the source provides opinions or generalizations.

All Security Service investigations and reporting should pay close attention to ensuring that all available biographical data is obtained FROM THE SOURCES. Certainly such information is not always available to the source, but subsequent debriefings should bear the need for identifying data in mind. As the source becomes more involved within an organization, more bio-data should become available which should be reported. All the sophisticated reporting in the world will mean nothing if it does NOT apply to the person or his relatives under security screening scrutiny. Attachment "E" demonstrates quite clearly what happens when a source is not asked for bio-data in the first instance and the investigator assumes that he and the source are on the same wave length when discussing a particular subject during future debriefings. ("E" is a true case with only the source changed - there is usually one similar case a year). (See "I" Directorate Policy Instructions - CORR - para. 14(d) and 20(d) and IP 8-3-Q-13; (IP-371-28) d. 9 September 1968).

(IP 290-11
d. 8-11-73)

There has been some controversy in different Divisions over the Investigators' Comments portion of reports. Headquarters welcomes such comments if they provide further insight into the case under review. A re-hash of the 'INFORMATION' portion is neither warranted nor desirable, but if the investigator has extraordinary comment on the motives or reliability of a source in providing the information, it should be included. Further use of this section of the report may be when the investigator gets a 'sixth sense' about the whole enquiry, which cannot be factually supported, but circumstantially is plausible.

The use of photographs is many times overlooked as a means of identification. HOWEVER, the investigator must always bear in mind, when using this method, that such photos must be identified to the subject of the security screening or his relatives. It is not sufficient for the source to confirm that the photo is that of the person on whom he has reported in the past. If he can not supply some bio-data that marries up with the Personal History Form (P.H.F.), then there is NO identification. If no suitable bio-data is received, then the investigator should contact the person listed at the address on the Personal History Form and determine if the photo pertains to that person.

Although an isolated problem, there are occasions where Divisions misinterpret security screening standards and conduct field enquiries when all that is requested is a clarification of certain traces. It might be appropriate to review the basic criteria for clearances and those factors which may render a candidate unsuitable to hold a clearance:

S.A. (Special Activity) - a field investigation covering the last 20 years; a check of subversive records and a fingerprint check.

Top Secret

- the same as S.A. except
a field for only the
last 10 years.

Secret &
Confidential

- a check of subversive and
fingerprint records.

(refer to Operational Manual CHA - para. 1 for
additional information)

Cabinet Directive #35 covers in specific terms
those characteristics which should prohibit an
individual from entering the public service. In
broad terms such prohibition should apply when

- (1) it is determined that the candidate's
loyalties are diluted by loyalties to a
communist, fascist or other legal or
illegal organization whose purpose is
inimical to Canada's national security
interests; or
- (2) it has been determined that the candidate
may be influenced by persons described
above to act in a manner prejudicial to
Canada's national security interests; or
- (3) it has been determined the candidate has
defects in his character which may render
him unreliable on account of his vulner-
ability to blackmail or coercion.

A continuing problem raised at courses by field
personnel employed on "A" Ops work is the
need for a photograph of the subject to accom-
pany the Personal History Form. We realize that
untold benefits would accrue, particularly in the
urban area, from implementation of such a
procedure. However, you will appreciate that it is
not the sole prerogative of the Security Service
to put this into effect. We have put forward
this idea to other levels of jurisdiction but
with little response. Individual discussions
with Departmental Security Officers (DSO) at
recently held D.S.O. courses indicates some
sympathy with our view. We hope to introduce
the photograph aspect again during the current
re-examination now underway on Cabinet Directive
#35.

GOVERNMENT SCREENING

N.C.E.P. Act
Sec. 21

Sec. 21

- (1) The Governor-in-Council may make regulations for the organization, training, discipline, efficiency, administration and good government of the Force and generally for carrying the purposes and provisions of this Act into effect.
- (2) Subject to the provisions of this Act and the regulations made under sub-section (1), the Commissioner may make rules, to be known as standing orders, for the organization, training, discipline, efficiency, administration and good government of the Force.

R.O. 1364

The D.D.G., Security Service is responsible for the direction and correlation of activities in respect to counter-espionage and subversive activities against the State, for security investigations regarding personnel employed by the Government and others as required, for co-operation with Commonwealth countries and foreign nations in matters concerning the internal security of the State, co-operation with the internal intelligence organizations, both service and civilian, and for the direction of security and intelligence investigations generally.

Cabinet Directive
#35

para. 10

"Information about persons who are being considered for access to classified information must be obtained at least from the persons themselves (P.H.F.), from referees named by the persons, and from investigations conducted by authorized investigative agencies.....".

"

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".....and do not limit in any way the right of the Armed Forces to conduct field checks, through their own resources, of personnel employed with or on behalf of the Department of National Defence".

(This is D.N.D. authority to do field enquiries in security screening)

Personal History Form

- note instructions at top of form, particularly item 2, which tells applicant that investigation may be made. (University campuses now accept this signed PHF as authority to release information).

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APPENDIX "D"

CITIZENSHIP

(IP 371-24
d. 21-8-72)

The criteria for the consideration of Applications for Citizenship has recently been revised to emphasize that the applicant must be considered a "Threat to the Security of the State" before a rejection will be considered. As such, membership alone in a Communist, Trotskyist, etc., organization is not considered sufficient grounds for rejection as the applicant must be shown to present a "Threat to the Security of the State". As a result, a number of applications that would have previously been referred to the field for Citizenship Interviews are now cleared at Headquarters and the number of interviews required will be considerably reduced. However, as some interviews will still have to be conducted the information on the following pages covers the authority for these interviews.

CITIZENSHIPCitizenship
Interviews(IP 371-24
d. 28-3-72)(G517-14
d. 19-5-70)

No written authority per se exists, however, 19 May 1970 letter outlines our responsibility under Section 10 of the Citizenship Act. Each case should be judged on its merits. If you don't wish to interview, then don't. If applicant refuses interview, a polite withdrawal should be executed.

(IP 371-24 ; 28-3-72) (G517-14; 19-5-70).

Criminal Code

Sec. 59

- (1) Everyone who, while in or out of Canada, 1968-69, c38, S.S.
 - (a) uses a certificate of citizenship or a certificate of naturalization for a fraudulent purpose; or
 - (b) being a person to whom a certificate, if a citizenship or a certificate of naturalization has been granted, knowingly parts with the possession of that certificate with intent that it should be used for a fraudulent purpose,

is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for two years.
- (2) In this section, "certificate of citizenship" and "certificate of naturalization", respectively, means a certificate of citizenship and certificate of naturalization as defined by the Canadian Citizenship Act.

Canadian Citizenship Act

Sec. 41 A person who

- (a) for any purposes of this Act, knowingly makes any false representation or any statement false in a material particular;
- (b) obtains or uses another person's certificate of citizenship or certificate of naturalization in order to personate that other person;
- (c) knowingly permits his certificate of citizenship or certificate of naturalization to be used to personate himself; or

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- (d) traffics in certificates of citizenship or has in his possession a certificate of citizenship for the purpose of trafficking,

is guilty of an offence and is liable on summary conviction in respect of each offence to a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months or to both fine and imprisonment.

Sec. 10 (1)

The Minister may, in his discretion, grant a certificate of citizenship to any person who is not a Canadian citizen and who makes application for that purpose and satisfies the Court that,

- (d) he is of good character and not under order of deportation.

R.C.M.P. Act

Sec. 18

It is the duty of members of the Force who are peace officers, subject to the orders of the Commissioner

- (a) to perform all duties that are assigned to peace officers in relation to the preservation of the peace, the prevention of crime, and of offences against the laws of Canada and the laws in force in any province in which they may be employed, and the apprehension of criminals and offenders and others who may be lawfully taken into custody.

O-C-517-5
G-517-14

May 19, 1970

URGENT - BY HAND

Mr. D. R. Christie,
Assistant Deputy Attorney General,
Room 452, Justice Building,
OTTAWA 5, Ontario.

Dear Mr. Christie:

In referring to our telephone conversation of April 30th, last, I deeply regret the delay in making this formal reply. The questions you asked were relative to a letter received by the Minister of Justice from Mr. James A. Renwick, M.P.P. (Riverdale). I understood you to indicate that Mr. Renwick was making the same enquiry of our Commanding Officer in Toronto. We have now received correspondence from that point indicating Mr. Renwick's letter was "for information purposes only". Consequently, we have judged a reply unnecessary.

2. To answer your specific questions in relation to that letter, we would say:

"Applicants for Canadian citizenship are not, as a matter of routine, questioned by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. However, they may be questioned in relation to a violation of Section 41 of the Citizenship Act or Section 59 of the Criminal Code. Further, where a question has arisen respecting the legality of citizenship already granted, the Registrar of Citizenship may request this Force to make enquiries. Routine examples are: substitution of identity, concealment of a criminal record, and lack of sufficient domicile.

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Section 10(1)(d) of the Citizenship Act requires applicants to be of good character. In order to satisfy this requirement, on occasion interviews are necessary to clarify certain aspects of the applicant's background. Although there is no specific statutory authority for conducting any of the above enquiries, Section 18(a) of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act acts out, in general form, the legal obligations which rest on the force".

3. In addition to the foregoing, you may find useful, a reference to the Report of the Royal Commission on Security; in particular, Para. 146, which reads:

"The grant of Canadian citizenship is a prerogative of the Crown, exercised in practice by the minister responsible for the administration of the Canadian Citizenship Act (R.S.C. 1952, c.33), at present the Secretary of State. Citizenship may be awarded to individuals who comply with certain administrative and residential qualifications, but may be withheld by the minister in the public interest."

4. Again, in regretting the tardiness here, I trust this information will assist you in making a proper reply for the Minister.

Yours truly,

J. V. Cain, S/Insp.,
Officer in Charge,
Legal Branch.

JVC:MCS

CASE HISTORY OF: Nick BUZINSKI
 Moose Jaw, Saskatchewan
 (Mistaken Identity)

1. Source [redacted] began reporting [redacted] on a Nick BUZINSKI -
 Re: Attending AUUC socials until 1959 and from 1959
 until 1966 AUUC and WEA socials and AUUC supporter.
2. First annual report submitted - 17-5-60 - Investigator
 (1) reports BUZINSKI pensioned from CPR and continues
 to reside at 440 Iroquois, Moose Jaw, Saskatchewan.
3. Second annual report - 3-7-61 - Investigator (2) -
 BUZINSKI, resides at 440 Iroquois.
4. Third annual report - 12-7-63 - Investigator (3) -
 BUZINSKI resides at 440 Iroquois, wife named Lily.
5. Fourth annual report, 18-11-64 - Investigator (4) -
 BUZINSKI resides at 440 Iroquois.
6. Fifth annual report (14-4-66) - Investigator (5) approaches
 source - Source [redacted] advises that:
 - (1) BUZINSKI has resided at 525 Ominica and
 to source's knowledge had never resided
 at 440 Iroquois.
 - (2) BUZINSKI is not married.

NOTE 14-4-66 (paragraph 6)
 Enquiries conducted at CPR Moose Jaw reflect that:

- (1) Three Nick BUZINSKIs employed by CPR. —
- (2) All three were pensioned and all three
 were born in 1897.
- (3) The Nick BUZINSKI who resides on
 Ominica Street was never employed by
 CPR.

During period 1952 to 1965 had we received a
 Personal History Form on a Nick BUZINSKI, 525 Ominica,
 not married he would have been cleared.

S E C R E TCANADIAN GOVERNMENT
- SECURITY COMMUNITY -

A 1972 re-organization of the structure of the security community has resulted in the elimination of the previous Security Panel and Security Sub-Panel. The attached diagram illustrates basically the new configuration.

- (a) The Interdepartmental Committee on Security and Intelligence replaces the Security Panel. The R.C.M.P. representative is the Commissioner. Its function is to keep under review Canadian security and intelligence organization activities.
- (b) In place of the Security Sub-Panel and the Joint Intelligence Committee, two new separate committees have been created to deal with 'Security' and 'Intelligence' and our representative on both committees is the Director General Security Service. The Security Advisory Committee's function is to provide co-ordinated advice on security policy to the Interdepartmental Committee and to assist Departments on security matters.
- (c) The Security and Intelligence Secretariat, a unit of the Privy Council Office, is to serve secretarially the above Committees and handle normal problems of departmental security officers.
- (d) Departmental Security Officers are responsible for their own departmental physical and personnel security, for which the Security Service is their investigative agency. This excludes the Department of National Defence who are the other investigative agency.
- (e) The R.C.M.P. is the repository of subversive and criminal information and acts as an investigative agency.
- (f) Police and Security Planning and Analysis Branch analyze and advise the Solicitor General on the threat to the country from criminal and subversive elements. (The functions of this group are presently under review).

HOMOSEXUALITY

One of the most difficult as well as distasteful aspects of our investigations is the field of homosexuality. To begin with, up until recently, we had very little factual knowledge about that particular character weakness. At best, most of us and the public at large look upon the homosexual as merely a second class citizen, along the same lines as mental illness or alcoholism. As uniformed members in the field we had very little contact with homosexuals and when we did, it was disposed of as 'indecent acts' or 'indecent exposure'.

As members of Canada's Security Service, we are interested in homosexuals because of the effect they have in regard to Government security. They are in constant danger of being exploited because of their character weakness and it is our responsibility to minimize this danger. Blackmail has been utilized on more than one occasion to commit espionage, and homosexuals in classified government positions are prime targets. Obviously then, to properly discharge our security responsibilities, we must identify these persons wherever they are in the public service, and maintain files and conduct enquiries to identify homosexuals that may apply for classified positions.

Unfortunately, due chiefly to society's changing attitude toward sexual deviates, valuable information is often overlooked by our investigators, simply because they are not aware of its value. Information suitable for court purposes is not required for our operations dealing with Government security. Often nebulous bits of information, when related to a person's daily life, are enough to provide reasonable grounds to deny a security clearance. In view of the importance of this aspect of our security screening process and our members' lack of awareness of the problem, the following paragraphs are offered to aid investigators to recognize potential sources in this field.

Homosexuality and other character weaknesses such as alcoholism, promiscuity, and just plain greed have not been the subject of special attention until an incident occurred in 1958. A member of the Canadian Embassy in Moscow was compromised by the Russian Intelligence Service by means of a series of photographs depicting a homosexual act. The Canadian and a Russian native were involved and a proposition by the R.I.S. naturally followed. The Canadian was advised to supply certain classified material from Embassy files or face the embarrassment of having his friends and relatives supplied with copies of the photographs. Unfortunately for

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the R.I.S., and fortunately for Canada, the individual concerned had the courage to bring the entire matter before his superiors. He was returned to Canada, and upon arrival was subjected to several interrogations by Security and Intelligence investigators. In his confession he related a life history of homosexuality. Times, dates and the identity of other participants were provided.

As a result of this interview, the Government Security Panel undertook a review of our Security Screening program. The immediate effect on Security and Intelligence operations was the formation of A-3 Section, created solely to deal with character weaknesses and especially homosexuality. Over the years, by careful and patient work, members of this section have recruited several homosexuals as casual sources. The co-operation of these people was difficult to obtain, basically because of their natural apprehension with regard to police.

Naturally, the best sources of information concerning homosexuals are homosexuals themselves. A-3 currently interviews people who have been identified over a period of time as known homosexuals or having associated with known homosexuals. Potential sources are usually selected on the basis of a review of data accumulated on them in Security and

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Intelligence indices. When it is felt that enough data has been obtained to indicate that the person is in fact a homosexual and that he may be receptive to an interview, consideration is given to making an approach.

The subject's co-operation is sought on the basis of loyalty to Canada and he is reminded of some of the more recent international scandals involving homosexuals. No pressure or coercion is used and the individual is assured that any information given will be kept in strict confidence. Because most homosexuals suffer from some form of persecution complex, it is difficult to convince them that our assurance is genuine. Once our subject's confidence has been gained, his own natural compulsion to talk takes over and a wealth of information is obtained. Further, he will compare notes extensively amongst fellow homosexuals, and therefore one such person usually has a broad knowledge of the local homosexual community. Over the years they have learned that they may rely on our assurances of confidence.

During the initial interview and after all the bonafides have been established, the subject should be encouraged to discuss his earliest recollections of sexual activities. After recounting the circumstances under which he was 'brought out' or initiated into the homosexual world, the subject

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should be asked to provide as much detail as possible concerning his past life as a homosexual. If the individual is reinterviewed after a lapse of a few days or a week he is likely to be able to recall a large amount of additional detail.

The investigator must also take steps to ensure that the information being provided is genuine. This may be accomplished by comparing details such as physical descriptions and dates and places with similar information supplied by other homosexuals, or information available through other channels.

Photographs are the best means of positive identification and should be obtained wherever possible. Photo albums are maintained at both "A" Division A-3 Section and at this Headquarters. Because of the danger of a homosexual source recognizing the photo of a person they did not previously realize as being 'gay', the album should not be shown to such a source until there is a reasonable chance that it will be treated as confidential. If the suspect has admitted his own homosexuality, and has provided a reasonably accurate account of his past experiences, he can probably be trusted. It is, therefore, a good practice to leave the album for use in the last phase of contact with the subject.

Before proceeding to interview a homosexual, the investigator should be well prepared. The investigator should study all the available information concerning the suspect's family, residence, work history, associates, places frequented, as well as any homosexual evidence. During the interview, the investigators must maintain a policy of complete honesty, making no effort to conceal the reasons for interviewing homosexuals. Government security is our sole interest and personal viewpoint concerning homosexuality should not be expressed. These people have been found to be a very sensitive group and are constantly on the lookout for signs of hostility from the authorities.

During the interview the investigator can expect the homosexual to protest that the recent Criminal Code amendments have legalized homosexuality; therefore, the police should not be concerned with this subject. It is our contention that the prime security threat arises out of the social stigma attached to this character weakness.

With the exception of the few very co-operative homosexuals, who are in a position to provide current information on a fairly regular basis, all contact should be severed when all aspects of the debriefing have been completed. Operational requirements may necessitate an occasional reinterview, though these should be very limited.

Though, under the present terms of reference which limit the active investigation of homosexuals to the Ottawa area, there are certain aspects of homosexual behaviour or physical attributes which should be known to all our members. Unless these attributes are present, it is virtually impossible for the average layman, including members of the Force, to recognize a homosexual for what he is. The usual concept of a homosexual includes an effeminate male or masculine female, a high-pitched voice in the male and lower voice in the female. In fact, most recent references indicate that possibly 4% of the homosexual population are physically obvious as such. Despite this, it has been found that most homosexuals have the ability to instinctively recognize fellow homosexuals, mostly by appearance and mannerisms.

These people usually seek out the companionship of other homosexuals for social activity as well as sexual necessity. As a result of interviews, it has been learned that they consider the normal person's choice of interests dull by their standards, lacking daring and imagination in both employment and social undertakings. Homosexuals are often very artistic and culturally sensitive people, taking employment as actors, designers and hairdressers.

These characteristics are also influenced by the homosexual's financial status. The affluent ones are able to conduct their affairs in greater secrecy and are able to attract partners with gifts. An example of the use of money and position is the involvement of a homosexual employee of a Montreal travel agency who used company funds to visit his boyfriend in Vancouver. The homosexuals' tendency to gather their associates around them presents a serious problem to us. It is not unusual for a highly placed deviate to recruit and promote fellow homosexuals into positions of influence in Government Departments.

The following are a few suggested tips to assist investigators during an interview with homosexuals:

- (a) Be absolutely sure you are contacting the correct person.
- (b) Do not hesitate to identify yourself and accompanying member.
- (c) Justify your visit with a brief resume of Canada's security commitment, and the use of character weaknesses of Soviet Bloc Intelligence in the gathering of information. Homosexuality should now be introduced.

- (d) Stipulate that information gathered by S. & I. investigations such as this will not be used in criminal prosecutions. Prove this by mentioning that the official warning was not given and the subject will not be asked to sign a statement.
- (e) Stress our role as an information gathering agency dependent on the co-operation of loyal citizens. Also explain that the granting or refusing of security clearances is done by Departmental Security Officers and we play no active part in these matters.
- (f) Assure the subject that his/her identification as a source of our information will remain confidential within our Department.
- (g) Advise the subject that the interview is based on the belief that he is in a position to provide information on homosexuality in relation to Government security.
- (h) Avoid any display of personal animosity toward homosexuality.

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- (i) Don't be taken in by explanation that the subject is not a homosexual because he is bisexual or because he is not the aggressive.
- (j) Be honest and treat the interview in a serious light.
- (k) Make every effort to conclude every interview on a friendly note, even if there is no co-operation.

In addition to the above, the normal rules of conducting interviews of file subjects generally apply. One of the main ingredients, of course, is good salesmanship and a lot of patience. These are a few of the principles that A-3 operations are based on and should prove helpful to other investigators.