

*Delivered to  
Supt. Kelly  
15/8/61*

TOP SECRET

G 355-9-1-15

MEMORANDUM TO:

The Senior Training Officer.

Attached is a copy of a paper prepared on the security risk presented by homosexuals which we have forwarded to all Divisions.

2. Because persons with this particular character defect do make application for engagement in the Force, you may wish to make the contents of this paper available to certain selected personnel in your Branch. However, we would request that the security classification of the paper and its contents be protected and that dissemination be on a "need-to-know" basis.

*b*  
Supt.,

(W. H. Kelly),  
Assistant D. S. I.,  
for D.S.I., O.D.S.

OTTAWA,  
15/8/61.

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21-8-61

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**ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE**  
TRANSIT SLIP FOR HEADQUARTERS USE

To Cpl. G. S. Blake  
To Sgt. W. W. Anderson

Date Sept 1965  
From Sgt. W. W. Anderson  
From Cpl. G. S. Blake

(For reply - if required)

For comment.....  
For perusal -  
    no action required.....  
For examination  
    and action.....  
Prepare reply.....  
Prepare brief.....

To see sender.....  
Have new file(s) made.....  
Return with current file.....  
Have records checked.....  
For instructions.....

Remarks:

The attached paper is for your  
convenience only, because of your responsibilities  
in screening employees & applicants.  
Please protect the paper and its  
contents.

Reply (if required):

W.B. Please return the paper to G.S.B.  
after you have read.  
Read with interest  
W.B.

Sept 1965  
W.B.

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G 355-9-1-15

August 9, 1961

TOP SECRET

TO: The Officers Commanding,  
RCMP - "A", "B", "C", "D", "E",  
"F", "G", "H", "J", "K", "L", "O" and  
The Officers i/c S.I.B.,  
RCMP - "E" & "O" Divisions,  
VANCOUVER, B.C. & TORONTO, Ontario.

The attached paper has reference  
to Item #71 in the minutes of the S. & I.  
Conference held at this "H.Q." in February, 1961.

2. It is felt that this paper may  
provide the investigators engaged on character  
enquiries with some insight into the security and  
investigative problems presented by the homosexual,  
thereby making them particularly conscious of  
this type of character weakness.

3. The dissemination of and discussion  
on this paper must be on a strict "need-to-know"  
basis.

*[Signature]*  
Supt.,  
(W.H. Kelly),  
Assistant D.S.I.,  
for D.S.I. O.D.S.

*[Signature]*  
M(5)  
11-8-b1

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G 355-9-1-15

~~TOP SECRET~~

The purpose of this paper is to set out the security risk presented by homosexuals employed on classified work by the Federal Government and the steps taken by us with a view to reducing the risk.

2. Since the inception of the government security screening programme homosexuality has been recognized as one of the character weaknesses which could be a determining factor in the security status of any applicant or employee. It was toward the discovery of this and other major character weaknesses in persons employed or likely to obtain employment on classified work by the Federal Government that our policies and procedures for security screening enquiries were established. Until 1958 it was generally believed that these enquiries were effective.

3. In 1958 this Force was called upon to investigate a government employee who the Russian Intelligence Service (R.I.S.) had attempted to compromise while he was serving in Moscow. The attempt was based on a threat to expose the employee's homosexual activities. The attempt failed because the employee reported the entire matter to his superior and was returned to Canada. He was subsequently interviewed by this Force and named other homosexuals of his acquaintance. These persons were interviewed and named more homosexuals. Through this cumulative effect our present investigation of homosexuals was commenced.

4. From our own investigations and research in this field and from correspondence with our counterparts [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] we have observed that the security risk presented by the homosexuals with access to classified government information is two-fold. First, they are targets for compromise by Soviet Bloc Intelligence Services (S.B.I.S.); this is a well-documented fact. Secondly, the effect of their aberration on their overall character makes their actions less predictable than those of a normal person. They tend to be indiscreet, emotional, impetuous and garrulous; characteristics which do not instill confidence in their employers. If not compromised directly by the S.B.I.S. they can be blackmailed by someone working for the S.B.I.S. or any other hostile intelligence service.

5. They present another problem which, while principally administrative, has a direct bearing on security. Homosexuals have a marked tendency to gather their own kind around them. The result being that there are often two or more homosexuals working in the same office, branch or

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To all Divs

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section of a Department. Not only does this have an adverse effect on the morale of other employees but the more homosexuals employed in any vulnerable Department the greater the possibility of a security leak.

6. This then is the security risk presented by the homosexual. Here the question may arise: what is a homosexual? The Oxford Universal Dictionary describes "Homosexual" as: "having a sexual propensity for persons of one's own sex". This definition is perhaps too broad for the purposes of security. Our interest is in only those persons who manifest this propensity by engaging in actual sexual acts with persons of the same sex. While there appears to be a number of ways in which two males can engage in a sexual act the three which have come to our attention almost exclusively are (1) oral copulation (fellatio), (2) sodomy (buggery), (3) manual (mutual masturbation). It is in the performance of a homosexual act that the persons involved run the risk of being apprehended, watched or photographed, from which a subsequent compromise attempt may be made. However, this is not to say that we are interested in only those persons on whom evidence can be produced to show they have engaged in a homosexual act. In addition to these, our investigation is designed to identify persons who by their actions, mannerisms and associates are considered to be the type of person likely to engage in such acts.

7. The reasons for isolating the homosexuals as a poor security risk are two-fold. First, we know that the S.B.I.S. are actively engaged in a continual campaign to identify homosexuals from western countries with a view to possible recruitment through threat of exposure. We have numerous examples of their successful and unsuccessful attempts in this regard and we can only speculate that there are other successful cases of which we are not aware. While the S.B.I.S. will attempt to recruit persons through compromise on any type of character weakness they are particularly vigorous in their search for sexual aberrants.

8. Secondly, experience has shown that homosexuality is one of the most difficult character defects to uncover by our current methods of routine character enquiries. This is not a reflection on the ability of the investigators. Whereas the drunkard is usually in no position to conceal his defect, the "Lotharia" is usually the boastful type, and creditors generally identify the person heavily in debt, the homosexual usually takes some pains to keep his proclivity hidden from his ordinary business and social acquaintances. Consequently our sources of information on homosexuals are usually limited to (a) police and court records, which contain the names of only a small fraction of the homosexual population and (b) other homosexuals, who are generally a most productive source.

9. During the past two and half years we have been engaged in a concentrated investigation, mainly in the Ottawa area, to identify all homosexuals employed in or by the Federal Government. In effect our investigation has been the continuation and enlargement of the 1958 investigation of the compromise attempt referred to earlier. The guiding principle of the investigation is that each person named as a homosexual is interviewed to admit or deny the allegation and to identify all homosexuals that he knows. There are two qualifications of this principle at the present time. Because of our interpretation of existing Cabinet directives on security screening procedures we do not interview known or alleged homosexuals employed in the Federal Government service except where the person has access to classified information and is employed in a position where it is considered an attempt to compromise is very likely, as for example, a posting to one of the Soviet bloc countries. Even then we interview only with the permission of the employing Department. Secondly, because the Criminal Code makes provision for the prosecution of homosexuals the government feels that every possible precaution must be taken to keep from the general public the nature of our investigation and the identity of the persons involved. We have maintained an interest only in the Security aspect not for the purpose of prosecution. In general terms our investigation has been restricted to a large extent to the interviewing of homosexuals not employed in or by the government who have agreed to co-operate with us and to certain employees of one particularly sensitive Department who have been interviewed by members of H.Q. "B" Branch.

10. In order that members of the Force who are conducting character enquiries may be aware of some of the difficulties in identifying homosexuals it is felt that a few observations relative to these persons might be of assistance. To begin, there are a number of popular concepts about homosexuals which have been found to be misleading. The first of these is that the homosexual is an effeminate looking person. This is applicable to only a small segment of the homosexual population. From our own experience we have found that the majority of homosexuals cannot be identified from the rest of the community on the basis of appearance. The only qualification to this opinion is that the homosexuals themselves can usually spot one of their own kind through casual observation of another's mannerisms, deportment and appearance. Nevertheless, the investigator should not overlook the fact that there is a good chance that an effeminate looking male is a homosexual.

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11. The second misconception is that homosexuals gravitate to employment in beauty shops, florist shops, clothing stores and as artists and interior decorators. Here again this belief is valid for only a segment of the homosexual community. Experience has shown that the homosexual may be found in any and all types of employment; his intelligence, education and employment preferences are apparently not controlled exclusively by his sexual aberration.

12. A third misconception is that homosexuals lack the virility and courage usually associated with the average, normal male; in effect they are considered "Sissies". This also is only partially correct, it does not apply to all homosexuals. Historically the Theban Band of ancient Greece, and our own current investigations and research have produced evidence to discredit the broad application of this theory.

13. Finally, it is a popular opinion that homosexuals remain bachelors or enter into marriage contracts which eventually end in disaster. This may be a valid argument for some homosexuals, however by taking into account certain hypotheses advanced by psychologists (the bisexual person; the homosexual continuum) together with our own observations in this regard we believe that a person's marital status cannot be used as a reliable means to determine the nature of his sexual propensities.

14. It should be emphasized that the foregoing concepts with which we have dealt are not considered to be false opinions; our concern with them is that they do not cover the homosexual community as a whole. However, any of them may serve to raise a suspicion in the mind of the investigator sufficient to warrant further investigation. Because of our lack of open sources of information at the present time every possible investigative lead should be examined when any such suspicion is raised.

15. The psychology of homosexual behaviour, per se, is beyond the scope of this paper. However, there are two facets thereof which warrant some comment. The first of these is the homosexual's reaction to a compromise attempt through threat of exposure or prosecution. From the cases that have come to our attention we may conclude that the reaction of the homosexual to a recruitment attempt is dependent upon the total character of the individual. Some have succumbed to the threat, others have reported any such attempts to their superiors and the necessary action has been taken to neutralize potentially dangerous situations. The risk presented by the homosexual is therefore one of degree, dependent upon the vigour with which the S.B.I.S. pursue this method of recruitment. In recent years the S.B.I.S. have been particularly active in this field and the more attempts which are made the more chances they have for success.

16. The second facet of the homosexual personality in which we are interested is their apparently innate desire to talk. This is a general character trait applicable to the majority of homosexuals with whom we have had contact. Their inability to keep their own counsel raises the suspicion of a poor security risk in that they are likely to discuss classified matters with persons who should not be so informed. This same character trait makes them generally voluble sources of information on other homosexuals. We have found that the majority of homosexuals whom we have interviewed have been most co-operative, except those who sought legal counsel or were coached by other unco-operative homosexuals.

17. In conducting interviews of homosexuals in the Ottawa area it has been found that a firm but not dictatorial approach to enlist their co-operation is effective. Generally, an explanation of the security risk inherent in this problem is sufficient. Some care must be taken to ensure that the investigator does not express any opinion on the moral or social aspects of homosexuality; our interest is solely one of the security of the state. While this approach has been effective in Ottawa, where the general populace is security conscious, it may prove less effective in other parts of Canada and the investigator will be obliged to adapt his approach to suit the individual.

18. Scientific estimates on the incidence of homosexuality in various western countries vary from one to ten percent of the male population. Although we are in no position to estimate the percentage in Canada our limited investigations to date have shown that the homosexual community is much larger than had been anticipated. Because they represent a sizable minority group and because of the concerted efforts of the S.B.I.S. to recruit this type of person we feel that our investigators should be particularly aware of the probabilities of this character weakness during the course of character enquiries generally.