

CHARACTER INVESTIGATIONS

(A) SECURITY SCREENING - APPLICANTS AND EMPLOYEES OF PUBLIC SERVICE

1. In order to appreciate the need for character investigations as a part of security screening, each member should have some background knowledge of this phase of the Force's operations. The Federal Government, by means of a Cabinet Directive, has laid down minimum security requirements respecting applicants for and employees of the Public Service who will have access to Top Secret, Secret or Confidential information. Briefly, the Directive makes completion of a Personal History Form mandatory in all cases and provides for the following specific procedures:

TOP SECRET - A fingerprint check, a subversive indices check and a field investigation.

SECRET - A fingerprint and subversive indices check. If derogatory information is developed during the record check which is not clearly identifiable with the applicant or employee, a background investigation will be conducted to the extent necessary to arrive at a reasonable determination in the case. Additionally, if the authorized representative of the Government department or agency considers that an investigation is necessary to satisfy him as to an applicant's or employee's loyalty, integrity or discretion, he may request that enquiries be made concerning the individual's background by means of a field investigation.

CONFIDENTIAL - A fingerprint and subversive indices check. Provision is made for comparable procedures to the above, with the exception of fingerprinting, to apply to persons employed in defence industry and certain related services.

NOTE:

A request to clarify adverse traces only, should not be interpreted as a request for field investigation.

2. The role of the R.C.M.P. is described in the Cabinet Directive as follows - "The function of an investigating agency is only to provide all available information pertinent to both loyalty and character in the form of evaluated factual reports." However, because of Canada's participation in NATO and close alliance with the United States and the United Kingdom in defence and research, the Force has certain commitments in the security screening field that allow more latitude in the scope of our operations.

3. While it must be assumed that the applicant will be aware that he is subject to screening, neither the person under investigation nor his relatives are to be interviewed except on specific instructions from Headquarters, Ottawa.

4. It should be remembered that the security status of an individual is determined not only by his political reliability but also by his character.

5. Interviews are to be conducted in person, however, under certain circumstances it may be necessary to telephone the intended source for an appointment for a future interview. In such cases the source should not be informed of the identity of the person being screened and if an explanation is unavoidable, it will be sufficient to state that the enquiry relates to a security matter which cannot be discussed by telephone. At the start of an interview with any person for information relating to an applicant or employee, the investigator should first identify himself as a member of the Force and explain frankly that the subject of the enquiry is being considered for a responsible position which may have a bearing on the security of the country. Then he should ask the person to respect the confidential nature of the enquiry. During the interview it is essential that the investigator maintain a serious, mature and businesslike manner. The person being interviewed should also be informed that a routine security enquiry should not be construed as a reflection on the status or character of the applicant or employee. The investigator must always bear in mind, that he is seeking information already in his possession. Questions put to all sources must be carefully phrased to elicit the information required without suggesting to the source that the candidate may be suspect. Every precaution is to be taken to avoid gossip arising from our investigations. These procedures are designed to gain the confidence of the person being interviewed and to minimize the possibility of criticism of the Force.

and that he must not reveal details of any information

6. When it has been determined that the person being interviewed is someone who has a comprehensive knowledge of the background and activities of the subject or his relatives, he should be asked for a frank assessment of their loyalty and character.

7. During security enquiries, the most thorough investigation possible is to be made into the character and background of the applicant or employee and the information obtained is to be reported in such a manner that the interested department may have a factual basis on which to determine his suitability for employment. Such investigation shall be sufficient to determine whether or not the individual is of unquestionable loyalty, integrity and trustworthiness; and of such character, habits and associations as would cast no doubt upon his discretion or good judgement in handling classified information.

8. Reports should be confined, insofar as possible, to facts, and any opinions regarding the suitability of an employee or applicant should be those of the persons interviewed, and not opinions based on hearsay. It is important to distinguish clearly between statements of fact and statements of opinion. When an opinion is expressed, it should be shown as an opinion and the sources' supporting reasons given. An opinion not identified as such is worthless and misleading. Police opinions should be confined to that portion of the report dealing with "Investigator's Comments" and, when necessary, to forwarding minutes.

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9. All character enquiries for security screening are to be carried out in plain clothes, except when specific Headquarters' instructions have been issued.

10. Headquarters is responsible for:

- (a) Accepting screening requests from and replying to Government Departments and agencies;
- (b) Checking Headquarters' subversive indices, and general indices when required;
- (c) Confirming citizenship, when necessary;
- (d) Confirming military service of applicant and relatives;
- (e) Controlling all security screening correspondence with foreign agencies;
- (f) Instituting enquiries to clarify any information, either foreign or domestic, that may have a bearing on the security status of the applicant or employee.

11. Divisions will be responsible for:

- (a) Checking Divisional and local police records on all persons, listed on the Personal History Form, who are residing in the Division;
- (b) Developing any subversive information which comes to light during an investigation;
- (c) Determining the extent and purpose of any connection the applicant or employee has had, either in Canada or abroad, with persons from Communist-dominated areas; (Information will also be sought concerning the purpose for any travel to such areas except in the service of the Government.)
- (d) Conducting neighbourhood enquiries relating to the subject's past and present places of residence;
- (e) Interviewing the present and past employers of the subject as listed on the Personal History Form, giving special attention to performance and reliability; (Remarks as to general conduct while employed and reasons for termination of employment should be obtained. Immediate supervisors or co-workers who might reasonably be expected to have personal knowledge of the individual should be interviewed. If an applicant requests that no approach be made to his present employer, additional care should be taken to determine character and reliability from alternate sources. If a candidate is a member of the Armed Forces it will not be necessary for the investigator to conduct enquiries at military establishments. Although this avenue of enquiry is a Headquarters' responsibility, as specified in para. 10, the instruction is not intended to prohibit the investigator from conducting enquiries at local Armed Forces establishments should such action appear necessary to resolve or supplement information developed during an investigation.)

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- (f) Determining if the subject or his spouse drink to excess or if they are inordinate users of drugs, narcotic or otherwise;
- (g) Determining if there is any illness, mental condition or hereditary weakness of a nature which might cause a significant impairment of the judgement or reliability of the candidate;
- (h) Verifying date and place of birth through available sources;
- (i) Determining if there is any indication of general deviation, particularly homosexuality, on the part of the applicant or spouse; (Sexual deviates are potential targets for blackmail and, as such, poor security risks.)
- (j) Determining if there is any indication of financial instability such as chronic indebtedness; (Habitual failure to honour financial obligations might conceivably constitute a security risk by reason of the individual's vulnerability to coercion or pressures.)
- (k) Determining the degree of influence on the candidate when an adverse trace comes to light on a relative;
- (l) Determining if there are any facts which furnish reason to believe that the candidate or spouse may be subjected to coercion, influence or pressure which may precipitate action contrary to the interest of security;
- (m) Determining, to a satisfactory degree, if the candidate is considered discreet and trustworthy.

12. Enquiries at educational institutions attended by the subject, to verify scholastic attainment and character will only be carried out on instructions from Headquarters. This does not prohibit interviewing former teachers or professors if relevant character information might be expected from such sources.

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