

30 June, 1959.

1423-1-1

Deputy Minister

Brief for Panel Meeting
2 July, 1959, 11:00 a.m.

I. Soviet Bloc Vessels in the St. Lawrence Seaway

1. This is rather a long document but since it is generally considered to be of importance, it is recommended that you read it.

2. The US are pressing for a joint policy on the inspection of Soviet Bloc vessels in the Seaway. This is an attempt to coordinate Canadian views before a meeting is held.

3. In paragraph 11, page 4, the Panel is asked to make recommendations concerning the extent of the threat and the implementation of procedures to minimize it. This is not properly put, as the extent of the threat has been established by the JIC in a paper submitted to Chiefs to be noted. Copy is attached to the document. The Panel could not entirely recommend as to the implementation of procedures to minimize it as some of the measures are too technical and will be too detailed to discuss at a Panel meeting. However, the Panel might recommend what measures should be taken to search vessels before entering the seaway, presumably at Montreal, provided a legislation exists for the purpose. As this document was received in National Defence at noon on Monday, there has been no opportunity to ascertain whether or not legislation does in fact exist. It is believed, however, that the seaway authority has the right to inspect vessels before entering the seaway in order to see whether they are properly equipped for seaway travel. If this method were used and a proper inspection given to the ship at that time, it might well serve as a deterrent to any vessel introducing nuclear weapons or their components. The nature of the threat could be patterned along the lines of the draft order in council which deals with port security in the event of an emergency, if the Panel wishes to go that far.

4. The second threat is the interception of radio, radar and other electronic emission from the many Canadian and American Defence, Research and Production projects located in the area of the seaway. It is understood that the Cypher Policy Committee are now studying this matter and the Panel may wish to await their report.

5. The third threat is the introduction of espionage agents and saboteurs into North America. This threat has always been with us and RCMP advice on the subject should be supported. If the ship is inspected at Montreal, presumably the police would make a head count and might be able to check on the way out.

II. Immigration Security Policy - Problems in Non-Soviet Countries where Security Investigation Facilities are Limited

6. This is a paper in which we have little or no interest and I doubt you need to read it. It appears to be quite in order and deals with the admissibility of certain classes of citizens from non-Iron Curtain countries where security clearance is normally waived.

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
III. Immigration Security Policy - Review of Present Grounds for Rejection

7. We have very little interest in this document and you may not wish to read it all the way through. However, we question paragraph 6 on page 4 which is failure to produce recognized and acceptable documents as to the time of entry and residence in Germany. They suggest that this point be dropped from the list of the present grounds for rejection. There are quite a few line crossers in West Germany and if this item is dropped it might leave the way open for many undesirable refugees to immigrate to Canada.

IV. Security Cases Involving Character Weaknesses, with Special Reference to the Problem of Homosexuality

8. This is a 14 page document prepared in answer to a Prime Minister's direction to study whether it might be possible to treat cases of character weaknesses differently from those involving ideological beliefs.

9. You may or may not wish to read the document which goes into the subject really more fully than appears to be required. We agree with their conclusions that no changes should be made to our present policy and the Prime Minister so informed. In fact, we have very strong views that the present policy should be unchanged. The paper does not relate the policy within Government service to the policy in industry or business and it is exactly the same. Any character weaknesses in an individual which would affect his duties or make him unsuitable for a position of trust would result in his removal and there is no reason why this should not be our policy also. A good deal is made of the black mail threat in the case of homosexuals and this is certainly true, however, they are quite undesirable on other grounds, particularly on the grounds of public relations. There are very few parents who would encourage their children to go into the Services or Government service if they knew that it was our policy to retain homosexuals and recruiting would suffer accordingly.


(W.A. Todd) Lt-Col.,
Executive Secretary,
Joint Security Committee.